Jammu and Kashmir: The issue
of Accession
By Dr. M.K. Teng
November 2010
Distortion of the history of the partition of
India, false propaganda and lies, shroud the
accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India in 1947,
as well as the exclusion of the State from the
Indian Constitutional organization by virtue of
Article370 of the Indian Constitution in 1950. The
Indian political class in its attempt to
substitute “greater autonomy “of the State, for
the “right of self-determination” , Pakistan and
the Muslim separatist forces have been demanding
during the last six decades, has undermined the
national consensus on the unity of India and the
secular Integration of the people of the State and
people of India on the basis of the general right
to equality.
Today the whole nation is
confronted with a situation which threatens to
disrupt the unity of the country and endanger its
territorial integrity. The people of India need to
stand up as one man to expose the perfidy which
has virtually pushed the State of Jammu and
Kashmir to the brink of disaster. Nearly half of
the State is under the occupation of Pakistan. To
allow the reorganization of the other half into a
separate sphere of Muslim power, will eventually
pave the way for the disintegration of the
civilisational boundaries of the Indian State.
Partition and the States
The creation of two Dominions
of India and Pakistan was restricted to the
division of the British India and the separation
of the British Indian provinces of Sind,
Baluchistan, North-west Frontier Province, the
Muslim majority contiguous regions of the province
of the Punjab, the Muslim majority eastern region
of the province of Bengal along with the Muslim
majority regions of the Hindu majority province of
Assam. The princely States, which formed an
integral part of the British Indian Empire, were
not brought within the scope of the partition
plan.
The process of the transfer
of power envisaged the lapse of Paramountacy, the
authority the British Crown exercised over the
States, liberating them from the British imperial
authority. The lapse of the Paramountacy
underlined the reversion of the powers, which the
British exercised in respect of the princely
States, to their rulers who were required, in
accordance with the transfer of power, to accede
to either of the two dominions or come to such
agreements with them as they deemed fit. The
British as well as the Muslim League insisted upon
the lapse of the Paramountacy and the reversion of
the powers to determine the future of the States,
to their rulers. Both the British as well as
Muslim league stubbornly opposed the proposals
made by the Indian National Congress to empower
the people of the States to determine the future
disposition of their States in respect of their
accession.
It is important to note that
the States formed an integral part of the British
Empire in India and were never recognized as
independent entities by the British during their
rule over India. The lapse of the Paramountacy
did not imply the independence of the States. This
was made expressly clear by British
under-Secretary of State for India, during the
debate on the Indian Independence Bill in the
British Parliament, when he categorically stated
that the British Government would neither accord
the status of Dominions to any princely State nor
recognize its independence. In fact, the truth is
that while negotiations on the partition plan were
in progress, the British officials assured Nehru
and the other Indian leaders that if the partition
plan was accepted, the Hindu majority provinces
and regions of the British India as well as the
princely States would be united in the Dominion of
India.
The Indian Independence Act
did not lay down any provisions in respect of the
procedure for the accession of the princely States
to the two dominions and the terms on which the
accession would be accomplished. After the 3 June
Declaration the States Department of the
Government of India was divided into two sections:
the Indian Section which was placed under Sardar
Patel and the Pakistan Section which was placed
under Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar of the Muslim
League. The task of laying down the procedure of
the accession of the States to India was entrusted
to the Indian Section and the task of laying down
the procedure for accession of the States to
Pakistan was entrusted to the Pakistan Section.
The Indian Section drew up an Instrument of
Accession for the accession of States to India. So
did the Pakistan Section for the accession of
States to Pakistan. The Instrument of Accession
enshrined the procedure and the terms in
accordance with which the rulers acceded to either
of the two Dominions. The Instrument of Accession
drawn up by the Indian Section laid down two sets
f terms and procedures, one for the larger
princely States and the other for the smaller
princely States. It is important to note here that
the States were provided no option, except to
accede to India on the terms and conditions laid
down by Indian Section or to accede to Pakistan on
the terms and conditions laid down by the
Pakistani Section of the Indian States Department.
All the larger princely States which acceded to
India, including Jammu and Kashmir, signed the
same standard form of the Instrument of Accession
and accepted the terms it enshrined.
The Instrument of Accession
enshrined acceptance by the rulers of princely
States to unite their domains with the Dominion of
India on terms and conditions and in accordance
with the procedure laid down by it. It has been
already noted here that princely States were never
recognized by the British as independent entities.
They formed a subsidiary structure of the British
colonial organization of India which was subject
to the British Crown. The lapse of Paramountacy
did not alter their status. Yes, the dissolution
of the Paramountacy opened the way for them to
stake claim to independence. Several of the
princely States in fact did stake their claim for
independence. When the British refused to
recognize the independence of the States, the
Nawab of Bhopal, who was then the Chancellor of
the Chamber of Princes approached the American
Diplomatic Mission in India to solicit support for
the independence of the States. The American
Mission promptly turned down the request of the
Nawab. That left no option for the Nawab to accept
to accede to India, which he did without any loss
of time. The ruler of Jammu and Kashmir was not
among the rulers, who staked claim for
independence of his State.
The Instrument of Accession
signed by the rulers of the princely States,
including Jammu and Kashmir, stipulated the
unification of the States with the two successor
States of the British Empire in India. The
transfer of power in India underlined the creation
of only two successor States of the British Indian
Empire: the Dominion of India and the Dominion of
Pakistan. The lapse of the Paramountacy put the
States on the inevitable course which led them to
accede to either of the two successor States.
The rulers located within the
geographical boundaries of the Dominion of
Pakistan, acceded to Pakistan. The ruler of Kalat,
who was opposed to the accession of Kalat to the
Dominion of Pakistan, was smothered into
submission by the Muslim League with the active
support of the British. All the other princely
States were situated in the geographical
boundaries earmarked for the Dominion of India.
The State of Jammu and Kashmir was contiguous with
both India and Pakistan. Its borders stretched
along the boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan
in the West and the South-west, while its borders
in the East and the South-east rimmed the
frontiers of the Dominion of India. The ruler of
Jammu and Kashmir, Maharaja Hari Singh harbored no
illusions about the accession of his State to
Pakistan and eagerly awaited a clearance from the
Congress leaders, who had secretly advised him not
to take any precipitate action in respect of the
accession of his State, till Hyderabad and
Junagarh were retrieved. He himself was aware of
the dangers of any wrong step on his part, which
he knew would lead to a chain reaction in the
States ruled by the Muslim rulers. He did not want
his State to be used as a pawn by Pakistan.
Pakistan had no special
claim to Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the
Muslim majority composition of its population. As
already mentioned here the Muslim League strongly
opposed any suggestion to recognize the right of
the people of the princely States to determine the
future of the States. It was only when Pakistan
failed to grab Jammu and Kashmir after it invaded
the State in October 1947, and the Indian military
action frustrated its designs to swallow Hyderabad
and Junagarh, both the States located deep inside
India, that Pakistan raised the bogey of
self-determination of the Muslims of the State of
Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of their numerical
majority.
Accession
The Instrument of Accession
was executed by the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir
State on the terms specified by the Dominion of
India. Neither the ruler of the State, Maharaja
Hari Singh, nor the National Conference leaders
played any role in the determination of the terms,
the Instrument of Accession underlined. Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah and many National conference
leaders were in jail when the transfer of power in
India was accomplished by the British. Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah was released from Jail on 29
September 1947, about a month and a half after the
British had left India. Three days after his
release the Working Committee of the National
Conference met under his presidentship and took
the decision to support the accession of the State
to India. The decision of Working Committee was
conveyed to Nehru by Dwarka Nath Kachroo, the
Secretary General of the All India States Peoples’
Conference, who was invited to attend the Working
Committee meeting of the National Conference as an
observer. Kachroo was a Kashmiri Pandit who had
steered the movement of the All India States
Peoples’ Conference during the fateful days in
1946-1947, when partition and the transfer of
power in India were on the anvil.
Interestingly the National
Conference leadership kept the decisions of the
Working Committee as a closely guarded secret.
Within a few days after the Working Committee
meeting, the National Conference leaders sent
secret emissaries to Mohammad Ali Jinnah and the
other Muslim League leaders. While Sheikh Mohammad
Abdullah held talks with a number of Muslim League
leaders of the Punjab, who had come to Srinagar
after his release, he sent two of the senior most
leaders of the National Conference, Bakshi Ghulam
Mohammad and Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, to Pakistan to
open talks with the Muslim League leaders. Jinnah
spurned the offer of reconciliation the National
Conference leaders made and refused to meet the
National Conference emissaries. Ghulam Mohammad
Sadiq was still in Pakistan when Pakistan invaded
the State during the early hours of 22 October
1947.
While the invading army
spread across the State Hari Singh sent his Prime
Minister, Mehar Chand Mahajan to Delhi to seek
help to save his State from the invasion and
offered accession of the State with India. Sheikh
Mohammad Abdullah had already reached Delhi. He
made no secret of the danger the State faced and
asked Nehru to lose no time in accepting the
accession and ensuring the speedy dispatch of the
Indian troops to the State. The instrument of
Accession was taken to Jammu by V. P. Menon, where
it was signed by the Maharaja. Menon then rushed
back to Delhi and got the Instrument Accepted by
Mountbatten. Next day, the air-borne troops of the
Indian Army, reached Srinagar.
Hari Singh laid no conditions
for the accession of the State to India. The
National Conference leaders were nowhere near the
process of the Accession of the State, to lay down
any condition for the accession of the State to
India. The Congress leaders including Nehru made
no promises to the National Conference leaders.
The terms of the Instrument of Accession were not
altered in any respect by the Viceroy. Nehru,
Patel or any other Congress leader gave no
assurance to the Conference leaders about autonomy
or Special Status of the State. In fact the
National Conference leaders did not make any such
demands at any time, while the process of the
accession was in progress.
The National conference
leaders demanded the exclusion of Jammu and
Kashmir from the Indian constitutional
organization in the summer of 1949, when the
Constituent Assembly of India was in the midst of
framing the Constitution of India. This was the
time when the foreign power intervention in Jammu
and Kashmir had just begun to have its effect on
the deliberations of the Security Council as well
as the developments in the State.
Legal platitudes apart, the
letter written by Mountbatten to Hari Singh
suggesting to elicit the opinion of his people,
did not prejudice the stipulations of the
Instrument of Accession. The Governor General of
India did not have the power to alter the
stipulations of the Instrument of Accession, nor
did Nehru, the Prime Minister of the Interim
Government of India, have any powers to make any
alterations.
The Instrument of Accession
was an act performed by the ruler of Jammu and
Kashmir to unite his domains with the State of
India. Mountbatten, in the capacity of the Crown
Prince as well as in the capacity of the Governor
General of India, had only one power to exercise:
to accept the Instrument of Accession, executed by
the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. The fact is that
as the Crown Prince and the Governor General of
the Indian Dominion, he exercised powers vested in
him by the Indian Independence Act, which were
strictly limited to his acceptance of the
accession of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh
offered. It is important to note that Mountbatten
could not refuse to accept the Accession of Jammu
and Kashmir to India. Indeed he had no powers to
refuse to accept the Accession of any other State
to India. So much so that he did not refuse to
accept the accession of Junagarh to India, which
was accomplished in a political crisis, the
rebellion of the people of the State against the
ruler led to.
Moreover Mountbatten did not
write the covering letter to Maharaja, because the
National Conference leaders had laid down any
condition to that effect, or because composition
of the population of the State of Jammu and
Kashmir was dominantly Muslim. Both Mountbatten’s
letter and Nehru’s commitment to elicit the
opinion of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, was in
continuation of the commitments the Congress
rulers had made to rulers and the people of
Hyderabad and Junagarh.
Nawab of Hyderabad was trying
frantically to align his State to Pakistan against
the wishes of his people. Hyderabad was situated
deep inside the Indian mainland, south of the
Vindhyas and Junagarh was situated in the midst of
Kathiawad States which had acceded to India. The
accession of Junagarh to Pakistan and the
insistence of the Nawab of Hyderabad threatened to
disrupt the unity of India and balkanize it. Nehru
as well as Patel pleaded with the Nawab of
Hyderabad to ascertain the wishes of his people in
respect of the accession of his State. Nehru as
well as Mountbatten repeatedly requested the
leaders of Pakistan to agree to refer the
accession of Junagarh to Pakistan, to the people
of the State. While Mehar Chand Mahajan was
pleading with Nehru to accept the accession
offered by Hari Singh, Junagarh was in a state of
civil war and Nawab of Hyderabad was secretly
plotting with Pakistan the course of action he
would take after Hari Singh had acceded with
India. Nehru sought to reinforce his interests in
Hyderabad and Junagarh by repeating the offer of
eliciting the opinion of the people of Jammu and
Kashmir in respect of their accession.
The Instrument of Accession
was a political instrument and the accession of
Jammu and Kashmir was a political act, which had
international implications for it formed a part of
the process of the creation of the state of India.
As such the Instrument of Accession, executed by
Maharaja Hari Singh, was irreversible and
irreducible, irrespective of the circumstances and
events in which it was accomplished.
The Indian princely States
were not required to execute any Instrument of
Merger. The claim made by some quarters in Jammu
and Kashmir that the State had not signed the
Instrument of Merger, which such quarters insist,
saved Jammu and Kashmir from being integrated in
the constitutional organization of India, is a
travesty of History. The State Department of India
laid down a procedure for the integration of
smaller princely States into administratively more
viable Unions of States. To complete the procedure
of integration of the small princely States into
the Unions of States, The State Department drew up
an Instrument of Attachment, erroneously described
as Instrument of Merger. The major Indian States,
including Jammu and Kashmir were not required to
sign the Instrument of Attachment. Also Instrument
of Accession had no bearing on the integration of
the States into the Indian Constitutional
Organization.
The withdrawal of the
invading army of Pakistan from territories of the
State under its occupation was the precedent
condition, laid down by Mountbatten, Nehru and the
Security Council for any reference to the people
of Jammu and Kashmir State. Pakistan refused to
withdraw its forces from the occupied territories
of the State. It has so far distorted the
discourse of the accession of the State to suit
its denial.
(Dr Mohan Krishen Teng
is a retired Head of Department of Political
science of Kashmir University. He has written
extensively on the constitutional and political
history of Jammu and Kashmir. His seminal works on
Article 370, Special Status, and government and
politics in Jammu and Kashmir have been
internationally acclaimed.)
Source: Kashmir
Sentinel
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