Pakistan's Real Intentions
Behind Such an Adventure
By Yoginder Kandhari
IN the haze of victory in Kargil that has
enveloped us, not many have yet analyzed India’s
response. It would be incorrect to term
Pakistani intrusions into Kargil sector a total
fiasco. Pakistan’s leadership, both political
and military, would have taken limited
sustainability of such intrusions into account
while planning Kargil operation. Pakistani aim,
therefore, would not have been solely to annex
territory but also to achieve larger
politico-military objectives. On political
plane, possible objectives were, firstly, to
bring Kashmir back into sharp international
focus, secondly, to expand area of conflict to
Ladakh region, which thus far had remained
untouched and lastly, to silence Nawaz Sharif’s
domestic critics and Islamic fundamentalists.
For any operation to be successful, it is
imperative that there is goal congruence at
political and military levels. This principle
would surely have been followed by the Pakistani
military planners. Moreover, this operation
offered military planners certain strategic spin
offs like tying down additional Indian Army
formations and in the bargain restricting their
alternate strategic employment, pushing in more
battled hardened militants into Jammu and
Kashmir and attempting a subtle psychological
war against Indian security forces by
engineering telling acts of sabotage in their
rear. Pakistan achieved her political and
military objectives to a great extent and that
in no way is a mean achievement.
Now let us examine Indian response to Pakistani
intrusions into Kargil. Firstly, our
intelligence agencies failed to gather any
information about the impending operation by
Pakistan. This was a multidimensional failure.
Not only did the agencies fail to gather any
information, there was a huge failure on part of
highest in the army hierarchy for it did not
asses such an eventuality in Kargil Sector. It
will be pertinent to mention here that
intelligence activity is not limited merely to
collection of hard information, it’s most
important aspect is to carry out a balanced
assessment of options available to the enemy
commander given his strengths and constraints.
It is here that our military leadership failed
miserably. It failed to pick enemy intentions
from loud and clear battle indications.
Firstly, it was no secret that we had
considerably thinned Kargil sector of troops,
during 1991-1992, when armed insurgency raised
its ugly head in Kashmir Valley. An infantry
division, less a brigade, was pulled out from
Kargil sector to Kupwara for counter
infiltration duty. Barely brigade strength of
troops was left there to guard 150 km of Line of
Control (LC). Did it not occur to the military
generals then that such a massive de-induction
of troops amounted to exposing own rear to
unchecked intrusions/infiltrations by the enemy?
Furthermore, Kargil has two strategic
connotations to it. One, it is flanked by
Siachen, a permanent battlefield between two the
countries, two; a strategically important
highway runs through it. This highway has
constantly been interdicted by Pakistani
artillery for last four years. These two
strategic aspects should have been reason enough
for our military planners to focus far more
tactical attention to this area. On the
contrary, we procrastinated and paid a heavy
price in terms of loss of about 400 gallant
soldiers.
Reports that Pakistani intruders purchased
cement from Kargil town for construction of
their bunkers in our area and about their
frequent visits to Kargil town, probably on
out-passes, add insult to injury. One wonders
where those were highly paid and jet-set
intelligence sleuths when all these enemy
activities were going on, for almost a year, in
our territory. May heads will have to roll in
case we are serious to arrest increasing trend
of criminal negligence to national security by
those very people who have been entrusted to
protect it. Even militarily, we failed to
carryout our basic tactical routine in an LC
environment. It is just not acceptable to shift
blame to non availability of latest surveillance
equipment. Had we been professionally honest
with accepted practice of sending long range
patrols, especially during winter months, we
would have been able to detect this intrusion
much before first week of May. Removing a
brigade commander and a unit commander would not
be enough. Every one up the chain has to accept
a portion of blame for management of LC
continues to be a joint responsibility of
commanders at all levels. How can one otherwise
explain Northern Army Commander’s assertion, in
third week of May, that intruders’ strength
being just 150-200 when in actual fact 2000 plus
were already parked in our territory.
Failure of intelligence agencies to forewarn
military commanders of an impending hostile move
by the enemy puts a fresh spanner into our
mobilization planning for war. Essentially, all
mobilization planning is based on the premise
that two to three weeks advance warning about
enemy’s belligerent moves would be given by
intelligence agencies to the defence forces.
Obviously, military planners will have to look
outside the realms of sand model discussions for
there is no guarantee that even satellites can
be depended upon fully, especially when even USA
could be fooled by our own men during Pokhran-II.
This shows human brain cannot be replaced by an
artificial intelligence gadget.
Kargil intrusions also caught us on wrong foot
as regards actual execution of our defence
plans. Our build-up for counter offensive took
longer than permitted by a fluid operational
time-frame. One could find artillery build-up
taking place till as late as mid June and
wonders if such a luxury would have been
available if whole of Indo-Pak border had been
activated. Our initial response was quite
strange. A mountain division, thickly involved
in counter-insurgency operations in the Valley,
was pulled out and moved to Kargil as a kneejerk
reaction to the intrusion. This left a gaping
tactical void in militancy infested Kashmir
Valley. No sooner was this division moved out
than militant activities rose to alarming
levels. In a ridiculous move, Director General
Rashtriya Rifles was directed to take charge of
counter-insurgency operations in the Valley,
thus compounding the confusion. For a long time
now there has been a talk about reorientation of
our combat effort in the Valley by establishing
a counter-insurgency grid by Rashtriya Rifle
battalions thus relieving Army formation for
conventional role. But nothing has moved on
ground and we were caught napping. This
necessitates a fresh tactical appraisal and
reassessment of our equipment requirement.
Shortage and inadequacy of basic warlike
equipment in our armed forces too has been
exposed during Kargil conflict. Here the blame
lies mainly with the narrow vision of our
political leadership. Concept of perspective
planning has sadly been missing from our
political monitors. It, surely, can not be given
due attention if we have political leaders like
Mulayam Singh Yadav at the helm of national
defence establishment. Such leaders, other than
favouring a few from their own state or cast,
can do precious little in casting a durable
defence policy. Arming of defence forces can not
be done overnight. Typical facet of Indian
defence planning is that General Staff
Qualitative Requirements (GSQRs) get obsolete by
the time equipment is introduced into service.
Kargil episode exposed our soft under belly in
this respect too. We were found wanting in
basic warlike equipment like LMGs, radio sets
etc. Certainly, this shortage has not been
created by our political masters. Army has been
living in austerity for three decades as far as
critical equipment is concerned. Commanders have
been wary of declaring units unfit for war on
account of equipment deficiencies. In such an
organizational environment better results would
appear to be distant dreams.
Kargil intrusions have put paid
to our claims that insurgency is waning in the
Valley and that normalcy was just round the
corner. Pakistan by one clever maneuver injected
a life booster to insurgency in the state.
Pakistan has extended the conflict zone in Jammu
and Kashmir to hitherto untouched Ladakh region,
thus projecting entire state of J&K as disputed
area. By pulling security forces’ combat
attention to Kargil, it is estimated, that
Pakistan has succeeded in pushing additional
2000 militants into the state out of whom 500
have specifically been tasked to take on
security forces and their camps. Even militant
engagements have shown qualitative improvement.
From ‘stand-off’ engagements, militants’
activities have graduated to ‘pitched battles’.
Recent militant attacks have shown signs of
mature military acumen thus portending
protracted combat in future. All these daring
actions by militants are likely to be a
psychological tonic for local Kashmiris to
resist the Indian state further. In fact,
Pakistan is fighting Indian Army on
psychological plane in order to render her weak
for a conventional engagement. With Kargil
heights now likely to house a division plus
troops permanently, Indian Army’s commitment in
the Valley has tremendously increased thus
restricting our strategic option elsewhere.
Notwithstanding Indian political leadership’s
statements to the contrary, Pakistan has been
able to bring international focus back on
Kashmir. Whole Kargil operation thus requires a
fresh appraisal by our
defence thinkers.
Source: Kashmir
Sentinel
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