Beyond the Intelligence Failure
Lapses in Ladakh
By P. Stobdan
THE
Pakistani intrusion in Kargil is reminiscent of the Chinese intrusion of
1962 in
Ladakh’s eastern flank, when the PLA caught the incometently-led and
ill-equipped
Indians by surprise. Internally, the issue of intelligence
failure was
raised then too. The Chinese troops withdrew to positions north
of the
McMohan Line under strong international condemnation. The same way,
the
intruders may withdraw now to the LoC position. But questions will
continue to
haunt the people as to why Indian territory repeatedly gets
encroached
upon and the Indian security forces are caught napping.
In 1948
also, the day was May 9, when the Pakistani Ibex and Eskimo Forces
captured
Kargil and Drass and advanced further up to Leh and pushed back
towards the
onset of winter in November. Military history since the 13th
century has
proved Kargil to be the most critical strategic point. The very
name Kargil
has a strategic meaning: kar (white) akhil (location/place) in
Tibetan also
spells as gar-gil meaning a cross-junction. The name signified
its location
at the cross-point between Skardu and Leh and Kashgar and
Srinagar.
Kargil has a unique strategic position which opens up four valleys
(Drass-Suru-Wakha-Indus).
The Pakistani military always considered Kargil a
check-point
for operation in Ladakh.
The
three-pronged strategy this time was to cut off Drass and Kargil from
Leh and
Srinagar, before Zojila is opened, enter the Indus Valley through
Batalik and
Chorbatla to capture areas upto Khaltse, and enter Shayok Valley
to recapture
254 sq miles of Turtuk, comprising five villages, Chalungka,
Thang,
Tyakshi, Pharol and Turtuk. But for the early opening of the Zojila
in April,
the Pakistani Army would have certainly accomplished its
objectives.
Pakistan has
been eyeing Ladakh for years, primarily to regain areas it lost
to India
since 1971. However, it has faced difficulties on two accounts.
First,
unlike in the Valley, Ladakh was not ripe for an Islamic revolution,
though
efforts had been made to communalise the region through subversive
means.
Secondly, the topographically feature (naked mountains) was not
favourable
for guerrilla operation.
To overcome
these, since the summer of 1997, Pakistan has resorted to
large-scale
occasional artillery shelling in Kargil. The aim was to
terrorise
the sequestered people so as to push and scare them away from the
high ridges.
This tactic has helped the Pakistani Army significantly in
undermining
Indian intelligence-gathering abilities.
Pakistan has
also been using the battle-hardened Afghan militia who fought
the
opposition in the Hind Kush and Pamir heights. Pakistan also has a
militia
raised locally to suit the terrain and climate. The objective was to
disrupt
communications, destroy supply dumps and gain the aid of the local
populace in
a hope-for general uprising.
New Delhi’s
assessment has been that the area north of Valley along the
frontier
with Baltistan is not prone to infiltration and subversion. On the
surface, it
has appeared that the Shia Purig-pa and Wahabi Shinas of Ladakh
would be
averse to Pakistani game plan. The situation on the ground,
however,
reveals as well-thought-out Pakistani plan for an Islamic uprising
in Ladakh
too-a plot hatched nine years ago.
What made it
worse was the Indian government’s own decision to separate
Kargil from
Ladakh as a separate administrative zone. This was done on July
1, 1979, a
year after the Iranian Revolution. The step has helped the
Pakistani
cause considerably.
By the early
eighties, the Shias of Kargil not only refused to support a
Union
Territory status for Ladakh but also rejected the offer of an
Autonomous
Hill Council status, essentially to mark their solidarity with
the Kashmiri
cause. The communal division of Ladakh has created a host of
issues with
wide implication for national security.
The Kargil
crisis, therefore, is not a case of intelligence failure but an
utter
intellectual failure. The faulty military command and deployment
strategy has
been evident. To have left the entire stretch of over 75
kilometres
of a vulnerable border to a sole brigade in Kargil was a criminal
mistake,
though the trend of the Pakistani thrust in the Ladakh sector was
clear since
1997.
While
intruding into Kargil, Pakistan has opened qualitatively a new front
vis-a-vis
India. While gaining control over the mountain heights, it has
managed
politically to widen the scope of Kashmir conflict on the ground.
Pakistan has
also the impression, as evident from the broadcasts from Radio
Azad Kashmir
and Radio Skardu, that the Buddhist Ladakhis too are getting
averse to
India’s rule. In the absence of India’s inaction to regain the PoK
through
offensive means, the Pakistanis would only like to alter the
existing LoC
to their own advantage. Particularly in view of what is
regarded as
an erosion of India’s ability to checkmate Pakistan after the
Soviet
collapse. India has been pushed on to a geopolitically defensive
position
after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban. Pakistan has certainly
managed to
gain a "strategic depth" for its rivalry against India.
The trend
also indicates Pakistan’s ideological agenda beyond Kargil--and
into China’s
Xinjiang. The attempt by Pakistan-based Islamic militant
outfits to
penetrate western China has been foiled by Central Asian states,
especially
by Uzbekistan when it threatened Islamabad with severe
consequence
should it try to push the Islamic agenda beyond Afghanistan.
There are
reports about hundreds of Chinese Ughur militants trained by the
Jamaat-e-Islami and the Tablik-e-Jamaat stranded in Pakistan due to China’s
strict
vigilance. The possibility of the militants looking for a passage via
Kargil into
Xingjiang cannot be ruled out.
Clearly, the
government’s naive policies with regard to Ladakh have
contributed
to Pakistani designs. New Delhi’s shortsightedness to bifurcate
Ladakh on
communal grounds will have disturbing implications for national
security for
a long time to come. New Delhi’s policy of giving a free hand
to Srinagar
to deal with Ladakh’s affairs has only compounded the security
vulnerability.
Reversing
the situation may not be an easy task as Pakistan has devised
sufficient
ways and means to sustain high-altitude guerrilla warfare tactics
in Ladakh
ranges. If India is serious about defending Ladakh, it will have
to reshape
its policy not only by politically regaining the confidence of
the people
but also by gearing up military preparedness while raising and
strengthening the existing local armed forces, the Ladakh Scouts. This could
only be done
if the Ladakh infantry units are conferred with a regimental
status.
After all, India can live with the Kashmir problem but neglecting
Ladakh will
be suicidal.
The author
is Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New
Delhi.
Source: Kashmir
Sentinel
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