Milchar
April-June 2002 issue
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Decline of the
Kashmiri Identity*
... Anil
Dhar
Even V.S.Naipaul failed to come to grips
with the Kashmiri mind: he (in An area of Darkness) would never really
know, as he prepared to leave the valley after a visit, whether his Kashmiri
attendant - with tears in his eyes - was mourning his departure or hoping
for more baksheesh. It's a risk most Kashmir-watchers incur: to dig a meaning
deeper than what every Kashmiri outburst warrants. There is a gesture that
is peculiar to the Kashmiri: the chin is held within the index finger and
thumb and the word 'ghulam' uttered. This is when you want a favour from
somebody. Naipaul probably observed this and dismissed the Kashmiri Muslim
as one who 'identified with his (Islamic) conquerors', but had no idea
of his pre-Islamic past.
The emergence of a distant Kashmiri identity has been a more recent
phenomenon and its first serious assertion occurred in 1931 when Sheikh
Abdullah led a briefly violent agitation against the Maharaja. This assertion
was distinct from the contemporary 'two nation' agenda that was taking
shape among a few Muslims elsewhere. In fact, Abdullah was quick to drop
'Muslim' in the conference and replace it with 'National'. Kashmiri Pandits
formed an important and vocal section of the National Conference.
The success Jinnah gained in carving out a separate nation-state
for Muslims in British India, however, provided Sheikh Abdullah a muddled
vision of a similar role for himself in Kashmir. After Sheikh's detention
in 1953, the ardor of Kashmiri separatism collapsed; helped, in part, by
rapid reforms that brought land to the Muslim tiller. The sixties and early
seventies were remarkable times here. The Kashmiri Muslim's religious moorings
were tenuous. His daily concerns were more liberal than sacred. More Muslim
children than Hindu, attended DAV Schools in Srinagar - unthinkable in
any other part of India.
The Kashmiri Muslim has, at most times, viewed himself a distinct
from his Pakistani or Indian co-religionist. Significantly, the Kashmiri
Muslim does not claim Afghan, Turkish or Arab descent as Muslims elsewhere
are wont to do. Again, unlike elsewhere in the region, the Hindus and the
Muslims in Kashmir have, until recently lived together. All this had made
Kashmir as safe a place as any other. As late as 1985, only five violence
related details were reported in a year in the entire Srinagar district!
At that time Kashmir separatism was still incipient and New Delhi
saw value in pumping vast sums of money to keep the moderate opinion going.
The corruption and profligacy engineered a new social elite in Kashmir:
PWD engineers, ‘civil’ and forest contractors, bureaucrats and their ‘multiplier
effect’ communities of Sopore apple barons, and Kashmir emporia operators.
Kashmiris love to present the valley as babe in the woods, with hungry
Indian and sometimes Pakistani wolves breathing down its neck. This self-serving
image was reiterated so often that Kashmiris came to believe that they
were indeed the injured party. Even so, the accord Abdullah reached with
Indira Gandhi was perceived as fair, and in 1977 the Kashmiri voted so
in the now generally regarded the state’s last fair polls.
But all this changed with the impact of the Iranian Revolution,
an event that changed the Kashmiri’s self image entirely. Iran, to the
Muslim world, was what France was to Europe in the 19th century, although
the former moved in the direction contrary to the later in the terms of
the libertarian values. The eighties saw the emergence of Islamic, as distinct
from Kashmiri culture. The revolutionary idea that religion alone should
be the basis of the culture and even politics, did not leave the
voter unaffected. The political Kashmiri read developments like the success
of 1979 Islamic Revolution, the rise of the Afghan Resistance in 1980,
the 1983 suicide bombing of US barracks by Lebanese Shiite Hizbollah, the
1987 birth of Palestinian Hamas and the 1989 Soviet retreat from Afghanistan
as a apart of a chain of events that promised a rightful place to Islam
eventually.
The JKLF, which had formed the vanguard of militant strikes in
Kashmir, quickly lost its clout once it sought a secular face to further
its efforts. Today secessionist groups in Kashmir, either outside or within
the Hurriyat, draw inspiration from Islam and its history. The transformation
of the Kashmiri Muslim from a dawdler to a frontline member of the Ummah
has been remarkable both in extent and swiftness. The Kashmiri Pandit was
quick to move out at the first sign of trouble and seek a pan-North Indian
identity in Delhi. Clearly, both the sides of what is now an unambiguous
religious divide are in a hurry to escape from, rather than assert, their
Kashmiri identity.
(* Reproduced from the Indian Express, Mumbai Dated
April 4, 2002.)
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