Chapter 1: Indian
Federalism
The Indian federal polity
grew out of two diametrically divergent processes
which underlined the devolution of authority to the
provinces, in what was known as the British India
before the independence, and the integration of the
Indian States, which had acceded to India in
accordance with the Instruments of Accession. The
Instruments of Accession envisaged the procedure by
virtue of which the Indian States, after the British
withdrawal from India and the lapse of Paramountcy,
exercised the right to accede to the Dominion of
India. The federal organization of India was,
therefore, constituted of the erstwhile Indian
provinces of the British India and the Indian States
which were liberated from the British tutelage after
the British colonial organization came to its end in
1947.
The federalizing process in
India underlined a combination of the devolution of
authority to the provincial governments on the one
hand and the integration of the acceding States on the
other. The Constituent Assembly favored a conditional
devolution of the powers to the provinces. The Rulers
of the States, however, on their part too, approved of
a conditional transfer of authority to the Government
of India. Initially the Rulers of the States acceded
to the Indian Dominion and delegated to the Government
of India, powers mainly related to the foreign
affairs, defense and communications and generally
hoped that the federalization of the States would be
confined to almost the same prescriptive which the
Paramountcy underlined. The Constituent Assembly
proved to be a great leveler and forged the provinces
and the States into an irreversible union in which the
Central Government assumed paramount authority over
the provinces as well as the States. The provinces had
nothing to bargain with, except the plurality of their
population, their culture and their history, which the
Indian leaders, singed by the partition, refused to
accept as the basis of the federal reorganization of
India. The princely States too, did not possess a
coherent personality to resist the federal operatives,
the Constituent Assembly evolved. They were peripheral
salient of the British colonial organization in India
and had never enjoyed any powers except the ceremonial
and the splendor the British allowed them and the
authority they were given to collect revenues in order
that the coffers of the British Government were
adequately filled and they had enough to squander.
The scheme of the division of
powers between the Central Government and the
federating States, which the Constituent Assembly
evolved, envisaged:
- Uniform political status
for all federating units, provinces and the
acceding States, except Jammu and Kashmir;
- Statutory division of
powers between the federal government and the
States;
- Precedence of the
federal government over the federating units in
matters of legislation, administration and
finance;
- Unified national,
judicial structure vested with original
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon disputes between
the States and the Union and exercise power of
review; and
- A single citizenship
with uniform rights and obligation for all the
people of India.
Princely States
The Constituent Assembly of
India, for some time during its deliberations,
recognized the right of the Indian States, many of
which had merged into Unions of the States, to devise
the structural organization of their governments and
their autonomous function. It was accepted that the
States and the Unions of the States would institute
their own Constituent Assemblies to draw up the
constitutions for their Governments.
The State Ministry
constituted a special Committee in November, 1948,
shortly after the draft Constitution of India was
introduced in the Constituent Assembly to lay down
broad guidelines for the Constituent Assemblies of the
States and the Unions of the States in order that the
Constitutions of the States were based upon uniform
principles and the principles did not conflict with
the constitutional organization of the Republic. The
Committee was constituted of two members of the
Constituent Assembly K.M. Munshi and Govinda Menon and
four representatives of the States in the Constituent
Assembly, Ram Sahai from Gwalior, K. Hanumanthaya from
Mysore, R. Sarkar of Travancore and C.C. Shaw of
Saurashtra. B. N. Rao, the Constitutional Advisor to
the Constituent Assembly was appointed the Chairman of
the Committee. The Committee drafted a model
constitution, more or less based upon the provisions
of the Constitution of India envisaged for the
provinces or what the draft constitution named the
part A States, for the State Constituent Assemblies to
adopt However, the process of instituting the
Constituent Assemblies in the States was slow and
except for the Sarurashtra States Union, Travancore-Cochin
and Mysore, Constituent Assemblies of the States were
not convened. The Interim Governments instituted in
the States, faced several problems of integration and
liberalization and the convocation of the Constituent
Assemblies was bound to take a long time.
To overcome these
difficulties the States Ministry convened a conference
of the Premiers of the States and the Unions of the
Stares in Delhi in 1949. The Conference of the
Premiers decided not to wait for the institution of
the Constituent Assemblies in the States and instead
proposed to entrust the task of framing the state
constitutions to the Constituent Assembly of India The
Constituent Assembly of India, it was decided, would
draw up the State Constitutions in consultations with
the States and with the consent of their governments.
The decisions taken by the
Premiers conference bridged the differences, which
were inherent in the plan to have separate Constituent
Assemblies for the States. In one respect the decision
to entrust the task of framing the State Constitutions
to the Constituent Assembly of India, was historic and
revolutionary, for it portended the delegation of the
constitutive powers of the Princes to the Constituent
Assembly which the Rulers had earlier, refused to
accept.
Consequently an Official
Committee was set up in the States Ministry, to
suggest amendments to the provisions of the draft
constitution of India in the light of the agreements
with the States and the recommendations of the
Premiers Conference. The recommendations of the
Committee were submitted to the Drafting Committee of
the Constituent Assembly, which later, drew up the
constitutional provisions for the States. The draft
provisions were then sent to Sarurashtra, Travancore-
Cochin and Mysore, where they were considered by the
respective Constituent Assemblies of these States and
accepted with minor modifications. The draft
constitution was also sent to the other States and the
Unions of the States for their consideration. All the
State Governments accepted the draft provisions,
except the Jammu and Kashmir State. After the States
gave their concurrence, the Drafting Committee moved
necessary amendments to the draft constitution of
India to incorporate in it, the constitutional
provisions with regard to the States. According to
these provisions,
- The States were included
in the First Schedule of the Constitution of
India which defined the territorial jurisdiction
of the Indian Union;
- The constitutional
provisions with regard to the Governor's
provinces, which were renamed as Part A States,
were made applicable to the States which had
merged in the provinces as well as the States
reorganized in the Chief Commissioners provinces
which were renamed as Part C States;
- The constitutional
provisions with regard to the government of the
Part A States, were made applicable to the
States of Hyderabad, Madhya Bharat, Patiala and
East Punjab States Union, Rajasthan, Saurashtra,
Travancore-Cochin and Vindhya Pradesh with
certain modifications and these States were
renamed Part B States;
- The provisions of the
Constitution of India with regard to the
legislative relations between the Union and the
Part A States were made applicable to Part B
States and Part C States;
- The provisions of the
Constitution of India with regard to the
administrative and financial relations between
the Union and the Part A States, were made
applicable to Part B States;
- The Part B States were
placed for a period of ten years, or such period
as the Parliament would by law provide, under
"the general control of the President of
India" and were required to "comply
with such particular directions as the President
would give from time to time"; and
- The remaining provisions
of the Constitution were also made applicable to
Part B and Part C States.
The amendments to the draft
constitution placed all the States within the purview
of the Constitution of India. Whereas the draft
constitution placed the erstwhile Governor's Provinces
of the British India in a special category of Part A
States, the Princely States were classified in two
special categories: Part B States and Part C States.
The heads of the Part B States were redesignated as
Rajpramukhs, and all of them were nominated from
amongst the erstwhile Maharajas and Nawabs. The
Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir and the Nizam of
Hyderabad were also appointed the Rajpramukhs of their
States. Special provisions were included in the drain
constitution for the payment of allowances and other
monies to the Rajpramukhs. Provisions were also
incorporated in the draft constitution by virtue of
which the State armies of the Part B States were
placed under the control of the President of India.
Since it was bound to take some time for the State
troops to be absorbed in the Indian army, control over
the State troops, for the transitional period was
vested with the Rajpramukhs.
The provisions of the
Constitution of India with regard to the States were
sweeping. In many of the States, interim Governments
were instituted, relegating the Princes to the
background; many of whom, had, in case of merger with
the provinces or integration with other States, lost
the initiative they had used during the British rule.
In fact, many of them quickly realized that with the
withdrawal of the British, their power and privileges
were lasted the real powers in the States had passed
to the representative Interim Governments. In most of
the States, the Rulers, turned for inspiration and
support to the States Ministry, and were, therefore,
eager to implement the suggestions made to them by the
latter.
The federalizing process in
India envisaged a political unity, which recognized
the political identity of the States but consolidated
them into integral parts of a political personality,
which expressed the will of their people rather than
the agreements, which the States had executed to join
the Indian Dominion. The founding fathers of the
Indian Constitution did not recognize the States as
subnational identities, nor did they visualize the
division of powers in the Indian federal organization,
between the central government and the federating
units, which represented any ethnic, cultural,
religious or linguistic subnationalities in India.
This could not be possible, because India presented a
highly intricate complex of numerous subnational
identities, which could not be identified with any
political boundaries or administrative limits. The
political boundaries of the Indian provinces and
Princely States, as they had evolved with the British
consolidation in India, overspread ethnic, religious,
cultural and linguistic diversities. The British
recognized the divisions in the Indian people, and
deepened the social, cultural, religious and
linguistic differences which divided them but they did
not link the manifold plurality of the Indian social
culture to the political consolidation of their power
in India. They broke up all political entities, which
represented any subnational identity, the Muslim
potentates, the Marhattas, the Rajputs and the Sikhs
and reorganized them into administrative divisions
which were territorial in character and were inhabited
by people who did not coincide with any ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious limits. The British
followed a policy of consolidation in India, which
dissolved the traditional political boundaries,
identified with ethnic, religious and cultural
conglomerates. The Indian uprising of 1857,
represented a reassertion of the various ethnic,
cultural and religious identities against the
political unification the British had initiated. That
was precisely the reason because of which the uprising
failed; the diversities, which the revolt represented,
could not be forged into a solid front against the
British power.
The British colonialism in
India led to the reorganization of land tenures and
revenue administration; destruction of indigenous
industrial structure, mobility of men and material,
the imperial interests demanded; spread of
communications and the emergence of a mercenary middle
class with vested interests transcending the
conventional commitments of the people in India to
their culture, religion and stock. The Indian
plurality survived but subservient to the political
operatives of the British empire, except in channels
which the British themselves devised like Muslim
communalism, separate electorates, regional segments
etc. The Indian social pluralism did not describe any
political boundaries. The ethnic divisions, religious
commitments, caste gradations and cultural diversities
cut across the political boundaries, the British
described creating innumerable interlocking political
segments. None of the interlocking segments described
uniformity and territorial contiguity. The Sikh Empire
was broken up and the Punjab, the heart of the Sikhs
State, transformed into a Muslim majority province of
the British India. The
Jammu and Kashmir States was
created by the unification of the ethnically,
culturally and linguistically separate regional
identities of Jammu, Kashmir and the frontier
divisions of Ladakh and Baltistan. The Muslims in
India, who laid claim to a subnational identity, did
not form a coherent territorial unity and the Punjab
and Bengal were broken up to separate the Muslim
majority areas into contiguous zones and then united
with Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier
Province and the Sylhet division of the province of
Assam, to form the Muslim nation of Pakistan. About
thirty million of Muslims in India were left out of
the Muslim homeland and more than fifteen million of
Hindus and Sikhs were pushed out of it. Except for
their religious commitments, the Muslims in India did
not form a subnational identity with any defined
content and contours. The founding of the Indian
federation was the culmination of a historical
process, which began with the consolidation of the
British power in India and ended with the creation of
Pakistan.
The founding fathers of the
Indian Constitution inherited a unified political
culture, encompassing vastly diverse subnational
pluralities. The federating process, they evolved,
accepted the territorial and political basis of Indian
unity, the British had assiduously fostered. The
Constituent Assembly at no stage sought to identify
Indian federal divisions with any subnational
diversity. It could not do so because the subnational
diversities did not have any social, territorial or
political description and it was not possible to forge
them into federating units on the basis of their
subnational personality.
The people of India, who
constituted the Union, were recognized as one and an
indivisible nation, with a single citizenship of the
federal union and the States, entitled to the same
rights and obligations, and subject to a uniform
process of law. No people in any state were accorded
separate citizenship and title to any special rights
and privileges. The territorial unity of India was
described within a single jurisdiction. The
territories of the Indian republic were defined by
Article1 of the Constitution of India in its First
Schedule. The boundaries of the federating States were
subject to the territorial jurisdiction of the
republic which was vested with the power to alter the
boundaries of a State, form new federating units by
separating a pert of the territory of a State or parts
of the States or by uniting two or more States or
parts of States and increase or decrease the area of
the States.
State Autonomy
The framers of the Indian
Constitution, did not unite national and subnational
identities into a federal form which they named the
Republic of India, but effected a devolution of
central authority to the Indian provinces, which were
administrative units of a unitary structure of power,
the British had forged to govern India. The accession
of the Princely States to the Dominion of India was
also, not only a part of their integration into the
Indian federal republic but a part of the historical
process of the Indian unification which began with the
partition and ended with the merger of the States in
the Indian Dominion. The Princely States, were, like
the provinces, administrative organizations, the
British had forged to govern the Princely India. The
Treaties between the Princely States and the British,
the Sanads which were bestowed on the Princes spread
into the vast sweep of Paramountancy, but did not
accord the Princely States any political independence.
When the Paramountcy ended the States were shorn of
the recognition they had assumed under the British and
emerged as territorial jurisdictions which were
subject to the imperatives of Indian unity and not
independent of it. The British refused to recognize
their independence and allow them to enter the British
commonwealth and no other foreign power accepted to
accord to them the position the British had refused.
The framers of the Indian Constitution did not abandon
the administrative basis of the division of powers
between the Central Government and the provinces in
British India and the delegation of authority embodied
by the Paramountcy.
The framers of the Indian
Constitution were as much concerned about the division
of powers, as much hey were about the future
organization of the federal government and the
government in the federal units as well as the liberty
and freedom of the people, individually and
collectively. The colonial organization of the
Government of India and the governments, in the
provinces, were closed frames of power instruments
which accepted no responsibility. The founding fathers
of the Indian Constitution had a selective preference
for the acceptance of parliamentary sovereignty and
the collective responsibility as the basis of the
future federal government as well as the governments
in the federating States.
Whatever the considerations
weighed upon the mind of the framers of the Indian
Constitution, they adopted three basic principles to
construct the Indian federal union. These principles
were:
- Constitutional supremacy
of the Union over the federating units;
- the precedence of the
authority of the Union over the States in the
federal division of powers; and
- the containment of the
federal organization within the limits of
parliamentary sovereignty.
The constitutional imperatives
which ensured the precedence of the Union, included
the territorial jurisdiction of the Union, a unified
citizenship, uniform rights and obligations of all the
people in India, a unitary national administrative
organization; financial Revolution, with the Union as
the epicenter, powers of the Union to deal with
emergencies including the emergencies arising out
constitutional breakdown in the States and the right
of the Union to appoint the State Governors.
The division of powers,
between the Union and the States, was embodied in an
elaborate scheme, in which the legislative,
administrative and financial powers of the Union
Government and the State Governments were enumerated
in detail. The Constitution also specified a
concurrent area of jurisdiction between the Union and
the States, with precedence ensured for the Union. The
powers vested with the Union Government were
enumerated in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule
appended to the Constitution of India. The powers
reserved for the States were detailed out in the State
List and the powers within the concurrent jurisdiction
of the Union and the States were included in the
Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule. A significant
feature of the distribution of powers, the Indian
federal structure envisaged, was the reservation of
all residuary powers for the Union Government.
Within the broad framework of
the division of powers, the Constitution of India
envisaged, the States were vested with powers which
were derived from the Constitution and were not liable
to be taken away except in accordance with the
procedure laid down by the Constitution. The powers
vested with the States were plenary but not inherent.
Constituent Assembly did not recognize any inherent
powers in the Indian provinces which constituted the
Indian Dominion or the States which acceded to the
Indian Dominion. The powers vested with the Union and
States were restricted to their respective limits,
which were specified by the Constitution.
Notwithstanding the clear
demarcation of the legislative, administrative and
financial powers of the Union and the States, the
founding fathers of the Indian Constitution ensured
the precedence of the Union over the States in the
scheme of the division of powers it envisaged. The
Union was secured control over a wider sphere of State
power. Powers were vested with the Union Parliament to
legislate in regard to the subjects included in the
State List:
- If the Council of States
declared, by a resolution, supported by two-
thirds of the majority of its members, present
and voting, that such legislation was in the
national interest;
- If the legislatures of
two or more States empowered the Union
Parliament to legislate on the subjects in the
State List in respect of the States;
- If the Union Government
found it necessary to legislate on the subjects
in the State List to implement treaty
obligations undertaken by the Government of
Indian.
The Union was also vested with
the powers to legislate in respect of the subjects in
the State List, in case of emergencies arising out of
war, external aggressions or internal disturbance and
the constitutional breakdown in the States.
Precedence was also ensured
to the Union in case of conflict between the laws made
by the Parliament and the laws made by the State
Legislatures on subjects in Concurrent List or the
subjects enumerated in the Union List or the State
List. In case of any inconsistency between the laws
made by the Union and the States, the laws made by the
Union prevailed and the laws made by the State were
rendered void to the extent of the repugnancy to the
central law.
In respect of administrative
relations as well, though the States were reserved
administrative competence over the entire field over
which Heir legislative powers extended, the founding
fathers of the India Constitution devised techniques
which ensured administrative precedence over the
States. The Constitution of India provided that the
executive power of each State would be so exercised so
as to ensure complete compliance with the laws made by
the Parliament and any existing law in force in the
State. The Constitution further empowered the Union to
give such directions to the States as would appear to
the Union Government to be necessary for that purpose.
The Union Government was also vested with the powers
to issue directions to the State Governments to remove
any obstacles or difficulties for any Union agency to
function in the States. The Union Government was also
empowered to issue special directions in the
construction and maintenance of the means of
communication of national and military importance and
the protection of the railways. The Constitution
provided that full faith and credit would be given to
the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of
the Union in all parts of the country. The
Constitution further vested in the Union Government
powers to deal with waters of inter-State rivers and
river valley as well inter-State disputes. Provisions
were also included in the Constitution by virtue of
which the President could declare a state of emergency
in the States and take over the government of the
States, if the States failed to comply with or give
effect to any direction given by the Union Government.
The concentric nature of the
federal division of powers was made more manifest in
the financial relations between the Union and the
States. The powers of the Union Government and the
State Governments to levy taxes were separately
defined and made mutually exclusive. No area of
concurrent jurisdiction was demarcated between the
Union and the States, though provisions were made to
empower the Union to levy and collect taxes and share
certain taxes with the States. In the allocation of
the financial sources between the Union and the
States, the Constitution of India classified the
exclusive Union sources, the exclusive State sources,
the duties levied by the Union, but assigned to the
States, the duties levied by the Union but collected
and appropriated by the States, and the duties levied
by the Union and distributed between the Union and the
States.
The division of financial
powers underlined by the Constitution envisaged two
distinct schemes: the division of powers to levy taxes
and the distribution of revenues. The Union and the
States were empowered to levy taxes within the orbit
of their competence to tax but the division of
revenues was subject to the principle of their needs
and requirements. Thus certain taxes included in the
Union List were wholly or in part intended for the
States and in certain cases their collection was
entrusted to the States. The net proceeds assigned to
the States were distributed among them on the
principles recommended by the Finance Commission.
In the scheme of the division
of financial powers, the distribution of the revenues
was made in favor of all the States uniformly.
However, due to regional disparities and economic
stresses the financial needs of some of the States
were adjudged more pressing than that of the others.
In order to meet exigencies arising out of the
regional and economic disparities; the Constitution
provided for a system of grants-in-aid to the States,
chargeable on the consolidated fund of India. The
grants-in-aid were provided for the States in addition
to the assignment of various tax proceeds including
those shared with the Union Government. The Grant-
in-Aid were actually the final balancing instruments
of the resources of the States which their manifold
functions, particularly in the fields of social
utilities and services were needed. The Parliament was
empowered to make the grants every year to the extent
deemed necessary. The grants were to be fixed in
accordance with the recommendation of a Finance
Commission, for which the provisions were made by the
Constitution of India. The Finance Commission was to
be appointed by the President every five years to
advise the President on the distribution of revenues
between the Union and the States, grants-in-aid to the
States and any other financial matter referred to the
Commission by the Parliament."
In the division of financial
powers between the Union and the States as well, the
Union was ensured precedence over the States. The
Union Government was unmistakably entrusted with very
wide powers to tax the sources, which by nature were
substantial and uniform. The financial structure of
the federation did not accept unqualified reciprocal
immunities of instrumentality between the Union and
the States. Several prohibitions were imposed on the
power of the States to levy taxes on the Union
activities. The immunity accorded to the States was
subject to a number of restrictions. In fact, with
their dependence on the federal grants, the States
were in reality, a shadow of the autonomy, the
Constitution of India apparently envisaged.
The founding fathers of the
Indian Constitution placed the federal organization of
India within the confines of the parliamentary
responsibility. In a parliamentary structure the
Revolution of authority is vertical in contrast to the
horizontal decentralization of power in a federal
division of powers. All parliamentary governments
underline the precedence of the parliament and its
right to make laws, subject them to its review and
amend the constitution. In a parliamentary form, the
division of powers, judicial supremacy and separation
of powers, the most essential ingredients of a
federation, are subordinated to the Paramountcy of the
parliament.
The founding fathers of the
Indian Constitution sought to combine the two
principles: Judicial supremacy, without which no
federation would survive and parliamentary
sovereignty, which could not be conceived except in
terms of parliamentary responsibility. The acceptance
of the Paramountcy of the parliament left the
evolution of the constitutional imperatives in India
within the purview of the Indian Parliament and not
the Indian judiciary. In the United States, the
evolution of the federal relations was determined by
the judiciary and the Supreme Court of the United
States widened the implied authority of the federal
government to ensure its precedence in the American
federal structure. In India the process was
accomplished by the Parliament, not by widening any
area of implied powers, but by subordinating the
States to its plenary authority to make law and repeal
it. The parliamentary supremacy and judicial
precedence are irreconcilable and inherent conflict
between the parliament and the judiciary in India did
not take long to precipitate. Ultimately, however, the
paramountcy of the Parliament prevailed.
Sub-national Autonomy
Indian federalism did not
represent the division of political authority on the
basis of distribution of powers between the federal
authority and subnational identities. It was based
upon the division of political authority which was not
related to subnational pluralities in India and which
underlined the integration as well as the autonomy of
political power in a concrete political system. The
Indian federal organization was embedded in an
environment which was culturally plural and diverse,
but its boundaries were clearly defined, and did not
overlap with the cultural, linguistic or religious
pluralism of the Indian society.
The Jammu and Kashmir State
alone involved a variation of the federal principles
the Constitution of India envisaged, as it symbolized
a federal relationship which was based upon the
recognition of special political identity of the State
for its Muslim majority character.
Jammu and Kashmir too, like
the other Indian Princely States did not represent a
subnational identity except that the Muslim formed a
dominant majority of its population. The people of the
State, among them the Muslims as well, constituted an
ethnic, cultural and linguistic plurality which was
scattered over three main regional divisions: Jammu,
Kashmir, and the frontier division of Ladakh and
Baltistan. The province of Jammu was dominantly Hindu;
the people spoke various dialects of Punjabi and other
Pahari languages, and belonged to the Sanskrit Aryan
stock. The people of Kashmir were predominantly Muslim
with a small minority of about six- percent Hindus and
Sikhs, by and large, forming a cultural homogeneity
and spoke Kashmiri and several dialects of Pahari. The
frontier division of Ladakh and Baltistan, was
geographically a part of the Tibetan tableland, and
constituted two distinctly different ethnic, cultural,
religious and linguistic denominations: the Tibetans
inhabiting the district of Ladakh and the Baltis and
Dardis, inhabiting the districts of Baltistan, Gilgit
and the Dardic dependencies of the Jammu and Kashmir
State. The people of Ladakh were of the Mongolian
stock, professed Buddhism, spoke variants of Tibetan
and constituted a part of Tibetan culture. The people
of Ballistan were Muslim, mainly Shiite, spoke Balti
and various dialects of Dardic and were akin to the
cultural patterns of the Dardic principalities of
Central Asia, some of which formed the dependencies of
the State.
When the Constitution of
India was framed, the National Conference claimed a
separate political identity for the State on the basis
of the Muslim majority character of its population.
The institutionalization of political power on the
basis of the recognition of the Muslims of the State,
as a subnational identity, a principle which the
Constitution of India did not recognize in respect of
any other religious denomination, had deep and wide
repercussions on the evolution of the political
personality of the State and its relations with the
rest of the country. The implications of the
recognition of religious subnationalism as a factor of
federal relationships were deep for the entire federal
system of India and the autonomy of the States and in
due course of time exposed the inherent dangers in
subjecting federal division of powers to subnational
pluralism. Within a short time the quest for Muslim
precedence came into sharp conflict with the
religious, minorities inside the State, as well as the
secular Operatives of the federal government.
Evidently federalization, as it was Conceived for
Jammu and Kashmir, provided a mechanism for the
protection of the religious denomination of the
Muslims in the State which claimed a separate cultural
identity and a specific vested interest in its
sociology on the basis of geographical distribution of
power. The recognition of the separate identity of the
Muslim majority in the State, however, subordinated
the Hindus, Sikhs and the Buddhist to the operatives
of Muslim precedence. The autonomous authority of the
State, based upon Muslim subnationalism resulted in
the establishment of an oligarchic domination over the
minorities and other weaker sections of the State's
population.
The conflict between the
imperatives of Indian secularism and Muslim
subnationalism was deeper. In less than two years, the
conflict came to surface and the National Conference
swung to a position, where it sought to establish a
balance between the Indian federal authority and the
subnational autonomy of the State which in effect
purported to secure the State, a position outside the
federal organization of India. In 1953, the State
Government was dissolved, and fresh federal operatives
evolved to govern the relations between the State and
Center. However, the basis of the new federal
operatives too, continued to remain committed to the
Muslim subnationalism of the State.
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