Since the very inception of the ‘Kashmir issue’, the United States has been
partial towards Pakistan. In its perception Pakistan was a better bet in
enabling her to complete the encirclement of the USSR. More over, even when
Islamic Ummah adopted Kashmir and fundamentalists started playing games of
subversion and sabotage in Kashmir, the US was unmoved. It con-tinued to
treat Kashmir problem as ‘Pakistan specific’ despite clear indications of
‘Afghan connection’ and pan-Islamic funda-mentalist dimensions that not only
bracketed Kashmir and Afgha-nistan together for the purpose of determining
strategy of take over a part of enforcing Nizam-i-Mustapha world-over. The
Islamic fundamentalists recognise no national boundries and believe in the
indivisibility of the Ummah. And history is witness to bloody wars between
the Muslim and Christian fundamentalists. The pan-Islamic fundamentalist
made no secret about their taking on the ‘Christians’ after the communists
were humbled. Despite all this, the USA in its single minded commitment to
drive the Soviets from Afghanistan, recklessly poured money and military
hardware through a regime in Pakistan that was headed by a dictator
Zia-ul-Haq known as “the Mullah in Khaki”. The USA turned a blind eye to the
diversion of money and weapons meant for Afghanistan to J&K for stoking the
‘proxy war’ and utilising the training facil-ities in Afghanistan by the
Kashmiri terrorists. She did not object to the allocaton of critical role to
Pakistan Jamiat-i-Islami in promoting Jehad in Afghanistan by the Pak ISI.
It was only after Najib was tricked into abdication Zia-ul-Haq perished in
an air crash and the Afghan groups began to jump at each others throat that
the mist cleared some what and the US policy planners recognised in
Hikmatyar less of a crusader and more of a narcotic peddler. The horrors of
narco-terrorism in which the core agency Pak ISI was an active participant
and benificiary and the repercussion back home compelled them to alter
course. Hikmatyar was discarded. However, the remedy engineered in the
formation of Taliban under the stewardship of Moulana Fazal-ul-Reman of the
Jamiat-ul-Ulmai-Pakistan proved worst than the disease. The Taliban soon
left no one in doubt that they were the worst fundamentalists,
obscurantnists and fanatics. The last nail in the coffin of the US policy
was hammered in by the friend turned foe, Osma Bin Laden, the Saudi
billionare. The bombing of American embassies in Africa and the American
counter attack from which Osma, a guest of the Taliban in Afghanistan
survived along with his four wives and fifteen children left the Pentagon
and the CIA red-faced. The Taliban refused even to discuss the extra-dition
of their ‘guest’, who they said was innocent. The world-wide activities and
direct assault on the American interests by pan-Islamic fundamentalists thus
forced the USA to review its policy in the global conext.
In the pan-Islamic strategic planning, the JEHAD in Kashmir was to be
launched only after the grip in Afghanistan had been firmed up. They were
unhappy with the precipitation in Kashmir premature and even accused JKLF,
the pioneers in unleashing militancy in Kashmir in 1988 as “acting at the
behest of India”. It was some-time in August-September, 98 that the
ISI,-Taliban axis started working on Taliban intervention in Kashmir. About
that time, Bin Laden was also busy working on participation in Kashmir by
his men. The only route from Afghanistan to Kashmir lay through the
so-called northern areas, a part of J&K state forceably occupied by
Pakistan. It was inaccessable to the outside world. But these advatanges,
the strategists felt, were more than offset by two forbidding
considerations. Firstly, there was no scope of local help or sympathy for
the extremists Sunni Taliban from a predomi-nently Shia population. In fact,
there were apprehensions of sabotage by “Indan Shia agents”. Secondly, the
US would be hos-tile to any intervention by the Taliban. The option was
there-fore discarded. I had written about this in an article titled “Are the
Afghan Taliban Comming?” in the daily Kashmir Times (4, Nov. 98). I had,
however warned:-
“Realisticaly speaking, the Pan-Islamic fundamentalists be they the Taliban,
Bin Laden or other mercenaries of Arabic or Afghan origion, have very little
choice but to persist with smuggling their goons across LOAC. Unfortunately,
the Indian government has failed to come up with appropriate preventive and
detective mechanism”.
Till the “gouri” was test fired, Pakistan government was avoiding any open
contact with fundamentalist organisations. It left the dirty work to the
ISI. But to everyone’s surprise a high level delegation led by the Pakistan
Information Minister, Mushahid Hussain and including the governor of Punjab
and atleast four ministers of the Punjab government openly visited the
headquar-ters of the notorious Dawat-al-Irshad in Murdike, which
indoc-trinates, trains and equips terrorists of the Lashkar-e-Toyba,
presently active in J&K. The Lashker has since been declared a terrorist
organisation by the USA. Mushahid Hussain expressed total agreement with the
concept of Jehad being taught in the Dawat and showered praise on the
contribution being made by them to the sacred cause of the Islamic Ummah”.
Hafiz Saeed, the chief of the Markiz boasted of the victories of
Lashkar-e-Toiba in Kashmir and declared “As soon as the Jehad in Kashmir is
cmplet-ed, his organisation will launch a Jehad in India, where 20 crore
Muslims were living as second class citizens”. “It will be naive to dismiss
the intent to launch Jehad in whole of India for which ground is alreayd
being laid, as mere rehotoric. In any case informa-tion of an impending
Pak-Islamic Fundamentalists intrusion via Notheren areas was in abundance
and the Indain intelligence agencies just could not have missed it. That the
American knew can safely be persumed. As for India is concerned, former spl
secretary RAW, Balchanderan was perhaps right when he wrote, “The probem may
not have been so much as absence of intelligence as inadequate stategic
assessment”. The bits of intelligence that flowed were not put together to
form the larger picture that would expose enemy strategic plan. The rest if
history.
The Pak incursion through her own troops with a smattering of ‘Mujahideen’
made headway in Drass-Kargil-Batalik-Turtuk sector and occupied some very
strategically important heights. Though late to respond, Indian army and
airforce hit with ferocity, Pakistan had lest expected. They were
particularly taken aback by the involvement of Indian Air Force. Armies soon
confronted each other all along Indo-Pak borders as Indians Army began to
write a new glorious chapter in the military history. The world ‘police man’
had, if nothing else reason to justify his role as such and react to a
possible all out confrontation between two nuclear powers. And react it did,
in a manner that Pakistan had not anticipated.
The USA disapproved of the armed intrusion violating the Line of Actual
Control drawn as part of the 1972 Shimla agreement between India and
Pakistan and demanded that the intruders return to their side of the LOAC.
She refused to go along with a string of lies doled out by Pakistan from its
non-involvement in an “indi-ginous” Mujahideen war of independence to
allegations of atroci-ties by Indian troops. She appriciated the restraint
shown by India in not crossing the LOAC, even though it cost the Indian army
precious human lives. Similarly, they were also praise for the Indian Air
Force resisting the temptation to hit across despite extreme provoation of
torture of a piolt after capture to the extent of causing his death through
inhuman and brutal means. Indians once again demonstrated complete
solidarity in the face of external aggression and our jawans and officers
exhibted unsurpassed valour, highest sense of duty and heights of
patri-otism, untouched any where by any one lese. They recaptured peak after
peak taking unthinkable risks and making unparalleled sacrifices. They died
as heroes and martyres and inflicted heavy casualties on the well
entrenched, better equipped and well stocked enemy. The world including USA
watched with awe and admiration. The Indian Republic had come of age.
But the ‘shift’ in US policy has to be viewed in the context of her own
national vested interest in seeing the Pan-Islamic funda-mentalists, who
were calling the shots in the Kargil conflict, defeated. Thier success would
severly endanger American vital iterests and encourage them to further
extend their influence in “religiously sensitive areas” around the globe.
Even China, a long time friend of Pakistan and no friend of India, refused
to go along with Pakistan on Kargil for fear of escalation of Islamic
fundamentalist uprising in her own Muslim majority back yard. Same was the
case with Russia, who after a bitter experience in Chechaniya was anxiously
watching fundamentalist forays into erstwhile Soviet republics in Central
Asia especially those bordering Aghanistan. The recent developments in
Dagistan hase proved them right. The assessment of the European community
was the same as that of the USA. Thus the misadventure in Kargil at the
behest of her Pan-Islamic fundamentalist left Pakistan isolated and
friendless. She had to bow before the world opinion in the diplomatic
circles and superior battle worthyness of the Indian Army in the field and
agree to withdraw the intruders even though clinging to the myth that her
army and citizens were not involved.
The change in American perceptions in respect of India, her mounting
commercial interests in this country and recognition of her long term
problems with an economically and militarily growing China out to benefit
from economic globalisation and liberalisation without imbibing democratic
values and system does open, as they say a ‘window of opportunity” in
improving Indo-American relations in variety of fields, for mutual benefit.
But let us remember that the ‘shift’ in our favour in Kargil conflict does
not mark the dissolution of Pak-America friendship or even a dilution of the
crucial role that American long term policy envisage for her in central and
South Asia. The opposition from fundamentalist groups and parties in
Pakistan and threats to his life have, infact reasserted Nawaz Sharifs
position as a ‘modern’ political figure’ in American mind. His position has
further been strengthened by his ability to carry his party and the Pak army
along. But then we need not relate the positive movement towards better
Indo-American relations to Pak-American relations. There is a vast area of
mutual benefit in which Pakis-tan is no factor. What is really necessary is
that we tread the path of improving relations between the two countries with
dire care and caution from a position of equality. There is certainly no
need to bend backwards as foreign minister Jaswant Singh has recently done
by saying that India policy post cold war was un realistic as far as America
was concerned.