Kashmir: Greater
Autonomy
by Dr. M. K. Teng, C. L. Gadoo
(Joint Human Rights Committee WA-88,
Shakarpur, Delhi - 110092)
Terrorism
in Jammu and Kashmir has almost broken up the national consensus on major
functional attributes of Parliamentary
government in Jammu and Kashmir.
There is a deep difference of opinion about the feasibility of a political
package on 'greater autonomy' to the State; Hindus and the other minorities,
about 46 percent of the population of the State, opposed to any restructurisation
of the existing constitutional relations between the Union and the State,
and the Muslims uncertain of whether the so-called package of autonomy
would be acceptable to militant regimes as a basis for settlement with
the Indian Govemment. Perhaps, the Government of India believes that it
can substitute 'greater autonomy' for the 'right of self-determination',
that the Muslim secessionist forces, militarised by Pakistan in 1989-90,
have been demanding for the last five decades. The former Prime Minister,
Narsimha Rao, went so far as to suggest, that the Congress Government would
concede "Azadi, short of Independence" to meet Muslim separatism, at least
half-way, exactly in the same manner as the Congress had offered to concede
a Muslim State within India, when it accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan
in 1946.
The acceptance of the separate
identity of the Muslim majority provinces proposed by the Cabinet Mission
Plan led to the partition of India in 1947. The acceptance of the 'autonomy
of the State', which, evidently, is presumed to be based on exclusion of
Jammu and Kashmir State from the Indian constitutional organisation, may
lead to the second partition of India.
The Government of India appears
to have overlooked the dangerous portent of forcing a restructurisation
of the existing constitutional relations between the State and the Indian
Union and exclude the State from the constitutional organisation of India,
to push it back into the position of isolation in which it was placed from
1947 to 1954. In the new setting created by fundamentalisation of secessionist
movements in the State and their militarisation by Pakistan, the exclusion
of the State from the Indian constitutional organisation, which the demand
for autonomy actually aims to achieve, will be a prelude to the disengagement
of the State from India. The recognition of Jammu and Kashmir, as a separate
Muslim identity, based upon the Muslim majority character of its population,
repudiates the Indian commitment to secularism and integration of the Indian
people on the basis of the fundamental right to equality. Perhaps, it is
not fully realised that Muslimisation of Jammu and Kashmir, the only Muslim
majority State in India, would eventually disrupt the foundations of the
Indian political culture and threaten not only the secular values of the
Indian nation but its unity as well.
DISTORTION OF HISTORY
Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler
of Jammu and Kashmir State, signed the same standard form of the Instrument
of Accession in October 1947, which the other Indian rulers signed to accede
to the then Indian Dominion. The Instrument of Accession was evolved by
the States Department, headed by Vallabh Bhai Patel, and was based upon
the principles the Cabinet Mission had stipulated for the accession of
the Indian States to the All India federation. All the rulers of the acceding
States retained all the residuary powers of government and the Instrument
of Accession they signed underlined the delegation of powers to the Dominion
Govemment in respect of foreign affairs, defence and communications only.
Among the other rulers, Hari Singh too retained the residuary powers of
the government, and the Instrument of Accession he signed envisaged the
delegation of powers to the Dominion Government of India in respect of
foreign affairs, defence and communications. The Instrument of Accession
did not bind any acceding State, including Jammu and Kashmir, to accept
the future constitution of India.
No separate or special provisions
were incorporated in the Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh and
there was no precondition or agreement, specially accepted by the Government
of India to any separate and special constitutional arrangement, to the
exclusion of the other acceding States.
That the State Department of
the Dominion Government, or the ruler of the State or the Congress leadership
accepted any condition that Jammu and Kashmir would be provided a special
constitutional position or any particular brand of autonomy or would be
recognised as a separate Muslim identity, is a travesty of history. Neither
Nehru, nor Patel gave any assurance to the Conference leaders that the
Jammu and Kashmir State would be recognised as a separate constitutional
entity because of the Muslim majority in its population.
When the invading armies of
Pakistan were fast approaching Srinagar, the Prime Minister of Jammu and
Kashmir, Mehar Chand Mahajan, arrived in Delhi, with a request from Hari
Singh for help against the invaders. Mahajan was instruced to inform the
Government of India that the Maharaja had decided to accede to the Indian
Dominion and accepted to transfer whatever authority he would be required
to make in favour of the National Conference. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah
was in Delhi and neither he nor Nehru laid any conditions on Mahajan in
respect of the future constitution of the State. Mahajan too did not make
any commitment on the separate Muslim identity of Jammu and Kashmir or
its autonomy. Nehru sought a substantial transfer of authority to the National
Conference which was in consonance with the pledges that the Congress had
given to the people of all Princely States. The Congress was committed
to replace personal rule, which characterised the political organisation
of the States, by representative institutions on the basis of administrative
responsibility which was accepted for the reorganisation of the governments
in the Indian Provinces. Jammu and Kashmir was not recognised as an exception
here also.
After accession of the State
to India, an Emergency Administration, headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah,
was constituted by Hari Singh on 30 October 1947, to deal with the situation
of crisis the invasion had created. In June 1948, The Emergency Administration
was dissolved and replaced by an Interim Government, formed by the National
Conference and headed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.
Unfortunately lies have been
multiplied during the last four decades to distort the history of those
crucial years and lies are being retold to justify the treachery and blackmail,
which characterised the atrocious process of forcing the exclusion of the
State from the Indian constitutional organisation in 1950, when the Indian
Constitution was adopted.
INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION
The Instrument of Accession,
which the rulers of the Princely States executed to join the Indian Dominion,
reserved them the right to convene Constituent Assemblies to frame constitutions
for their respective governments. The ruler of the Jammu and Kashmir also
reserved the right to convene a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution
for his government. The Constituent Assembly of India, was by mutual consensus
of the Premiers of the States and the representatives of the Constituent
Assembly, entrusted with the task of evolving a model constitution, which
the Constituent Assemblies of the States would follow in order to avoid
any conflict between the Constitution of India and the constitutions of
the States. Constituent Assemblies were convened in the Mysore State, the
States Union of Saurashtra and the States Union of Travancore-Cochin.
In 1949, an extraordinary decision
was taken by the Premiers of the States in a Conference held in Delhi.
They decided to entrust to the Constituent Assembly of India the task of
framing a uniform set of constitutional provisions for all the States.
The constitutional provisions for the States, the Conference decided, would
be incorporated in the Constitution of India.
The National Conference leaders
did not accept the decision of the Premiers' Conference and insisted upon
convocation of a separate Constituent Assembly for Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently,
a Conference of the Conference leaders and representatives of the Dominion
Government, in which Nehru and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah participated, was
convened in Delhi, shortly after the Premiers' Conference. A number of
issues pertaining to the territorial jurisdiction of the Union, citizenship,
fundamental rights and related safeguards, freedom of faith, emergencies
arising out of war, rebellion and constitutional breakdown in the States,
jurisdiction of the Courts, division of powers between the Union and the
federating States, residuary powers between the Union and the federating
States, the residuary powers and the institution of the Constituent Assembly
in the State, came up for deliberation in the Conference. The Constituent
Assembly of India had evolved provisions in respect of the territories
of the Union, citizenship, fundamental rights, principles of State policy,
jurisdiction of the courts and emergencies. The Constituent Assembly of
India had also evolved a scheme of the division of powers between the Union
and the States, which it proposed would replace the delegation of powers
stipulated by the Instrument of Accession the acceding States had signed.
The Conference leaders stunned
Nehru and the other Congress leaders when they refused to accept the application
of any provisions of the Constitution of India to the State and instead
insisted upon the continuation of federal relations between the proposed
Union of India and Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the Instrument of
Accession. In other words they demanded the exclusion of the State from
the consitutional organisation of India and its reorganisation into a separate
political entity which would be aligned with the Union of India in respect
of external relations, defence and communications. In fact, the National
Conference demanded the restoration of control over the State army to the
Interim Government, which they claimed, would undertake the defence of
the State, after the Indian army was withdrawn. The Conference leaders
proposed that
(i)
the rule of the Dogra dynasty be abolished;
(ii)
the State be excluded from the constitutional organisation of India:
(iii)
the relations between the Union and the State be governed by the stipulations
of the Instrument of Accession;
(iv)
the control over the State army be transferred to the Interim Government
of the State;
(v)
the Interim Government would institute a separate Constituent Assembly
to draw up a Constitution for the State.
The Indian leaders agreed to
leave a wider orbit of authority to the State Government and accepted to
vest the residuary powers with it. They agreed to the demand for the abolition
of the Dogra rule, and the institution of a separate Constituent Assembly
for the State. However, they refused to countenance the exclusion of the
State from the Indian Union and its constitutional organisation. Nehru,
evidently disconcerted with the proposals the Conference leaders made,
told them that he could not accept to deprive the people of the State of
the Indian citizenship, fundamental rights and the Directive Principles
of State Policy which reflected the pride of the Indian people in the ideological
commitments of their liberation struggle.
The National Conference harboured
completely different views about the constitutional relations between the
State and India. They visualised the State as a separate political entity
with its own constitutional organisation, independent of the political
organisation of India in respect of which the Union of India assumed the
responsibility of defence, communications and external relations within
the stipulations of the Instrument of Accession. The Conference leaders
were motivated by a subtle consideration that since the execution of the
Instrument of Accession by Maharaja Hafi Singh, which the Conference leaders
derisively described as "Paper Accession", was subject to a plebiscite,
the Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir, had assumed a veto over the accession
of the State to India. To retain the Muslim right to veto on the accession
of the State, the Conference leaders evaded any fresh Constitutional postulates
and agreements with the Indian Union, which would replace the Instrument
of Accession or would alter its consequences.
The atmosphere in which Delhi
Conference was convened, was pervaded by a deep feeling of uncertainty.
A month before the Delhi Conference was held, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah
had thrown a bombshell in the Indian camp when he had told the correspondent
of 'Scotsman', that the independence of Jammu and Kashmir would be the
most suitable course to end the dispute over Kashmir. In case, Sheikh Mohammad
Abdullah maintained, Kashmir was able to establish good neighbourly relations
with India and Pakistan, the two countries would settle down to peace and
live as good neighbours.
The National Conference leaders
made a tactical retreat mainly to bide time and an agreement was finally
reached between them and the Congress leaders. The agreement stipulated:
(i)
that Jammu and Kashmir would be included in the territories of Indian Union;
(ii)
provisions of the Constitution of India in respect of citizenship, fundamental
rights and related legal guarantees, Directive Principles of State Policy
and the Federal Judiciary would be extended to the State;
(iii)
the division of powers between the State and the Union of India would be
governed by the stipulation of the Instrument of Accession and not the
Seventh Schedule of the Indian Constitution;
(iv)
the administrative and the operational control of the State army would
remain with the Government of India;
(v)
a separate Constituent Assembly of the State would be convened to draw
up the Constitution for the State; and
(vi)
the Constituent Assembly, after it was convened, would determine the future
of Dogra rule.
The agreement was shortlived.
Not long after the Conference leaders returned to Srinagar, they made public
pronouncements that the Jammu and Kashmir State would not compromise on
the issue of autonomy and the Constituent Assembly of the State would evolve
a set of separate principles in regard to citizenship, fundamental rights,
Principles of State Policy and elections. The Conference leaders gave ample
expression to their reluctance to accept the inclusion of the State in
the Indian Union and the application of any provisions of the Constitution
of India to the State.
The issues came to a head when
Gopalaswamy Ayyangar sent the draft constitutional provisions, he had drawn
up for the State, to the Conference leaders for their approval. The draft
provisions were based upon the agreement reached in Delhi in May 1949,
between the representatives of the Government of India and the Conference
leaders. After closed door deliberations, the Conference leaders placed
the draft proposals before the Working Committee of the Conference. The
Working Committee turned down the proposals promptly.
Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah sent
an alternate draft to Ayyangar which envisaged exclusion of the State from
the Indian Union and its constitutional organisation. The draft stipulated
the abolition of the Dogra rule and the reorganisation of the State into
an independent political entity which would be federated with the Indian
Union on the basis of the Instrument of accession. The draft proposed that
the separate political identity of the State would be based upon the Muslim
majority character of its population, its separate culture and history
and the aspirations of its people for economic equality and political freedom
which the Constitution of India did not enshrine.
The Conference leaders were
particularly opposed to application of the provisions of the Constitution
of India with regard to citizenship and fundamental rights to the State.
They disapproved of all forms of safeguards which the provisions of the
Constitution of India in respect of fundamental rights embodied, on the
pretext that such safeguards would frustrate the resolve of the Interim
Government to undertake economic, political and social reforms in the State.
The real reasons for the Conference leaders to resist the application of
the fundamental rights to the State were, however, different. The right
to equality and the right to protection against discrimination on the basis
of religion, the right to freedom of faith and the right to property enshrined
by the Constitution of India, conflicted with the Muslimisation of the
State, the Interim Government had embarked upon, right from the time it
was installed in power. The Interim Government enforced the communal precedence
of the Muslim majority in the government, the economic organisation and
the society of the State with religious zeal. The discriminatory legislation,
which devastated the non- Muslim minorities in the State, worst hit among
them being the Hindus in the Kashmir Province, controverted the safeguards
the Constitution of India envisaged against discrimination on the basis
of religion.
Ayyangar received a jolt when
the communication of the Conference leaders, along with the draft proposals
drawn by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, was delivered to him. On 14 October
1949, he had a long meeting with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and Mirza Afzal
Beg in Delhi and tried to persuade them to adhere to the agreement they
had accepted in the conference at Delhi, earlier in May. The Conference
leaders did not relent and told Ayyangar bluntly that they would not accept
the application of the Constitution of India to the State.
Ayyangar failed to face the
Conference leaders with firmness. He made a vain bid to placate the Conference
leaders by offering to exclude fundamental rights and related legal safeguards,
from the provisions of the Constitution of India, which were proposed to
be extended to the State in his draft. To his consternation, the Conference
leaders rejected the modified draft as well. They informed Ayyangar that
the National Conference would not accept the application of any provision
of the Constitution of India, including the provisions with regard to the
territories of the Union and citizenship and that it accepted only the
Instrument of Accession as the basis of any relationship between the State
and the future Union of India. When Nehru and other Indian leaders insisted
upon the inclusion of the State, at least, in the basic structure of the
Constitution of India, the Conference leaders broke off the negotiations
and threatened to withdraw from the Constituent Assembly.
Fearful of a crisis the resignation
of Conference leaders from the Constituent Assembly of India would create
in Jammu and Kashmir and its repercussions outside India, Ayyangar beseeched
them not to take any precipitate action which would adversely affect Indian
interests in the Security Council. A breach with the Conference leaders,
he believed, would undercut the support India had among the Kashmiri speaking
Muslims who Nehru, still believed, would win the plebiscite for India.
The Conference leaders, foxy and sly, used the United Nations intervention,
ironically enough, invoked by India to secure the withdrawal of the armies
of Pakistan from the occupied territories, to foist on the Indian leaders,
a settlement which placed the State in a position outside the political
organisation of India.
Nehru was abroad in the United
States of America. Ayyangar met the Conference leaders and assured them
that the Government of India would accept a constitutional position for
Jammu and Kashmir outside the Indian constitutional organisation. He further
assured them the Government of India respected the aspirations of the Muslims
of the State, and therefore, would accept the institution of a separate
Constituent Assembly of the State which would frame the Constitution of
the State and also determine the future of the Dogra dynasty. The provisions
of the Instrument of Accession, Ayyangar assured them further, would determine
the Constitutional relationship between the State and the Union of India.
Ayyangar drew up a fresh draft
in consultation with Mirza Afzal Beg. Abdullah pulled the strings from
behind the scene. The revised draft, prepared by Ayyangar and moved in
the Constituent Assembly of India, envisaged:
(i)
no provisions of the Constitution of India, except Article 1, would be
extended to the State;
(ii)
the division of powers between the Union and the Jammu and Kashmir State
would be limited to the stipulations of the Instrument of Accession;
(iii)
a separate Constituent Assembly would be convened in Jammu and Kashmir
to frame its Constitution;
(iv)
the President of India would be empowered to vest more powers in the Union
Government in respect of Jammu and Kashmir in concurrence with the State
Government;
(v)
the President would be empowered to modify the operation of the special
constitutional provisions for the State on the recommendations of the Constituent
Assembly of the State;
(vi)
the State Government would be construed to mean, the Maharaja acting on
the advice of the Council of Ministers appointed under his proclamation
dated 5 March 1948."
The draft provisions were incorporated
in Article 306-A of the draft Constitution of India. The draft Article
306-A was renumbered Article 370 at the revision stage.
Article 306-A was circulated
in the Constituent Assembly on 16 October 1949. It came up for consideration
of the Assembly the next day. Several members of the Constituent Assembly
detected an error in the draft provisions, which Ayyangar had overlooked.
The draft Article defined the State Government as the "Council of Ministers
appointed under the Maharaja's Proclamation dated 5 March 1948." The members
of the Constituent Assembly pointed out to Ayyangar that the definition
of the State Government envisaged a perpetual Interim Government which
would lead to the creation of an anomalous situation of excluding all successor
governments from the provisions of the Constitution of India. Ayyangar
modified the draft to remove the anomaly and redefined the State Government
as the "person for the time being recognised by the President as the Maharaja
of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for
the time being in office under the Maharaja's proclamation dated the fifth
day of March 1948."
The Conference leaders took
strong exception to the change in the definition of the State Government.
Mirza Afzal Beg threatened to move an amendment to the draft provisions
of Article 306-A, seeking to alter the definition of the State Government.
Beg had actually sought to
include provisions in the draft Article 306-A which envisaged a perpetual
Interim Government in the State and which could be used as a lever against
India in future. He and the other Conference leaders, were disconcerted
with the inclusion of the State in the First Schedule of the Constitution
of India and wanted some pretext to block the passage of the special provisions
in the Constituent Assembly.
Ayyangar could not remodify
the definition of the State Government, in view of strong reaction against
it in the Constituent Assembly. He failed to persuade the Conference leaders
to condescend to the modifications he had brought about in the draft. When
Article 306-A came up for the consideration of the Constituent Assembly,
the Conference leaders sulked away and did not join the deliberations on
the draft provision till Ayyangar completed his speech. They sat glum when
the draft provisions were put to vote and passed unanimously.
Immediately after the draft
provisions were adopted by the Constituent Assembly, they sent a sharp
rejoinder to Ayyangar demanding the rescission of Article 306-A as adopted
by the Constituent Assembly, failing which they threatened to resign from
its membership. Ayyangar was stunned. He sent a plaintive note to the Conference
leaders entreating them not to take any action which would prejudice the
Indian interests, and wait for Nehru's return. The Conference leaders did
not resign from the Constituent Assembly, but as the days went by, they
launched a surreptitious and widespread campaign to subvert the special
provisions of Article 370.
Article 370
Article 370, in its original form, envisaged exclusion
of Jammu and Kashmir State from the secular Constitutional organisation
of India, and its reorganisation into a separate political identity based
upon the Muslim majority character of its population. It imposed a limitation
on the application of the provisions of Constitution of India to the State.
The division of powers between the State and the Union was also limited
to the stipulations of the Instrument of Accession. Article 370, was therefore,
not an enabling act. It was, in fact, an act of limitation imposed on the
application of the Constitution of India to the State, after the State
was included in the First Schedule of the Constitution. The State was included
in the First Schedule independent of Article 370.
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
The Conference leaders sought
to use the Constituent Assembly of the State to undermine the special provisions
of Article 370 as well as the Instrument of Accession. The elections to
the Constituent Assembly of the State were held in 1951. Seventy three
of the Conference nominees were returned to the Assembly unopposed. Two
of the remaining seats in the 75 member Assembly were also annexed by the
National Conference.
In his inaugural address, Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah claimed plenary powers for the Constituent Assembly to
determine the final form of the Constitutional relations between the State
and the Indian Union, which virtually sought to subject the special provisions
envisaged by Article 370 to the verdict of the Assembly. He went further
and asserted that the Constituent Assembly, its powers drawn from the people
of the State, would determine future affiliations of the State in respect
of its accession, in accordance with the options the Cabinet Mission Plan
had reserved for the States. In categorical terms, he spelt out that the
Constituent Assembly would determine whether the State would remain in
India, accede to Pakistan or assume independence. The implications of his
statement were clear. Article 370 would be rendered redundant after the
Constituent Assembly had taken a final decision on the accession of the
State and its constitutional relations with India.
The exclusion of the State
from the Constitutional organisation of India and the insistence of the
Conference leadership on the right to plenary powers for the Constituent
Assembly, caused concern among the Hindus and the other minorities. The
Hindus of Jammu reacted sharply against the exclusion of the State from
the Indian Constitutional organisation, which they feared was a ploy to
undo the accession of the State to India. They also opposed the abolition
of Dogra rule, which they alleged would be used by the Interim Government
to break the last link between India and the Jammu and Kashmir State.
The Hindus of the Kashmir Province,
who bore the rigours of the Muslimisation of the State, also expressed
strong disapproval of the Conference demand for a separate political organisation
of the State. They had been devastated by the enforcement of Muslim precedence,
and virtually reduced to a state of servitude. Their voice was stifled
by the Conference gendarmes, who had taken over magistracies in the Valley
in the aftermath of the invasion and dispensed justice in the name of Islam.
The Conference leaders branded the Hindus as the traitors to the freedom
of Jammu and Kashmir and accused them of having supported the Dogra rule
in its depredations against the Muslims.
The Hindus made frantic appeals
to the Indian Prime Minister and entreated Ayyangar not to accept the exclusion
of the State from the Indian political organisation. They pleaded with
the Indian leaders that the consequences of the isolation of the State
and its reorganisation into a separate political organisation, governed
by the commitment of the National Conference to the Muslimisation of the
State, would have disastrous consequences in the long run.
History proved them right.
Four decades after Article 370 was enacted, the rickety structure of the
political instruments envisaged by it, crumbled under the onslaught of
the Muslim secessionist forces, militarised by Pakistan. With that were
wiped out the Hindus and the other minorities, along with the hollow slogans
of secularism with which the successive governments of India had concealed
the ugly face of Muslim communalism in the State.
The demonstrations made by
the Hindus in Kashmir evoked little response from the Congress leadership.
Blinded by the partition of India, which had been brought about by the
Indian Muslims, rather than the British, they looked to the Muslims of
Kashmir as the sole guarantors of secularism in India. They denounced the
Hindus and other minorities for allegedly seeking to communalise the traditionally
tolerant community of the Muslims and applauded the National Conference
for its demand to secure the exclusion of the State from the secular political
organisation of India on the basis of the Muslim majority character of
its population
The National Conference used
the Indian State to defend Jammu and Kashmir from the invading armies of
Pakistan in 1947. After that was accomplished, they sought to use the United
Nations intervention to pull out the State from India. In August 1953,
the Interim Government was dismissed and a second Interim Government headed
by Bakhshi Gulam Mohammad installed in its place. In 1954, the limitations
imposed upon the application of the Constitution of India to the State
were partially lifted by a Presidential proclamation, in respect of citizenship,
fundamental rights, Government of India, division of powers, federal judiciary
and elections to the Parliament. Subsequent proclamations extended more
provisions of the Constitution of India to the State. The application of
the provisions of the Constitution of India, however, were subject to reservations
and exceptions, which mutilated their real content.
TERRORISM AND AUTONOMY
In the broad background of terrorist violence
which has ravaged the State for the last six years, the demand for greater
autonomy and the wild assurances of the successive Indian Governments to
support it, has an ominous portent. The restoration of the 1953 status,
which is presumed to be the bottom line the autonomy of the State will
necessitate restructurisation of the existing Constitutional relations
between the State and the Union of India and the withdrawal of the provisions
of the Constitution of India, extended to the State, following the Presidential
proclamation of 1954. The restoration of the separate political identity
of the State on the basis of the Muslim majority character of its population
will reinforce the Muslim claim to a veto on the accession of the State
to India.
The insistence on (i) a safer
zone to protect the Muslim minority from the dominance of the Hindu majority
in India, and (ii) the right of the Muslims to reconstitute the Muslim
majority provinces to form a Muslim State, were the two basic planks on
which the Muslim League secured the partition of India. The creation of
an autonomous state of Jammu and Kashmir placed outside the political organisation
of India, will go half-way to substantiate Pakistan's claim on Kashmir.
With militant guns booming in the background, India will, sooner or later,
be forced to accept a settlement which is acceptable to Pakistan.
The militarisation of Muslim
secessionist forces and their reorientation to Pan-Islamic fundamentalism
has added a new dimension to the Muslim separatism in Jammu and Kashmir.
The consolidation of Pan-Islamic fundamentalism as a basis for a global
strategy to unify the Muslim nations into an independent power in the world,
with Pakistan as one of its focal centres, threatens the whole northern
frontier of India.
The demand for autonomy reflects
the unconcealed satisfaction with which its proponents are using the ground
earned by militants, to pull out the State from the Indian political organisation.
With the Hindus in exile, there is no one left in Kashmir to weep for India.
On a midnight hour, sometime in future, India might once again awaken to
the reality of a second partition.
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