The Mice Trap
By Yoginder Kandhari
As usual, Kashmir Valley was in a grip of a
freezing cold wave in January 1995 too. Since
any major success against militants had eluded
us for quite a long time it made matters colder
for us. Pressure to ‘perform’ was increasing
from the higher echelons. In fact, troops took
time to adjust to the new role of mounting
sustained counter-insurgency (CI) operations
after a period of protected employment on road
opening duties on Srinagar-Leh road. Road
opening has always been an extracting routine,
physically as well as psychologically, affording
very little freedom of action to rejuvenate the
morale. Whole of the preceding month had been
consumed in familiarizing with own area of
responsibility. This area included Ganderbal
town which has, till date, retained its
notoriety as a hot bed of militancy. Since it
was the first time troops stayed on in the
Ganderbal area after road closure, intelligence
compendium of the area was conspicuous by its
absence. Our operational imperatives were thus
self defining and establishing a responsive
intelligence network was priority one task for
us no matter how much pressure was built on us
to ‘perform’.
We were located at Zakura and our area of
responsibility extended much beyond Ganderbal.
Ganderbal town and area beyond was dominated by
the Hizbul Majahideen(HM) cadres. However, area
south of Ganderbal had a fair representation of
almost all militant groups including the then
newly surfaced Harkat- ul- Ansar. Al Umar was
the dominant group in the villages located at
the foot hills east of Srinagar-Leh road while
HM dominated the area west of it.
Intelligence Inputs: Local
connections helped us to establish an effective
intelligence gathering mechanism. In retrospect,
one feels satisfied that this network provided
us real time and actionable intelligence many a
times that lead us to a number of recoveries and
successes during our stay in the area. It was on
20th January 95, while on a routine
visit through the area, a young boy passed on a
crumpled ball of paper to me. I immediately
sensed that information channels had started
opening up no matter what the status of the
information would be. This piece of paper turned
out to be a latter, written in Urdu, giving a
detailed account about the militant group
operative in village Bakra. It was written by a
girl who appeared to be a victim of this very
militant group. Surprisingly, drafting of the
letter was so deliberate that it could match an
intelligence summary produced by any competent
combat headquarters. Details in the letter
provided a wealth of information that helped us
to plan and execute the intended operation in
Bakra with precision.
Planning: A tactical lull was
observed on 21st and 22nd
January. This period was utilized to corroborate
available information and to plan the operation
in detail. During the planning stage, emphasis
was laid on retention of surprise and rehearsals
so as to ensure meticulous execution of the
plan. A deception was also planned to outwit the
militants. A source was tasked to create a hoax
about a cordon operation, on 22 January, in a
village adjacent to the targeted one. A young
boy made an announcement from the public address
system, of the village mosque, urging people to
congregate as was the routine during all cordon
and search operations. The trick, while passing
off as a childish prank, had the intended effect
of setting in required complacency in the people
in general and the militant in particular.
Execution: Cordon and search of Bakra was
planned for 23rd January. At sharp 4
a.m., I along with three JCOs and just 24 men
moved out of camp stealthy to approach the
village cross-country, carefully avoiding
populated areas enroute. Moon lit up the whole
area which appeared to be covered with a snow
white blanket. With white rooftops, Bakra stood
out in the horizon. Establishing cordon was
comparatively easy in the moon lit night. Wide
gaps between the stops could easily be covered
visually and by fire. There always lurked the
danger of own movement being detected and
consequent loss of surprise. Cordon was
effectively established within an hour and we
all waited for the day break. At about 7.30
a.m., an announcement was made from the village
mosque telling people to congregate in the
village school compound. To our surprise, people
started trooping in quickly at the appointed
place. I could feel the glitter in the eyes of
our spotter who kept a close watch on people
passing by him. He segregated five young men and
whispered to me that all of them were confirmed
militants. The deception plan seemed to have
worked for militants had not expected an actual
cordon operation just a day after the hoax.
As soon as these segregated people were
taken for questioning, one out of them walked upto me. He identified himself as Moshin Khan
and admitted that he was an Afghanistan trained
militant. Fearing rough treatment, he was quick
to bear his back to show us torches marks
inflicted upon him by his local militant
commander (now a very prominent counter
insurgent). He was quick to handover his pistol
and two magazines with 16 rounds of ammunition.
He further confirmed that all the other four
men, spotted by our spotter, were active and
dreaded militants. Taking Moshin Khan away from
the flock, all the four were questioned
individually. First to break was Nikka. He led
us inside the village mosque from where we
recovered one hand grenade and a radio set.
Nikka, barely sixteen year old, had participated
in a number of actions against security forces.
He bore a six inches long post- surgery scar on
his abdomen. Nikka had been shot in the abdomen
during an inter-militant group clash.
Gula was next to a break. He took us to
a hut located on the periphery of the village.
On his instance, we dug up the floor inside to
recover an 84 mm motor shell, an IED activator,
batteries, camping kit etc. This shell was
possibly to be used as an IED at a later date.
Thereafter, we concentrated on the fourth member
of the gang, namely Hassan Raida. After a great
deal of resistance he finally broke down to hand
over his AK-47 Rifle, two magazines and 60
rounds of ammunition. He had hidden his weapon
inside hay stacked in the mosque premises. The
weapon had a round loaded in the chamber and was
ready to be fired. He appeared to have held back
his fire at the eleventh hour and strangely
deciding to join the villagers for the
identification parade.
Babloo, the last of the group, was the
most difficult nut to crack. It took us quite a
bit of effort to obtain his weapon. Finally, he
too gave up and led us to a shop adjacent to the
village mosque. We managed to recover two AK-47
rifles, 4 magazines and 164 rounds of ammunition
from him.
This operation led us to recovery of
three AK -47 rifles with six magazines and 224
rounds of ammunition, one pistol with two
magazines and sixteen rounds of ammunition, one
live 84 mm motor shell one hand grenade one
radio set other IED detention kit and camping
equipment etc. It was huge haul by any
estimates. Complete tactical group of five
militants, of Al Umar outfit, was rounded up
without a bullet being fired. This operation
was hailed by all and sundry including the
locals of the area. Suddenly, pressure to
perform vanished and an era of successes ushered
in. Intelligence network, built so assiduously,
started paying dividends.
As we were pulling out of Bakra, I
could see all the five militants hurdled
together in a vehicle like mice inside a trap.
As these militants were driven past the village
womenfolk they were showered mouths-full of
abuses. In no time, these heroes were relegated
to the status of petting criminals.
Source:
Kashmir
Sentinel
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