risis in Kashmir
continues to defy solution, not due to complexity of the problem but because the Indian political leadership has allowed itself to become prisoner of
myths, assiduously promoted by the vested interests inimical to Indian interests
in Kashmir. Such expressions- 'Maximum autonomy, short of secession', 'Sky is
the limit', 'dialogue within the framework of Insaniyat', 'borders are
irrelevant', 'we have to give something to Kashmiris to address their alienation
and accommodate their aspirations", etc. indicate how the separatists and
their apologists in Indian civil society continue to dictate the discourse on
Kashmir.
Kashmir problem has three dimensions one, it is part of
nonsecularisation of
Indian Muslim Community. If in
Kashmir it manifests as
secessionism, elsewhere it presents as cultural separatism. Legacy of two-nation
theory, pursuance of religious identity politics by the Valley's political
leadership, rise of Jamaat Islami as a significant force and the impact of
global Pan-Islamism have not left Kashmiris untouched. These processes have
acted as a brake on the process of secularisation in Kashmiri Muslim society.
How a weak secular society be a willing partner in secular nation-building? Many
solutions that are being flaunted would ultimately strengthen communal
consciousness in Kashmir and further deepen alienation. Kashmiri alienation is
actually the manifestation of a weak secular consciousness.
The second dimension is the issue of crossborder terrorism,
directly sponsored by Pakistan. As long as Pakistani Military-Civil oligarchy continues to visualise
Pak security in terms of bleeding India how can there be peace with Pakistan.
Whatever may be the compulsions for the latter to remain engaged in 'peace
process', there is as yet, no evidence about a paradigmal shift in Pakistan's
approach. Countering Pakistan's proxy war adequately and building strong
deterrents to immobilise internal support structures of subversion in Kashnmir
remain India's
best options. Weak signals emanating from
Delhi that
India was willing to accommodate
Pakistan and Kashmiri separatists 'for the sake of eternal peace' would convey
that terrorism pays.
Lastly, it is the internal dimension that has received little
attention, both by the scholars as well as the Indian political leadership.
Kashmir has been projected
as a problem between Kashmiri Muslims and the Indian state. Plurality of the
state, where other communities strongly opposed to secessionism outnumber
Kashmiris, is overlooked. J&K is treated as a homogenous entity and Kashmiris as
a monolithic group. In the past the Central government would reach a settlement
with a section of Kashmiri leadership and leave the people of state to their own
fate. This only worsened the situation. By addressing the internal dimension the
Centre can facilitate the return of peace but also help keep external
interference at bay.
'Demystifying
Kashmir',
authored by Navneet Chadha Behera breaks new ground by
dissenting from the myths woven around
Kashmir imbroglio over the past
two decades. The book's main value lies in that it tries to grapple with the
internal dimension in a way that has never been attempted before. The author
makes two profound statements. One, 'the deeply plural character of J&K
society is at the heart of the secessionist movement in the state and helps to
account for secessionist demands as well as failures'. Secondly, Chaddha
warns that while addressing the alienation of Kashmiris, one should not lose
sight of the political aspirations of other communities as well. She says,
"They had a great deal to do with the failure of the Kashmiris' secessionist
agenda in the 1950s and the 1990s and are a critical factor in shaping the
future peace process". Since 1947 the Valley leadership has been successful
in manipulating a political dispensation that has effectively marginalised
non-Kashmiri regions of
Jammu
and Ladakh, besides Kashmiri Pandits and Gujjars. This has weakened the
nationalist response in the state. The Centre has been more willing to listen
and accommodate the interests of Valley's political elite. Even today, be it the
issues of delimitation of constituencies or the solutions that are being peddled
the patriotic groups continue to receive the raw deal.
Navnita Behera has quoted extensively from history to show how
Kashmiri leadership has been pursuing hegemonist and sectarian
policies. She remarks that the National Conference had sought the status of
an autonomous republic in the Indian Union to safeguard and nuture the interests
of Kashmiris. But reversing the logic in J&K Kashmiris the majority community
were reluctant to share political power with Jammu and Ladakh...“Sheikh
Abdullah was not prepared to concede to Jammu and Ladakh those very rights and
privileges that he himself had demanded from the Indian state, which were not to
be interpreted as a step towards separatism but as a 'mutual accommodation of
each other's viewpoint".
The Constituent Assembly (dominated by NC) had created a
unitary state with a clear concentration of powers in the Valley through
disproportionate representation in both the constituent Assembly and the
State Assembly. In 1951 in 45 out of 49 seats Praja Parishad contested the
nomination papers were rejected on flimsy technical grounds, "thereby
subverting the democratic process and denying
Jammu a voice in shaping the
future political system".
Secondly, constitutionally and politically the state had no
systems of checks and balances. The slogans of despotic regime - 'one party,' 'one
leader', turned "Parliamentary democracy, resting on the principle of majority
rule, into a 'Kashmiri rule.' Chadha remarks, "The Unitary state structures
and parochial policies of the NC government favoured the Valley in political,
economic and administrative matters, leaving Jammu and Ladakh feeling neglected
and marginalised, and prepared to seek separation from the Valley".
Breaking up the Hindu-majority district of Udhampur,
Opposition to rehabilitation of refugees from PoK, imposition of Urdu in Jammu
and Ladakh, closing down of Sanskrit Research Department etc. by the Sheikh
Abdullah regime soon after 1947, have been quoted to show how NC pursued
sectarian politics. Ladakh too bore the brunt of communal governance. Chadha
records, "The studied indifference of the state government in transferring
Zanskar to Leh tehsil was in marked contrast to its willingness to grant Doda
the status of a separate Muslim-majority district in the
Jammu region".
No allocation was made in the
first budget for Ladakh's development, the region had no separate plan until
1961. Sheikh Abdullah began differentiating between the "Muslims and non-Muslims
of the State" - 'It is the Muslims who have to decide accession with India and
not the non-Muslims as the latter have no place in Pakistan and because their
only choice is India..."Chadha observes," His conception of the Kashmiri
identity had changed from "the people of J&K state" to mainly the "Kashmiri
Muslims".
Institutionalised discrimination against
Jammu and Ladakh forced these
regions to raise demands for regional autonomy. Instead of responding to
their legitimate grievances, the Valley leadership "sought to undercut the
political base of groups demanding regional autonomy by creating alternative
political alignments along communal lines". The author indicts ‘secular,
progressive’, GM Sadiq regime for sowing seeds of communalisation in Ladakh in
1960s. She says," to scuttle this movement (for regional autonomy), Chief
Minister GM Sadiq promoted a new leadership of lamas by favouring Kushak Thiksey
over Kushak Bakula and at the same time promoting the Muslim leadership of
Kargil over the Buddhist leadership of Leh...Sheikh Abdullah's decision to
divide Ladakh into 2 districts in 1979 - Leh and Kargil-created yet another
communal faultline in Ladakh, between its Buddhist and Muslim identity" Chadha
dismisses Hill Council, saying it has failed to adequately address local issues.
The author has situated political assertion of regional
identities in a historical and sociological perspective. On the issue of
Displaced Pandits she exposes the RAC (Regional Autonomy Committee) appointed by
NC government in 1996 by arguing, "The committee simply disregarded the
Pandit's demand for Panun Kashmir without offering an alternative strategy or
framework for redressing their grievances and securing their social, cultural,
economic and political rights".
Initially, though Gujjars gained political prominence when
Sheikh Abdullah tried to rope in the Muslim majority districts of Rajouri and
Poonch and the Kashmiri-speaking Muslims of Doda into a "Greater Kashmir" in the
late 1970s. Patriotic Gujjar community was then given short shrift by
Kashmir-dominated
State governments. ST status was not given to them until 1991. As a result,
Gujjars are now entitled to representation in proportion to their population in
the legislature, local self-governing institutions, government services, and
professional and technical institutions. Since Gujjars live in hilly areas, the
community can be given effective representation only by carving out Gujjar
dominated areas as Hill Constituencies. Their demand for reservation of
constituencies, to which they are entitled, is also not being acceded to. The
Gujjars fear threat to their interests from patronisation of Paharis by Valley
leadership.
The author has done good homework to expose the designs behind
the demand for Autonomous Hill Council for
Chenab region. She remarks,
"Critics view the demands for councils by the Muslim-majority districts of
Rajouri, Poonch, and Doda as part of a larger plan to break Jammu's plural identity and
reinforce the communal faultline within the Jammu region. Their claims are in part driven
by the desire to undermine the influence of the Gujjar and Bakkarwal leaders in
the region..Perhaps that is why the Gujjars do not support the demand for an
Autonomous Hill Council for Rajouri and Poonch".
Chadha is scathing in its indictment of NC government
appointed RAC - "the committee sought to protect only the "Muslim interests" to
the total exclusion of other ethnocultural, ethnolinguistic and ethnoreligious
minorities. While it was ready to lean backwards to accept the demand of Jammu
region's Muslim minority for separate provincial status, it did not even mention
the demand of the Hindu minority in the Valley-Kashmiri Pandits- for a Panun
Kashmir...Nor did it take notice of the Zanskar Buddhists long-standing demand
for these areas to be brought under Leh's administration. Likewise, it glossed
over the fact that Doda district had a significant Hindu minority alongside its
Muslim (58%) majority and made no provision for safeguarding the minority's
political interests".
Arguing that
attempts to superimpose communal boundaries would be divisive the author
visualises solution 'in providing a responsive government, rather than a
sharpening the communal boundaries'. Strongly advocating that power sharing
be inclusive, Navnita Chadha recommends that 'It is imperative for the
Central government to reach out to the minority communities in the peace process
and ensure that their political interests are safeguarded in any final
settlement". It is too early to say whether Round Table Conference would
deliver anything to non-Kashmiri groups and other minorities. Anyway,
'Demystifying
Kashmir',
is bound to
provoke debate on strategic blunders the Indian political leadership continues
to commit in Kashmir.
