Insurgency in J&K
A Review of Our Response
By Yoginder Kandhari
Insurgency in the
State of J&K is a decade old now and appears to
have firmed in fully for a protracted combat
with the security forces. Day by day we are
being pushed into an Afghanistan like crisis
with frightening consequences. Why we failed to
bring the situation under control? Answer to
this question lies in proper analysis of our
response, both political and military, to the
challenge of militancy.
Counter insurgency operations are fought on two
fronts simultaneously, political and military.
On political front, our response has throughout
remained confused. Our political leaders are
unable to comprehend the basic causes of the
problem thus have failed to evolve a consensus
on this strategic issue of national importance.
Ever since eruption of militancy in Kashmir,
successive governments at the Centre appeared
bereft of ideas to counter this menace, so much
so that the problem now appears to have slipped
out of our hands. There hardly has ever been any
substance in our political response which would
merit a review or re-appraisal.
There is no doubt that our security forces have
risen to the challenge of insurgency in the
state in a wonderful way. Where else in the
world does one find foot soldiers covering
hundreds of miles day in and day out, just to
keep road networks sanitized for safe vehicular
movement. Hundreds of soldiers have been lost in
last ten years and many times more maimed. Yet,
the security forces have stuck to their job
without a whimper. One justifiably feels proud
of having been a member of such an organization,
unmatched the world over.
Indian security forces, especially the Army,
have enough counter insurgency experience. Yet,
they have not been able to control the situation
in J&K for last ten years. Surely, we have
faltered somewhere in our military response. In
retrospect, one finds that a lot of issues were
either lost sight of or not addressed at all
while formulating the military response.
Current Security Scenario
In
present day context, insurgency in the state has
graduated from hit- and-run and stand-off
strikes to full-fledged pitched battles with the
security forces. Of late, we have seen
insurgents launching daring pre-dawn attacks on
security forces’ camps which were unheard of
till now. Recent encounters have revealed mature
military planning and execution.
Adding a deadly dimension to the current
security scenario is continued smuggling in of
latest weaponry. Militants appear to have eased
pressure in the Valley with a two fold aim in
mind. Firstly, their continued presence would
not have permitted revival of economic activity
there which is essential to retain sympathy of
the local public. Secondly, they have drawn our
security forces to the ground of their own
choosing where-in the difficult terrain acts as
a force multiplier for them to offset their
numerical inferiority. Their planning follows a
carefully thought out design and they seem fully
set to retain the initiative they have gained
thus far. Needless to say, combat in insurgency
situations is mostly battle of wits and
retention of initiative is half the battle won.
Gap in Strategic Vision
A yawning gap in our
strategic vision was evident when we failed to
appreciate possible options available to
Pakistan to keep Kashmir pot boiling.
Fomenting insurgency in the Valley always lurked
as a distinct possibility especially in the
context of a similar attempt made by her in 1965
and in light of more recent experience of Indian
response gained by ISI in sponsoring urban
insurgency in Punjab. While we were thickly
involved in Punjab, ISI dumped arms and
ammunition, in heaps, in the Valley with
impunity for their ultimate mission. We failed
to pickup the threads and were caught off guard
in our own backyard in 1989. Blame for this
fiasco should equally be shared by the
politicians and strategic planners.
Inadequate Initial Response
Since our security
forces were just not prepared for such an
eventuality, our initial response was inadequate
to the task. True, there was an acute lack of
will and direction at political level,
especially so, in the initial stages. Our
military leaders should have known that the buck
ultimately would be passed on to them alone.
Such a realization would have compelled the
military planners to evolve an effective counter
strategy, best suited to the local pattern and
psyche. Instead, army think tank was found laid
back in their approach to the problem just
wishing away the worst. This delay forced the
security forces to use age old concept of Cordon
and Search Operations (CASO) every where without
any results.
Thus our military response was ab initio cast in
a predictive and essentially a reactive mould. A
chance to gain military and moral ascendency
over the militants was lost in the initial
stages itself. It was the time when militant
rank and file mainly consisted of home grown and
ill trained youth who hardly understood nuances
of actual combat. Whatever might have been the
extraneous constraints, evolution of an
effective counter strategy was security forces’
sole domain and none would have dared interfere.
Alas, we procrastinated and let the golden
opportunity slip away.
Failure to Read Design
Insurgency in
J&K did not show any innovativeness per se. Its
course was as predictable as it could be. As is
common the world over, it started with isolated
blasts to herald its arrival. This stage was
followed by killings of prominent public figures
by specially designated militant squads to
strike terror. Thereafter, we had a longish
period of five to six years when militants
upgraded their operations to take on security
forces, albeit standoff ones, with the primary
aim to stay in the news. Hazratbal and Chrar
Sharief episodes were essentially part of this
phase. Simultaneously, militants ensured that
their writ ran through the entire administrative
and social fabric through frequent calls for
strikes and ‘bandhs’. Next logical stage was to
shift the battle ground to inhospitable terrain
as obtained in Rajouri, Doda and Kupwara. Had
we read through their design we would have
snatched the initiative by being proactive to
keep them on the run. But, we waited for things
to happen rather than preventing them.
Failure of Intelligence Setup
It is an open secret
that huge quantity of arms and ammunition was
brought in from across the Line of Control (LoC).
Similarly, truck loads of youth were carried
onto the other side from various towns of the
Valley in full view of the administration. What
were intelligence agencies doing in the Valley?
We had a handful of them working there even
before militancy erupted. It is just not enough
to explain away intelligence failure to
elimination of intelligence officials. Such
contingencies should have been thought of in
advance and alternate channels created to keep
information flowing out to avoid information
black-out that we witnessed in the Valley from
1990-1993. Even after intelligence agencies
regained their poise, hardly any real
time/actionable intelligence was forthcoming.
Lack of Tactical Planning
All tactical plans
evolve out of clear understanding of adversary’s
intentions. We failed to read the design of
insurgency and our tactical planning suffered as
a consequence. Had we initially dominated the
difficult terrain, which militants are holding
now, we would have denied these safe sanctuaries
to them and upset their planning. We, of course,
pumped in two more divisions into these
difficult areas but only after militants had
established bases. We seem to have fallen into
their trap by committing a large number of
troops, as if on militants’ command.
Lack of Appropriate Equipment
It is a common sight
to find Generals cribbing about non-availability
of proper equipment to fight insurgency. This
cry has been there for long within the security
forces but was never heeded to. Even genuine
requirements were never projected to the
appropriate authorities. We now hear that
procurement is underway of ground sensors to
check infiltration, of direction finders to hone
on to militant command setups and of state of
art weaponry. These items have been in the
international market for a long time. We only
woke up too late in the day to their
requirement. Most of our counter insurgency
operations have been fought with semi-automatic
rifles, obsolete radio sets and opaque night
vision devices.
Most senior officers wanted their tenures to
pass off as quickly as possible leaving the
dirty work to troops at execution levels. In
1993-94, troops
received some bullet
proof jackets but most refused to wear them.
These jackets consisted of two crude steel
plates, weighing 10 kg each, put in cloth sacks
to be bridled on to the human body. Imagine a
soldier making tactical maneuvers, under battle
conditions, with such ill fitting equipment.
These bullet proof jackets were cause more of
casualties than of protection.
Setting of Unrealistic Targets
As soon as higher
commanders were under pressure to perform they
set strange targets for their subordinates.
Weekly Key Result Areas (KRAs) were set in terms
of number of weapon recovered. Thereafter, the
troops just went after weapons. A militant could
move around freely provided he had hidden his
weapon discreetly. Recoveries were stage managed
in order to please the bosses. One is reminded
of an instance when recoveries were stage
managed to appease a divisional commander on
visit to a brigade headquarter. An operation was
planned for the occasion and recoveries, made
much earlier, were announced in stages
coinciding with each course being served to the
General in the officers’ Mess. Thus, there was a
general loss of directions in our counter
insurgency effort and we lost sight of the real
objective.
Interference from top
Troops in actual
combat were not allowed freedom of execution by
the top echelons. In such an exacting
environment, it is very difficult to maintain
morale of troops at battalion/company levels if
orders are not clear-cut/self explanatory and
tactically feasible. One has to guard against
psychological fatigue setting in the troops.
Curtailment of leave, mundane routines and over
eagerness to show results, are factors
contributing to such malice. Of late,
psychological fatigue has started showing in the
form of frequent shooting incidents within
security forces camps.
Lack of Resources
Any number of mine
blasts could have been averted and many more
lives saved only if adequate resources, in terms
of expertise and specialized equipment, were
released by various headquarters to the troops
in ‘action’. A strange bureaucratic attitude had
set in and staff at various headquarters were
too miser to even release whatever was available
with them, leave alone requisition from other
sources. Even basic equipment like mine
detectors, prodders, radio sets etc were at
premium and none bothered to rationalize these
even within the same formation. Such callousness
was manifest almost everywhere. Military
intelligence fund never percolated down to
execution level troops. How could it have? It
was a means to procure exquisite wood carvings
and ‘Pashmina’ shawls by those who were at the
helm.
Inapt Media Handling
In all counter
insurgency operations consummate handling of
media is essential for success. Our senior
officers, too keen to show themselves off on TV
screens, were found wanting in this skill.
During Chrar Sharief operations, we saw a
General live on the national hookup declaring
that his troops were fully poised to catch
‘Major Mast Gul’ alive. To the General’s bad
luck Mast Gul did not oblige him. Just by one
amateurish comment on electronic media, Mast Gul
attained an instant ‘hero’ status. Escape of
Mast Gul was celebrated through-out the Valley
as an outright victory over Indian Army by the
militants.
Security forces have
to search appropriate answers to the militants’
threats soonest before costs of our involvement
in the battle rise further. A stock taking of
our responses thus far is necessary to plan
appropriate interventions if situation is to be
redeemed before it is too late.
Yoginder Kaudhari was commissioned in the
Regiment of Artillery in 1976. He served,
participated in counter insurgency operations in
Assam, Punjab, Jammu & Kashmir before seeking
premature retirement.
Source:
Kashmir
Sentinel
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