AFGHANISTAN FACTOR IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIAN POLITICS

BY

HIMALAYAN RESEARCH AND CULTURAL FOUNDATION

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1.0 PREFACE

Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of Central, South and West Asia, sharing its borders with the Central Asian States of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on the north, Chinese province of Xinjiang in the east, Iran on the west and south-west, and Pakistan and Pak-occupied territory of Kashmir on the south and south-east. Due to its strategic placement Afghanistan became the focal point of intense rivalry between Tsarist Russia and Britain during the nineteenth century. Afghanistan remained at the centre stage of international politics as a theatre in the cold war games of super powers with Pakistan acting as the frontline state of USA for channelling its financial, material and military supplies to the Afghan Mujahideen. Pakistan used this opportunity to divert part of these supplies to Indian border states of Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, thereby promoting the Klashnikov culture, trans-border terrorism and religious extremism. In the post-cold war era, which has witnessed the demise of USSR and establishment of an Islamic state led by Mujahideen, Afghanistan has assumed importance due to its potential to influence the societies and politics in its bordering countries. This has amply been demonstrated by the events in Tajikistan. The Central Asian states and Russia have
responded by denouncing the export of terrorism and Islamic extremism and by declaring the 'Inviolability of State Borders'. They have acted together to defend the Tajik-Afghan border. Fresh eruption of factional fighting in Afghanistan and shifting equations between the rival groups has once again brought this region in the spotlight of international attention.

It is in this backdrop that the Himalayan Research and Cultural Foundation has devoted the first of its Occasional Paper Series exclusively to the study of Afghanistan's involvement in Central and South Asian politics and the challenges posed thereby to these states.

K. Warikoo provides an insight into the trans-border movements across the Tajik-Afghan border, export of Islamic militancy from Afghanistan to Central Asian states and the subsequent responses by these states and Russia to meet the new challenge.

Uma Singh examines the involvement of Pakistan in funnelling military and other supplies to Afghan Mujahideen and evaluates the negative results of the spread of klashnikov culture, drug trafficking and Afghan refugee problem on the society and politics in Pakistan.

A. K. Ray has with the support of documentary evidence exposed the role of Pakistan in manipulating Afghan Mujahideen and Islamist radicals in the ongoing terrorism in Kashmir.
2.0 COCKPIT OF CENTRAL ASIA: AFGHANISTAN FACTOR IN TAJIKISTAN'S CRISIS

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2. Ethnicity and Politics in Central Asia;
3. Afghanistan Factor in Central and South Asian Politics;
5. Central Asia: Emerging New Order, and

Geographical contiguity, racial and religious affinity and long established border trade have provided a strong basis for cross-border fraternization between the people of Central Asia and adjoining Afghanistan, particularly its northern part also known as Afghan Turkestan. Afghanistan not only shares its borders with the three Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmanistan, but the majority of people settled in northern Afghanistan are also of the Central Asian stock. About 4 million Tajiks, 1.7 million Uzbeks and half a million Turkmens live in Afghanistan. Besides, the Pamir Tajiks living in the Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous oblast of Tajikistan share their language and lifestyle with their counterparts in the Badakhshan region of Afghanistan.

2.1 Afghanistan and Central Asia: Trans-Border Contacts

Notwithstanding their intra-ethnic or intra-tribal diversities, this Central Asian population of northern Afghanistan has been quite conscious of its group identity as distinct from the Pashtun majority of Afghanistan. This is becoming increasingly obvious from the political assertion by the Uzbek and Tajik factions led by General Dostam and Ahmad Shah Masood, respectively, in the post-Najib era in Afghanistan. For most part of its history, the influence of Pashtuns and the central government at Kabul over Afghan Turkestan including Badakhshan has remained tenuous at least till Amir Abdur Rahman Khan subdued the area in 1884. And at about the same time, the northern boundary of Afghanistan was delineated and duly recognized by the Afghan, British and Russian authorities. Areas north of the Oxus such as Shignan, Roshan, Pamirs etc. came under Russian control and the areas south of the Oxus including Wakhan were recognized as part of Afghanistan. But this did not mean the cessation of links between the two sides.

The traditional border trade and family ties between the people of this region developed over the years particularly after the improvement of communication facilities under the Soviet regimes. The Soviets used the cultural similarities among people living north and south of the Oxus, to bolster the pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan. Closer interaction between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, particularly the exchange of students, academics, literatueurs, artists, media persons,
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cultural delegations etc. was encouraged. Mazar-i-Sharif became the main center of economic exchanges between the two sides, as it was well connected by roads with Central Asia. Cotton produced in northern Afghanistan was trucked to Tashkent for processing. Movement of people and their goods increased. Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed agreements of technical, scientific, educational and cultural cooperation envisaging exchanges of scholars, scientists etc. A joint Afghan-Tajik enterprise Intertrans which was set up in southern Tajikistan's Kurgan Tyube oblast, engaged itself in the transport of textile and consumer goods from Afghanistan to Tajikistan. In September 1992 Mayors of Dushanbe and Mazar-i-Sharif signed formal agreements on economic and social cooperation. Similarly an Afghan firm concluded an agreement with the Central Samarkand Store undertaking to supply goods to Samarkand. In southern Turkmenistan, a power line was laid up to the Afghan border village of Mari Chaq to bring electricity to more than 1000 Turkmen families living in this village. More recently, Afghanistan has joined the Iran sponsored Association of Persian Speaking Peoples. A joint meeting of the member countries - Iran, Tajikistan and Afghanistan was held in Teheran in February 1992 in which it was agreed to revive and spread the Persian language, traditions and customs of the three countries. All these measures have only helped in strengthening the hands between the people and more 50 those of the Central Asian racial stock living on both sides of the Oxus.

2.2 Rise of Islamic Militancy in Tajikistan

The specter of cross border movement, which was earlier limited to social and trade contacts, changed dramatically after the Soviet army's intervention in Afghanistan which was perceived as direct Communist attack on Islam. The Soviets and those who represented the Soviet regimes came to be seen as the enemies of Islam. This was more so because most of the present settlers in northern Afghanistan had left Central Asia as refugees at the height of anti-Soviet Basmachi movement (1917-21) and the collectivisation campaigns in early 1930s. For instance, Azad Beg - the sixty year old leader of the Islamic Union of the Northern Provinces of Afghanistan (Ittihadiya-i-Islami-yi-vilayat-i-Samt-i-Shamil-i-Afghanistan), who is responsible for numerous operations against the Soviet forces, is closely related to Ibrahim Beg, one of the leader of the Basmachi movement. (Naseeruddin, the last Amir of Kokand was Azad Beg's maternal great grandfather). That this Islamic Union was founded in Peshawar in 1981 with the help of Pakislan government for "bringing together all the Turks (az Nizhadi-Turk) of Afghanistan and then to liberate Soviet Turkestan", was disclosed by Azad Beg himself in an interview to a French scholar, Olivier Roy. Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) provided Azad Beg "great deal of money and weapons to build an alternative framework for channeling Turkic nationalism against both the Soviet and Kabul regimes". It is not a mere coincidence that Pakistan's forward policy in Afghanistan and trans-Oxiana was pursued by Mirza Aslam Beg, former Chief of Pakistan's army, who is a descendant of a Central Asian muhajir and is also related to Azad Beg. Azad Beg did succeed in enlisting the support of some Uzbek, Tajik and even Turkmen field commanders, notably Uzbek muhajirs from Soviet Central Asia like Khaluddin of Kunduz and Ait Murad from Barqa (Baghlan province). Azad beg who has been operating in Balkh, Djauzdjan, Farib, Sari Pul and Samangan areas, has been actively involved in shipping weapons to his Islamic supporters in Tajikistan". That the Central Asian muhajirs from Tajikistan who migrated to Afghanistan during the Bolshevik revolution are in the forefront of what is described as jehad (Holy war), was confirmed by Mohammad Sharif Himatzade, Chief of Islamic Renaissance party (IRP) presently in exile in Afghanistan. Common ethnic and religious
background of the people inhabiting this border region facilitated the cross-border smuggling of religious and subversive literature, arms and ammunition by the Afghan mujahideen into Tajikistan.

The rapid politicization of Islam and the emergence of a militant Islamic fundamentalist movement in Tajikistan took place after the Soviet action in Afghanistan. This coupled with the success of Khomeini revolution in Iran brought a new awakening among the Muslims of Central Asia. The Central Asian clerics and Sufi brotherhoods which withstood the Soviet policies, now not only became stronger but came under the influence of Wahabism - the radical and politicized form of Islam. The Afghan mujahideen established wide contacts with the Tajiks particularly after the Soviet troops most of whom were from Central Asia, landed in Afghanistan. They started crossing the border into Tajikistan where they were greeted by radical Islamic activists. Afghan mujahideen Leaders acknowledge that the 1979 Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan "helped re-establish links between the Tajiks and their Muslim brethren in Afghanistan, who have the same language, same culture, same religion and same ancestors in common". Another mujahideen leader Masood Khalili disclosed that Soviet soldiers conscripted from Tajikistan were not only reluctant to fire on Afghans but they even sold their rifles to purchase the Koran. Two Afghan resistance parties, namely Jamat-i-Islami led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar were particularly active enrolling members and distributing shabnemeh (night letters) in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. These Afghan mujahideen groups evoked maximum response from young Tajiks with high education, especially teachers and engineers.

Reports about the active involvement of Afghan mujahideen in propagating jihad in Tajikistan began to appear in the Soviet press since 1986, that is following Gorbachev's policy of glasnost (openness) in the media. K.M. Makhkamov, the then first Secretary of the Tajik Communist Party admitted at a party meeting held in Dushanbe on August 30, 1986 that young people and children were getting increasingly swayed by propaganda from across the border. Communist Tajikistan of December 30, 1987 published a statement of Tajik KGB Chief, Petkel confirming the existence of "hostile foreign ideological centres and organisations in Tajikistan". An article in the same paper of May 13, 1988 disclosed that Islamic revolutionary literature was being distributed in thousands, which was later confirmed by Afghan mujahideen sources. There was wide circulation of audio cassettes, video films etc. to spread radical Islam in Tajikistan. Works of Maududi - the founder of Jamat-i-Islami, Said Kutab, Muhammed Kutab and Jamal Din Afghani, the noted Muslim revolutionary were translated into Russian and printed at Peshawar and then smuggled across Afghanistan into Tajikistan for wide circulation. Wahabism gained roots in the rural areas of Tajikistan especially along the Tajik-Afghan border. The Wahabi literature that was smuggled via Afghanistan, lays emphasis on religious absolutism and is opposed to Sufism and holy shrines which represent the traditional and tolerant trend in Islam. Tajikistan's Wahabi leader Abdullo Saidov advocated the creation of an Islamic State and called for jihad against the Soviets. This ideological onslaught was followed by the smuggling of arms and militant cadres across the Oxus. That the Soviet Borderguards under the authority of KGB failed to prevent illicit traffic on the Tajik-Afghan border was illustrated in March and April 1987 when Afghan mujahideen staged two cross-border armed attacks in Kulyab and Kurgan Tyube regions of southern Tajikistan. Apart from the surreptitious trans-border movements and smuggling of arms and ammunition, Afghan mujahideen leaders openly abetted rise of militancy among the Muslims of Tajikistan. For instance, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Masood, both being Tajiks and belonging to Jamat-i-Islami faction, reacted strongly to the Dushanbe
disturbances of February 1990 (anti-Armenian riots). They characterised these disturbances as "freedom movement" or "internal revolt" against the "Soviet Subjugation". Harping on the linguistic, cultural, religious and racial affinity of Tajiks and Afghans, these leaders exhorted the Muslims in Central Asia to break from Moscow. Rabbani warned that "the Afghans living on this side could create complications for the Soviets".

From the foregoing discussion it becomes clear that the Afghan mujahideen groups with active guidance and assistance of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) played a key role in fomenting the Islamic military in Tajikistan with a view to establish a friendly Islamic State there. The Deputy Chairman of Tajikistan's KGB, Belousov openly accused Pakistan's intelligence services of carrying out a subversive programme code-named 'M' to destabilise the socio-political situation in Central Asia. Belousov claimed that 150 groups of Afghan mujahideen were operating near the Tajik border and training centres were set up to give religious and military training to youth Tajiks. And by the time the Soviet Union crumbled, an underground network of Islamic movements, arms dumps and trained Islamic militants had positioned themselves in Tajikistan for launching the offensive to oust the remnants of Communist system and establish an Islamic form of government. This is borne out by the subsequent events in Tajikistan which has witnessed the rise of Islamic fundamentalist political parties and proliferation of armed bands resulting in bloody armed clashes between rival groups.

2.3 Crisis in Tajikistan

Soon after its independence in 1991, Tajikistan has been engulfed by political conflict and violent inter-group clashes between the pro-Communist and the Islamist forces and their supporters. Regional disparities both in terms of ethnic composition and economic-industrial base, have further complicated the situation. Khodjand in the north and Kulyab in the south of Tajikistan, which have a strong presence of Uzbek population, have been the communist strongholds. These have given determined fight to the radical Islamic groups led by the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) and the Rastokhez, which draw support from majority of Tajiks living in Dushanbe and Kurgan Tyube and Gorno Badakhshan regions which are adjoining Afghanistan. Trans-border infiltration of armed bands and smuggling of arms has been the main destabilising factor. Besides, Afghan Mujahedin controlling the Afghan border have been actively involved in armed clashes with the Russian and Tajik border guards. About 500 Tajik transgressors were reported to have been detained at the Tajik-Afghan border in the first six months of 1992 alone. 50 Afghans who were heading for Termez with drugs were also detained. The establishment of Islamic government in Afghanistan led by Mujahideen factions gave a boost to Islamic fundamentalist groups in Tajikistan. The Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, which is populated by the Ismailis and where the influence of Islamist groups has been strong, declared itself as Badakhshan Autonomous Republic in April 1992. On May 10, 1992 the Chairman of Democratic Party of Tajikistan, Shodmon Yusufov issued a public appeal to Afghanistan asking for aid in the ongoing conflict between pro-Nabiyev and Islamic opposition forces and also against the "interference" of the CIS forces in "Tajikistan's internal crisis". This statement only accentuated the crisis, as the incidence of cross-border infiltration and smuggling of arms from Afghanistan increased manifold. So much so, a civil war like situation developed in some areas of Tajikistan resulting in bloodshed, killings and refugee problems. The Deputy Commandant of the Central Asian Border District, Major General A. Martovitsky later confirmed that after Yusufov's statement there were increased attempts by groups to cross the Tajik-Afghan border and get weaponry for the opposition parties.
The violent clashes in Kurgan Tyube between the rival parties and the victory of Islamic opposition parties over pro-communists in May 1992 led to unprecedented exodus of Russians and Uzbeks from the region. In fact Shodmon Yusufov's public threat that they would seek aid from "Afghan brothers" and that national minorities in Tajikistan could be used as hostages" created a panic reaction among the Uzbek and Russian minorities. The situation on the Tajik-Afghan border became tense and all efforts by the local commander of CIS border forces to persuade the local Afghan majahideen leader belonging to Hizb-e-Islami, Abdul Latif Ibrahimi to prevent arms smuggling and infiltration of armed persons failed to yield any result. Latif not only admitted the fact of illegal entry of Tajik groups into Afghan territory for arms, he also refused to hand over these people without authorisation by the Tajik opposition party which had sent these groups. In Kulyab region too, otherwise the strong support base of Nabiye, the members of opposition Democratic Party organised themselves with the active Afghan assistance. A number of groups from Kulyab came to Dushanbe and openly threatened to seek armed assistance from Afghans.

The spurt in incidents of border violations and armed clashes on the Tajik-Afghan border during July to September 1992 escalated the tension. In July alone more than 80 persons (both Tajiks and Afghans) were detained on the border and hundreds of automatic guns, grenade launchers, plastic mines and tons of thousands of ammunition pieces were confiscated. There were about 20 cases of firing on the border guards from the Afghan side. Over 150 border crossers with arms and ammunition were reportedly captured by Russian border guards in September 1992 alone. The situation became so tense that the Tajik government expressed concern over the continued and systematic violation of border and supply of Afghan weapons and drugs into Tajikistan. About 400 rifles were confiscated on the Tajik-Afghan border between May and December 1992, which was a meagre fraction of more than 20,000 weapons reported to be in illegal possession of armed groups in Tajikistan. Fighting in Tajikistan which raged during this period involved regional, ethnic and clan disputes as well as differences in political and religious connections. By the end of 1992, about 50,000 were reported to have been killed in these armed clashes, whereas more than six lakhs became refugees.

Rakhmon Nabiye, the former Communist who had been elected as the President of Tajikistan in November 1991, tried to buy peace by including members of the Islamist opposition groups in government and administration. But the IRP and its supporters were determined to wrest total political control. On September 7, 1992 Nabiye's motorcade was attacked at Dushanbe airport and soon after his government was ousted by an alliance of Islamist forces comprising the IRP, Raslokhez and the Democratic party, under the leadership of A. Iskandrov. This was followed by violent clashes between Nabiye's supporters and his opponents in Kurgan Tyube regions. Subsequently the anti-Islamists rallied their forces and formed regional government in Kulyab and Khodjend. Finally in December 1992, they stormed the capital and installed Imamali Rakhmanov as the new leader. Rakhmanov and his forces have since been working to rid Tajikistan of radical Islamic extremists, who retreated into the Gorno Badakhshan region and also sought refuge in Afghanistan. It was in January 1993 that the new government was able to strengthen its position in the eastern parts of Tajikistan. The Garmsky region, which had declared itself as an independent Islamic Republic was freed of Islamists' control soon after in the last week of February 1993. On March 2, 1993 the Tajik Government announced the recapture Or Tadjikabad. The State Procurator General, Mukhamadnazar Sabikhoz claimed that during the offensive over 100 tonnes of weapons and 20 lanks and armoured vehicles had been captured. By March 1993, the Tajik government had thus consolidated its control over most of the country.
Government sources claimed in early June 1993 that about 5,90,000 refugees had returned to their homes and the Tajik authorities had taken steps for guaranteeing their housing, employment and personal safety. However, with the concentration of Islamist radicals in the southern mountainous province of Badakhshan, this vast and rugged terrain continues to pose problems for the Tajik government forces. Tavildara, Komsomolabad, Kharog and other areas in the Pamirs are the strongholds of opposition groups. Notwithstanding the peace initiatives pursued by Rakhmanov government using the well respected Ismaili leader, Syed Mohammad Naderi as its mediator, peace is still fragile in Badakhshan.

With the leaders of Tajik opposition groups and their Tajik supporters numbering about 90,000 seeking refuge in Afghanistan and the active involvement of Afghan mujahideen leaders in arming and training these Islamist radicals, prospects of peace and stability returning to Tajikistan remain elusive. Clashes between Islamist fighters and Russian/Tajik security forces have been taking place along the Tajik Afghan border. More than 50 militants were killed when some 200 to 300 Islamic radicals and Afghan mujahideen intruded into Shurohabad around April 20, 1993. Eruption of serious clashes on the Tajik-Afghan border on July 13, 1993 when at least 25 Russian border guards, 70 Islamic fighters and 200 civilians were reportedly killed, highlighted the explosive nature of the situation. This incident sparked outrage in Russia and Afghanistan was warned of punitive military action in the event of further trans-border raids into Tajikistan. Soon after, Russian forces launched artillery and air attacks on the bases of Tajik militant and Afghan mujahideen in northern Afghanistan. Tension on the border mounted again when 1 Kazakh and 4 Russian border guards were taken hostage to Afghanistan after their unit was ambushed by the Islamic militants on August 10, 1993. Tajik opposition groups namely Islamic Renaissance Party, Democratic Party led by Shodmon Yusuf, National Front led by Abdul Jabbar Takir and Lal-e-Badakhshan of Atta Beg, have joined hands and set up a Tajik government in exile in Taloqan, Afghanistan. Both the Jamat-i-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami led by Gulbadin Hikmatyar are reported to be "training and arming" Tajik militants in guerilla warfare against the Tajik government. A local Hizb-e-Islami commander, Mohammad Zaman claimed in an interview with Washington Post that his party had trained about 1000 Tajiks most of whom "filtered back into Tajikistan". An Islamic field commander in Gorno Badakhshan was quoted by Interfax as saying that 15,000 Afghan trained Tajik mujahideen had infiltrated Tajikistan, which was in addition to several groups of 70 to 300 men undergoing training in Afghanistan. Given this situation, there has been no let-up in tension on the Tajik-Afghan border. In fact the fighting escalated in Pyandz in mid-September and Gorno-Badakhshan region in October 1993.

Meanwhile, the Tajik Islamist radicals have set up a new Radio Station "Voice of Free Tadzikistan" somewhere in Afghanistan, which stated operating since mid - October, 1993. The Tajik Islamic leader and their supporters presently in exile in Afghanistan have become radicalised. Encouraged by the active military support received from major political parties such as Jamat-e-Islami and Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan, the IRP leaders have taken a hardline posture declaring its opposition to any peace talks with the Tajik government. They have also refused to accept Uzbekistan as a party in these negotiations. One may be skeptical about the claim of IRP leader, M.S.Himatzade that "more than fifty percent of Tajik territory was now in hands of the alliance of four main resistance parties", but there is no denying the fact that the Tajik Islamic militants and their Afghan mujahideen allies are preparing to launch fresh offensive. And it does not augur well for regional peace and security.
2.4 Uzbekistan’s Reaction

Uzbekistan has been the foremost CIS state to take strong notice of the developments in Tajikistan and the continuing crisis situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. The Uzbek President, Islam Karimov, has been repeatedly warning against the “advance of Islamic fundamentalist and extremist forces from Afghanistan and Tajikistan”. Karimov's fears are based on the belief that events in Tajikistan would not only consolidate the rapidly growing Islamic consciousness in Uzbekistan but also lead to its politicalisation. The increasing clout of militant Wahabi radicals including the formation of armed bands in Ferghana valley and influx of Uzbek/Tajik refugees and even Afghan nationals into Uzbekistan further strengthened these fears. We have it on the authority of Tajik Islamist opposition leaders that Uzbek Islamic volunteers from Ferghana valley have been participating in the ongoing "jehad" against pro-Communist regime in Tajikistan. It is also known that the Afghan General Abdul Latif, associated with the Hizb-e-Islami of Gulbadin Hikmatyar, is an ethnic Uzbek and he had been conducting fierce attacks on the Tajik government positions from his base in Imam Saheb area in northern Afghanistan. Presence of a sizeable number of ethnic Tajiks who constitute about a quarter of Uzbekistan's population, is yet another factor for the Uzbek concern over disorder in Tajikistan. There have been reports about massive influx of refugees from Tajikistan, majority of them being Tajiks, into the Samarkand and Bukhara regions of Uzbekistan which is worrisome for Uzbekistan keeping in view Tajikistan's claims over these two cities.

Disquietened at these developments, President Karimov initiated a series of steps to meet the perceived security threat to Uzbekistan. During 1992 when the Islamic opposition groups were in control in Tajikistan, Karimov launched suppression of the Uzbek opposition groups like Birlik and the Islamic radicals in Ferghana. He sealed Uzbekistan's borders with Tajikistan and Afghanistan and closed all traffic from that direction to prevent any influx of arms and men. More than 2000 foreigners (mainly Tajiks and some Afghans) are reported to have been expelled from Uzbekistan on charges of "illegal entry and for involvement in subversion in Ferghana valley". Recently Uzbekistan's Security Chief, G. Aliyev claimed to have recovered arms, explosives and even drugs from the possession of some Tajiks who aimed at "sparking off Tajik style conflict in Uzbekistan and also foment Tajik-Uzbek clashes".

At other level, Karimov has kept channels of his friendly communication open with General Dostam, an ethnic Uzbek and the powerful military leader in Afghanistan with his stronghold in Mazar-i-Sharif. Dostam visited Tashkent several times during 1992 and held discussions with the Uzbek authorities. In November 1992 Dostam's troops captured a key Amu Darya river crossing to Taiikistan at Sher Khan Bandar which was earlier used by Hikmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami as a staging point for cross-border forays. Subsequently a network of border posts along the river supported by boat patrol was set up under the new Afghan Uzbek Commander in-charge of border security, Maj. Gen. Abdul Hamid Aka. This led to sealing of an important channel of supply of arms and support to Tajikistan's Islamic opposition. Besides, Dostam has been in close touch with General Nadiri, a leader of the Ismailis and some other important personalities in northern Afghanistan in order to influence the course of events there. That Dostam's family has been staying in Tashkent on a long-term basis is also cited as evidence of cooperation between Dostam and Uzbek authorities. There have been reports that General Dostam and Uzbek President, Karimov have been toying with the idea of creating a "secular buffer state" in northern Afghanistan to cover the southern borders of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan which would act as a wedge against the spread of radical Islam from the direction of Iran from the west and from the
side of Pashtuns under Hikmatyar from the south. However, it becomes clear that there is a basic understanding between Dostam and the Uzbek leadership on the need to keep at bay the radical Islamist fighters.

The Uzbek President, Karimov took the initiative in mobilising regional response against external interference in Tajikistan. He called upon Russia to take into account the "powerful offensive of pan-Islamism" in the south and asked for continued presence of Russian forces in Tajikistan to control the Tajik-Afghan border. Karimov explained that the "border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan is not only a border between these two states, it can turn into an open gate to all CIS countries from the point of view of arms smuggling, drug running etc." Karimov also initiated diplomatic moves to stop the situation on Tajik-Afghan border from spilling over into other republics. He has been urging upon the leaders in Iran and Afghanistan to help in defusing the tension. Uzbek Foreign Minister was deputed to Teheran in October 1992 to seek Iran's cooperation for settling the issue peacefully. Karimov has been pleading with the CIS leadership particularly Russia and Kazakhstan to take note of the alarming situation. On March 14, 1993 Karimov appealed to the UN Secretary General seeking his help in "ensuring the security and inviolability of border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan". He warned that the continuing conflict in Tajikistan could become a "powerful detonator of political and social upheavals in the region". Karimov wanted the UN to take note of the "arms and ammunition being stockpiled and camps set up for terrorist groups in Afghanistan for sabotage and subversion". Karimov's stand that the southern borders of Tajikistan are the southern boundary of all CIS countries, has finally been accepted and endorsed by the CIS leaders in August 1993.

2.5 Threat to Kyrgyzstan's Security

That the turbulence and strife in Tajikistan has spilled over into the neighbouring state of Kyrgyzstan is evidenced by the influx of thousands of armed Tajik Islamic radicals into the Osh oblast. The Kharogh-Osh highway which provides direct access form Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan to the CIS is also used as the channel of drug trafficking via Kyrgyzstan. The republican leadership has been worried over the protracted civil war in Tajikistan and the possibility of Tajik armed groups supplying arms to Kyrgyz criminal bands. The Kyrgyz President, Akayev publicly expressed his concern over the steep increase in the crime rate witnessed in Kyrgyzstan during 1992 (70 per cent in the whole state and 220 per cent in Osh oblast) and most of this crime was related to drugs. To meet this new threat of illegal entry of narcotics and arms from Tajik territory into Osh through the Afghanistan - Pamirs route, the Kyrgyz army and militia units were transferred from Bishkek to Osh.

Pan-Islamic Tajik radicals also seem to have established some foothold in Osh. In early January 1993 reports came about the disruption of supplies to Osh by the Tajik militants who also killed 3 local Kyrgyzs and held 18 others hostages in the border area of Jergetal of Kyrgyzstan, for their refusal to join their pan-Islamic movement. They are also reported to have hoisted the green Islamic flag on the building of regional administration. These Tajik radicals have been urging the local Kyrgyz populace, which is not so fervent in its Islamic zeal, to fight for the establishment of an Islamic state. The Islamic resurgence in Tajikistan and also in Ferghana region of Uzbekistan, has already created a marked impact on the Uzbeks in the Osh oblast. This is reflected in a study conducted by the Bishkek Polytechnical Institute, which found that 25 per cent of Uzbeks in Osh oblast favour the establishment of an Islamic state in Kyrgyzstan as against only 10 per cent of Kyrgyzs there. Bitter memories of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz riots that took place in 1990 are yet another source of social turmoil and political instability in the region.
Similarly, the border dispute between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which was the cause of Tajik-Kyrgyz clashes in 1989 in Batken region of Kyrgyzstan over division of land and water, has not been resolved yet. Conscious of this uneasy situation, Kyrgyzstan has been pressing for the conclusion of a formal treaty with Tajikistan to confirm and consolidate the "inviolability of the existing borders". At the same time, Kyrgyzstan has in consonance with the CIS agreement on collective security of the Tajik-Afghan border, sent a battalion of Kyrgyz troops to take positions at the border posts of Ishkashim and Murghab in Tajikistan. It signifies an end to the earlier reluctance to commit Kyrgyz troops, which was essentially due to the local women's protest against sending their sons to what they viewed a second Afghanistan and in deference to the Parliament's decision against Kyrgyzstan's participation in defending the Tajik-Afghan border. Due to the escalation of conflict on the Tajik-Afghan border, better understanding of the security threat to Kyrgyzstan from drugs and arms trafficking and influx of armed Tajik/Afghan militants has dawned upon the political leadership. The need to take urgent preventive steps has been left more so because the Kharogh-Osh highway provides direct connection from the republic to the stronghold of Islamic radicals in Gorno Badakhshan region of Tajikistan.

2.6 Russian Response

Preoccupied with its own domestic problems and obsessed with the Eurocentric approach in its foreign policy, Russia initially viewed the crisis in Tajikistan as an internecine struggle for power between rival groups, in which it did not wish to get involved. This perception was mainly based on the past Soviet experience in Afghanistan which had cost the Soviet Union too high in terms of men, materials and international image. The Central Asian Border Guards and their Russian commanders, who continued to remain under the CIS unified command, did not receive adequate support from Russia after the disintegration of USSR. The Border Guards defending the Tajik-Afghan border were now facing acute shortage of men, fuel and funds which prevented them to get reinforcements or increase mobility for effectively dealing with the increased border violations. Besides, the Russian officers and troops were reluctant to shed their blood for the security of Tajikistan which was now an independent and sovereign country. At one stage, even the air defence radar stations at Pamirs broke down in October 1992 due to lack of infrastructural support by Russia. This confusing scenario not only worsened the border situation but also emboldened the Tajik and Afghan militant groups. However, in response to Nabiyaev's requests for assistance, Russian Vice Premier, A. Shokhin visited Tajikistan in July 1992 and reached an agreement on the "status of Russian troops in Tajikistan and modalities for recruitment, material and technical supplies by Russia". It was agreed that the Tajik-Afghan and Tajik-Chinese borders would be reinforced by the Russian subdivisions. Subsequently, President Yeltsin issued a decree placing the border troops stationed on the Tajik border under Russian jurisdiction. Soon after, the CIS Commander-in-Chief, E. Shaposhnikov visited Tajikistan at the end of August 1992 and reached a preliminary agreement on the deployment of forces. These measures were intended to remove the structural anomalies in the functioning of the border troops in Tajikistan. But it was a belated response to the fast deteriorating situation in Tajikistan.

Nabiyaev's ouster on September 2, 1992 by the Islamic extremist parties and the escalation of fighting in Tajikistan provoked prompt and strong reaction from Russia and the neighbouring Central Asian states. Just one day after the removal of Nabiyaev, the Presidents of Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan issued a warning to the government and political
organisations of Tajikistan describing the unrest as a danger to the CIS. They also announced their collective decision to deploy CIS troops along the 1300 km long Tajik-Afghan border to stop the large scale smuggling of arms and cross border movement of armed bands. Towards the end of September 1992 the Russian Defence Minister sent additional troops to strengthen the beleaguered 201st Motorised Rifle Division stationed in Tajikistan and authorised its command officers to prevent "seizure of arms, equipment and munitions belonging to Russian troops and unlawful acts against Russian Servicemen and their families". But matters were made worse by the connivance of Tajik authorities and leaders with the armed Tajik extremist groups and Afghan field commanders. Piqued at this ground situation the Russian Border Guards Officers Corps in Tajikistan sent an appeal to Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia on November 13, 1992 questioning the "expediency of further stay of their units in the absence of guarantees of legal and social protection". The problem was compounded by the stiff opposition by Tajik media and Islamic parties to the presence of Russian troops who were accused of interference in the internal affairs of Tajikistan and were even charged of supplying/selling arms and fuel to anti-Islamic forces. Tajik Deputy Premier, Davlot Usman compared the ongoing conflict in Tajikistan to Russian intervention in Afghanistan and called it as "a war between Tajikistan and Russia, a war between Islam and non-believers". Protest rallies against the Russian presence were held in Dushanbe on October 6, 1992 which were also addressed by Tajik President, Iskandrov and the Chief Kazi, Turadzonzoda. On the other hand, Kulyab and Khodjent oblasts and also the Russian and Uzbek minorities sought additional CIS peace keeping troops to bring order in Tajikistan. Russians held a rally in Kulyab on October 10, 1992 appealing Yeltsin to keep units of 201st Motor Rifle Division of Russian troops in Tajikistan. Increasing attacks on Russians and their continuing exodus from Tajikistan became important factors in determining Russia's active policy in this region. Now senior leaders of the Russian government and military openly voiced their concern over the security of Russian minorities and vowed to discharge their responsibilities on this account. Whereas Khasbulatov, Chairman of Russian Federation Supreme Soviet wrote to the new Tajik President, Iskandrov asking him to "guarantee the security of Russians living in the Republic", the Russian Foreign Minister, Kozyrev warned that the "entire might of Russian state is poised to defend human rights, including the rights of Russians and of Russian speaking people". Similarly, the Russian Dy. Defence Minister, General Toporov viewed the presence of Russian troops in Tajikistan as necessary to protect Russians there. The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a strongly worded statement on October 15, 1992 expressing concern over the "expanding fratricidal civil war in Tajikistan and the danger of conflict spreading to adjacent countries. It drew the attention of Tajik authorities, movements and leaders to "the attempts to provoke outbursts of anti-Russian and anti-Russian sentiments and use of violence against Russians and attacks on Russian servicemen". It warned that "Russia will do everything necessary to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the Russians". This signalled an end to the drift in Russia's policy towards Tajikistan. Now Moscow took the lead in involving the concerned Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan or evolving a joint strategy to control the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. A meeting of leaders of these Central Asian states and the Russian Foreign Minister, A. Kozyrev was held at Alma Ata on November 4, 1992. It was agreed that Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division should remain in Tajikistan, which could be supplemented later by CIS peace keeping forces. Next day Kozyrev led a CIS delegation to Tajikistan for on the spot study. He also met the Russians trapped in Kulyab. It was at the Minsk summit of the Heads of CIS States on January 22,1993 that a formal decision to reinforce the
Russian border troops by forces from the neighbouring CIS slates for effectively closing the Tajik-Afghan border was taken. Despite Russia's success in mustering the support of four CIS states, it were the Russian forces which bore the brunt of defending the Tajik-Afghan frontier. The massacre of more than 25 Russian border guards on the Tajik border post on July 13, 1993 sent shock waves in Russian official and public circles. President Yeltsin called a special session of the Russian Security Council in Moscow on July 26, 1993 to take stock of the situation and adopt remedial measures. Taking the border incident seriously, Yeltsin described the Tajik-Afghan border as "the frontier of Russia", and removed Shlyakhtin, the commander of Russian Border troops from his post. The Russian Security Minister, Victor Barannikov was also reprimanded. It was for the first time that a comprehensive Russian policy aimed at settling the problem on the Tajik-Afghan border and at normalising the situation in Tajikistan was worked out and adopted in the form of a Presidential decree. It was decided to seek political solution to the crisis by organising a diplomatic dialogue between Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and to encourage talks between the Tajik leadership and the opposition leaders. At the same time, need for taking coordinated steps by the Russian ministries of Security Internal Affairs, Defence and Foreign Affairs on Tajikistan was stressed. To achieve this objective, Foreign Minister Kozyrev was appointed the President's Special Representative for Tajikistan and Defence Minister, Grachev was made responsible for general operational leadership in coordinating all the forces and hardware involved in carrying out the defense of the Tajik-Afghan border. Having set the task for his government, Yeltsin organised a summit meeting with the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan at Moscow on August 7, 1993, on the Tajikistan issue. He stressed the need to "neutralise the growing threat to security in Central Asia and ensure stability". Yeltsin called upon the leaders of these states for concrete joint action to reinforce the Russian border troops in Tajikistan on an equal basis. Four important documents which were signed by the five CIS states at this conference provided the legal basis to legitimise direct Russian/CIS role in Tajikistan. These documents are:

i) the Declaration on the Inviolability of the State Borders

ii) Statement on the ways to normalise the Tajik-Afghan border as part of the common CIS border

iii) Appeal to the UN Secretary General to take measure against the offensive launched from the territory of Afghanistan against Tajikistan.

iv) Appeal to leaders of the CIS member states to discuss the creation of an economic union.

In sum, the basic parameters of Russian policy in Tajikistan, which is now looked after by a separate Tajikistan Desk instead of the general Central Asia Section, as it has evolved over the past two years, are:

1. Commitment to the inviolability of State borders,

2. To prevent Islamist extremist forces from Tajikistan and Afghanistan from destabilising the social and political situation in the CIS.

3. To ensure security of Russian speaking minorities.

4. Treating the Tajik-Afghan border as the common CIS border. Hence its protection is to be the joint responsibility of Russia and adjacent CIS states. A
formal agreement was reached by the Foreign and Defence Ministries of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for the establishment of an allied defence force to ensure security of the Tajik-Afghan border.

5. Right to retaliate including military action and hot pursuit of enemy. In July 1993 Russian jet fighters bombed several villages in northern Afghanistan to eliminate Tajik Islamic militants who were operating from their bases. It is significant that the Russian policy in Tajikistan finds an expression in the new Russian military doctrine which allows stationing of armed forces outside its national territory to preserve its territorial integrity and that of the CIS, and reserves the right to nuclear strike against the territory, troops or military targets of an aggressor country.

6. To encourage Tajik government to expand its support base within different ethnic groups and clans in Tajikistan and to have reconciliation with the Tajik opposition leaders.

7. To encourage and organise dialogue between Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and Russia to seek a solution to the vexed problem using all available diplomatic means.

2.7 Moves for Tajik Afghan Dialogue: Problems and Prospects

Occasional contacts have been established between the Tajik/Russian Border Guards and the Afghan Mujahideen field commanders controlling the border on the Afghanistan side to resolve the recurrent problems of arms smuggling, infiltration of armed men or even to secure the release of captives. But these local contacts failed to bring the desired improvement in the border situation. The visit of high level Tajik delegation led by Prime Minister Akbar Mirzoyev to Kabul on July 14, 1992 to seek the help of new Islamic government of Afghanistan for stopping the Mujahideen field commanders from supplying arms and ammunition to Tajik militant groups also proved to be ineffective. The Tajik delegation met the Afghan President, Burhanuddin Rabbani and other Afghan leaders including Ahmad Shah Masood. Though the Afghan leaders shared Tajik concern over the increased border violations and smuggling of arms, they expressed their inability to exercise any control over General Latif Ibrahimi, the Afghan commander of rival Hizb-e-Islami group who has been controlling the Pyandzh border stretch in Kunduz. Similar opinion was later expressed by Rabbani during his visit to Tashkent in October 1992 when the Uzbek President raised the issue of Afghan interference in Tajikistan.

It was in mid-August 1993 that the Afghan Foreign Minister visited Dushanbe at the invitation of his Tajik counterpart for talks to settle the vexed border problem, to expedite the process of repatriation of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan and to prepare the ground for bilateral summit between the two heads of state of Tajikistan and Afghanistan. The Dushanbe meeting resulted in a joint communique (issued on August 15, 1993) which announced the setting up of a trilateral commission comprising representatives of Afghanistan, Tajikistan and office of the UN Chief Commissioner for Refugees to assist in the return of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan. Both sides reposed faith in "principles of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs". But the Tajik-Afghan dialogue was made difficult by the kidnapping of 1 Kazakh and 5 Russian Border Guards who were taken as hostages to Afghan
territory on August 10, 1993. It was no mere coincidence that the border incident occurred on the same day when Afghan Foreign Minister H. Amin Arsala arrived at Dushanbe thereby assuming priority in the bilateral dialogue and pushing substantial issues to the backstage. Obviously the Tajik opposition groups and their Afghan supporters positioned in northern Afghanistan were seeking to disrupt the process of direct political dialogue between Tajikistan and Afghanistan. However, the Tajik government's unilateral decision to hand over 5 Afghan prisoners as a goodwill gesture to the Afghan authorities was calculated to pave way for the return of hostages. Notwithstanding this gesture and the assurance by Afghan Foreign Minister to have the hostages released soon after his return to Kabul, the Russian and Kazakh Border Guards continued to be held captive by the Afghan authorities for about 20 days. On one occasion, Gulbadin Hikmatyar, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan refused to free the CIS Border troops on the plea that the Russian guards were attacking Tajik refugees on the Afghan territory. The hostages were finally released on August 31, 1993 when the Tajik Head of State, Rakhmanov arrived at Kabul to hold discussions with Afghan President, Rabbani. Both sides discussed the border problem but had to content with the ratification of earlier decision to create a trilateral commission for looking into the problems of Tajik refugees. Later Rakhmanov conceded that release of CIS border guards was "the major result of his visit to Kabul". However, this visit too was marred by renewed fighting on the border in which one Russian border guard was killed. This again reflected the rivalry between different factions of Afghan leadership. The problem is compounded by perceptual differences as Hikmatyar has been against the "deployment of Russian border guards along the Tajik-Afghan border". To him this is the mutual concern of only two states-Afghanistan and Tajikistan.

That there is remote possibility of any peace process taking off in this region, is indicated by the renewal of intense fighting in October 1993 on the border and in Pamirs area and another kidnapping of 3 Russian and 3 Kazakh Border Guards by Tajik/Afghan militants. It has been viewed as yet another attempt by the Tajik Islamic opposition groups and their Afghan Mujahideen supporters to disrupt the process of Tajik-Afghan dialogue and in particular to torpedo the planned return visit of Afghan President, Rabbani to Tajikistan. However, Rabbani did visit Dushanbe on December 19,1993 and held talks with Rakhmanov, the Tajik Head of State on issues of border security and repatriation of refugees. Both leaders signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, economic and trade accords and an agreement on border security. However, these conciliatory moves did not cut ice with the Tajik Islamist leaders, who dismissed it as meaningless. Tajik Islamic opposition leader, Haji Akbar Turajonzoda also discounted the possibility of Tajikistan conducting any trade with Afghanistan. The Afghan Dy. Minister of Planning, D. Mahadi, who had earlier signed the trilateral agreement on return of Tajik refugees with UNHCR and Tajikistan, also voiced his disapproval to the presence of CIS forces on the Tajik-Afghan border. With the escalation of fighting between Hikmatyar and Rabbani factions in Afghanistan and due to persistent Tajik Islamists' opposition, the Tajik-Afghan peace moves initiated by Rabbani and Tajik government, are doomed to failure.

2.8 Conclusion

The crisis in Afghanistan has had a direct impact on the situation in Tajikistan due to supply of arms and ammunition and training imparted by the Afghan Mujahideen to Tajik Islamic extremists. After the demise of Soviet Union narcotics trade in the Golden Crescent has found yet another lucrative supply route via Pamirs-Tajikistan to the Commonwealth of Independent States and European countries. The Afghan Mujahideen have been playing an overt role in
subverting the socio-political situation in Tajikistan to establish an Islamic regime there. The situation gets further complicated by different Afghan Mujahideen groups exercising control over different areas in northern Afghanistan who keep on pressing ahead on the Tajik border regardless of what happens in Kabul.

The hostilities in Tajikistan going on for about two years now, have already taken a heavy toll of almost one lakh killed and injured and more than six lakhs rendered homeless. And there is very little prospect of peace and stability getting restored in the region, given the belligerent stance adopted by the Tajik Islamist radicals who have now set up a "Tajik Government in Exile" in Afghanistan. The exchange of friendly visits by Heads of State of Afghanistan and Tajikistan in late 1993 has not resulted in any let-up in the tension on the Tajik-Afghan border. The Tajik-Afghan peace process has been marred by Hikmatyar's continued support to Tajik Islamist extremists and his opposition to the presence of CIS troops on the border. Though the intensification of bloody fighting between rival groups led by Rabbani and Hikmatyar has sidelined the Tajikistan issue for the time being, it has turned the situation murkier. The trans-border movement of armed Tajik and Afghan Islamist extremists and smuggling of drugs and arms has been the main source of destabilisation for the entire Central Asian region.

External factor in Tajikistan's crisis, particularly the trans-border export of Islamic extremism and terrorism from the direction of Afghanistan evoked strong reaction from the adjoining Central Asian States and Russia. Whereas Uzbekistan played a key role in galvanising opinion against "the advance of Islamic fundamentalists and extremists forces", Russia has been concerned over the security of ethnic Russian minorities and the defence of Tajik-Afghanistan border. Though the Russian official and public opinion, still reeling under the impact of Afghanistan syndrome, is divided over the ways and means and extent of Russian involvement in Tajikistan, there is unanimity over the need to keep Islamist extremism at bay. Russia has outlined its geo-political interests in the region as, "preserving internal stability in Central Asia, protection of Russian speaking minorities and preventing Islamic extremism from passing through the Tajik-Afghan border into the CIS". Conscious of the highly destabilising potential of the situation and the efforts made at redrawing of borders in this region, Russia and the adjoining Central Asian states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have declared their firm commitment to the "Inviolability of State Borders". Not only that, Russian jet fighters have on several occasions bombed the bases of hostile Tajik and Afghan militants in northern Afghanistan, thereby following the policy of hot pursuit. Given the ground realities, the CIS peace-keeping forces are bound to stay put to defend the Tajik-Afghan border.
3.0 AFGHANISTAN CRISIS: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND IMPACT ON PAKISTAN'S POLITY

Uma Singh

The Afghanistan issue came as a blessing in disguise for Gen. Zia-ul-Haq who opted to go all out against Moscow playing the card of Islamic solidarity and terming Pakistan as the front-line state. He used the Afghanistan situation to legitimize his martial law regime and it is often felt that Zia's government would not have lasted so long without the war in Afghanistan and the generous military and economic assistance it received from the US which totalled more than 7.2 billion dollars. Pakistan provided sanctuary to the mujahideen to launch their military operations. Zia was overnight catapulted into a leader of world fame and importance and for almost a decade Pakistan was on the center stage of world politics. But the eclipse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War saw it pushed into the wings. The sweeping changes in the global political system and the emerging realities at the regional level resulted in Pakistan's political isolation as it was no longer required as a conduit of US supplies to Mujahideen. The end of the bipolar world has changed the contours of US-Pak relationship and a radically new foreign policy orientation favoring regional peace and cooperation, free trade, demilitarization and economic development deserve top most priority in the national agenda. Pakistan is making efforts to return to its regional moorings and a quest for alternate linkages has already begun.

Islamabad was certainly motivated by geo-strategic and domestic imperatives. Most paramount aim of Pakistani policy makers was to block the revival of nationalism and assure recognition of what Pakistan had always claimed as its international border (the Durand Line). This could be achieved, Pakistan felt through the creation of an Afghanistan that, if not a client state, would at least, offer a friendly north-west frontier province. This would provide Pakistan's military planners with strategic geopolitical depth in any future conflict with India. Naturally the army played a leading and crucial role as the Afghan war became a major national security issue. As such, the major responsibility was assumed by the Pakistan military intelligence division, the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, known as ISI which, later on, started designing Pakistan's Afghan policy. Islamabad certainly started looking far beyond than merely rolling back the Red Army aggression. It was during this period that there were talks of securing strategic depth. Ambitions even if not fulfilled leave their marks behind. The Afghanistan tragedy, stemming from adventurism on the part of former Soviet Union and aggravated later by the miscalculations and misperceptions of the US and Pakistan has continued to be mishandled to this day.

The options available to Pakistan to remedy this mess are few. The declaration by Pakistan of its firm support to Burhanuddin Rabbani's government in Kabul and the sealing of border between the countries has proved to be too little and too late. The fragmentation of Afghanistan has had grave implications for the country and its neighbors. It has ended up as a battle ground of external forces aspiring to control the course of events in this strategically important territory according to their own perceived interests. Be it Iran, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, each one of them
has its fingers in Afghanistan pie. The Afghan policy of Pakistan is now the cornerstone of creating an Islamic bloc comprising the Central Asian republics and ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation) members. Turkey favours Pan-Islamic alliance and organisation of economic cooperation and cultural contacts. Iran wants to create a more nationalistic and language based grouping particularly with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and parts of Afghanistan. Islamabad is trying to consolidate its influence in Kabul and open up the country for international transit trade to Central Asian republics. The success of Pakistan's strategy will depend on Afghan unity being consolidated in the first instance - which is an uncertain political scenario at this moment. Secondly, it would depend on the needs, capabilities and resources of Pakistan on the one hand and those of five Central Asian republics on the other.

Islamabad acted equally short-sighted. Anti-Pakistan sentiments are on the rise in Afghanistan despite Pakistan having unstintedly helped the Mujahideen for 14 years. Two main targets of the resentment are Pakistani intelligence agencies and the government in power in Pakistan. The Afghans have never accepted a regime imposed from outside. Pakistan expected a major stake in the configuration of power, the economic policies and the prevailing ideologies of a post-war Afghanistan. Thinking on these lines they sought to install an Islamic regime sympathetic or beholden to Pakistan after fall of Najibullah. Far from that it has fuelled civil strife in the war-torn Afghan capital. The only change visible is that the venue of infighting and squabbles among the resistance groups has shifted from Peshawar to Kabul. Peace is rather elusive and the developments in Afghanistan and the dilemma that seems to have gripped the Pakistani decision makers exposes the ruinous effects of Pakistan's Afghan policy which has ended in disarray with no political or strategic gains for the nation after paying heavy costs - especially on its federal structure. It reflects the lack of proper understanding of the situation and complete dearth of political options. Pakistan now faces an Afghan scenario over which it has very little control. Despite Pakistan's public support to the Rabbani government, it has not been able to give up its support for Hekmatyar. The seizure of arms on the border intended for Hekmatyar and his factions and the involvement of senior ISI men clearly shows that some quarters in Pakistan have always remained wedded to Zia's forward policy on Afghanistan. These incidents certainly do not send the right signal to Kabul.

Zia the main architect of Pakistan's Afghan policy had opted for a disunified and decentralized Afghan state as the best insurance that no government antagonistic to Pakistan would emerge in the future. Pakistani authorities virtually controlled every aspect of Afghan presence in Pakistan as well as the direction of the war. The activities of Afghan refugees and the objectives of their armed efforts were congruent with the perceived interests of Pakistan. The authorities in Islamabad were to be the final arbiter of war management. The operation involves close management of refugees and the direction and coordination of Afghan resistance parties based in Peshawar. Pakistani authorities never seriously inhibited the free movement of resistance forces across the border nor the recruitment and training of fighters. Arms for the resistance groups came from a number of sources. The cost of the operation as late as 1983 was not more than 50 million dollars with the US financing about half and Saudi Arabia the rest. By the late 1980s, Washington was providing about $300 million and Saudis approximately the same. Washington's total contribution for the decade was roughly two billion dollars. In addition to Iran's assistance to Shia resistance groups, Egyptian, Saudi and Chinese arms were supplied to Pakistani army for distribution as were those paid for by the US. With Pakistan's approval, supplies from some Arab countries were provided to select Sunni parties designated by these states.
Officially Pakistani government kept denying active involvement and Mujahideen leaders also insisted that they were carrying on the war without the Pakistani support. In reality, the ISI worked closely with the resistance groups in the more accessible border areas planning and offering tactical advice and training. Pakistani officers collaborated with Afghan field commanders in a number of larger operations. The ISI was the main source of information for the US about the politics of the resistance groups. It can also lay claims to some of the credit for the failure of the Soviets to achieve their objectives in the war. CIA operatives and others came to depend heavily on Pakistan's military intelligence not only in reference to supplies and its relationships with resistance groups but also for strategic assessments. The CIA also relied heavily on often less than reliable Pakistani sources for information about the reception and use of arms across the border. The US overlooked the report that elements of the Pakistani army and refugee administration were cooperating with members of the Peshawar organization in the sale of weapons to parties outside the conflict. The US also condoned the regular siphoning off of aid intended to pass across the border into Afghanistan but which instead was utilized for the comfortable life styles of some of the resistance leaders in Peshawar.

Although there had been more than 80 resistance groups operating in Peshawar, by 1982 Pakistani authorities had forced them to coalesce into seven. With the exception of Yunus Khalis, leader of one of the Islamist parties in Peshawar, none of the party leaders had a territorial base inside Afghanistan. Permission to register refugees in the camps, an authorization given to all seven Peshawar-based parties was critical to their survival. Pakistani officials discriminated in military and other forms of assistance in favour of the more radical Islamic resistance factions and cooperated in curtailing the activities of their more moderate traditionalist competitors. The Shia parties and non-religious oriented Afghan national parties were, in effect, excluded from the Peshawar alliance.

Zia and his military government found in Hekmatyar an excellent instrument of policy to support an armed resistance. He remained a favourite of Zia regime and his Hizb-e-Islami was considered to be the best organization and most disciplined of the Peshawar based parties. His close ties with the conservative Jamat-i-Islami of Pakistan, effectively a domestic political ally of Zia also justified assistance to the Hekmatyar group. Also, Zia in his Islamic fervour found in Hizb-e-Islami a group that in its authoritarian internationalist brand of Islam shared with him an anti-communist zeal. Hekmatyar's party developed what Pakistani observer Mushahid Hussain referred to as the relations of trust and confidence with the military. Above all, an ideologically compatible Afghan party was expected to provide the geopolitical assurances that Pakistan was aiming at.

Hekmatyar was also favoured by the Pakistani refugee administration especially so during the 1980-83 tenure of commissioner Shaikh Abdullah Khan who sympathized with the religious parties. Arriving refugees from Afghanistan were obliged, if they wanted to qualify for rations to become affiliated with one of the resistance groups and many camp officials favoured those who identified with Hekmatyar's party. United Nations monitored funds were regularly diverted by Pakistani officials to Hizb-e-Islami enabling it to take more than its full share of rations, tents and other relief aid. The Pakistanis gave the Islamists a strong voice in the educational programme in the camps and later in the cross-border transfer of educative materials and the establishment of schools. Hizb-e-Islami was also allowed to run its own security service, presumably to watch for Kabul trained infiltrators but actually more to undermine competing Afghan resistance groups. Given Hizb-e-Islami's limited popular base within Afghanistan, only
with direct Pakistani support could it hope after a resistance victory to be a serious contender for power in Kabul. His party was said to have received 20-25 per cent of US-supplied arms during the late 1980s. Others insisted that during most of the decade, roughly half of the US supplied weapons went to Hekmatyar. By contrast, other resistance forces inside Afghanistan (estimated 12,000 men) under the command of Ahmad Shah Masud were not favoured by either Pakistan or Saudi Arabia. Masud whose network of commanders covered six northern provinces had regularly criticized the Pakistanis and their US supporter for ignoring his group. Pakistan's policy towards Masud was influenced by his refusal to accept ISI dictates. Also as an ethnic Tajik he was not acceptable to the ISI which was wedded to the idea that only a Pashtun could rule Afghanistan.

"The Afghan policy of Pakistan often seemed to play on the social changes and cleavages within Afghanistan that intensified during the war" As mentioned earlier, Pakistan favoured a fragmented future of Afghanistan which would not pose any threat to Pakistan. Thus an alliance of the seven Peshawar based parties formed in early 1988 referred to as the "ISI shot gun marriage agreement" by Louis Dupree provided for a rotating leadership. This arrangement assured that no Afghan leader including Hekmatyar could monopolize power and that the movement would therefore have to continue to look to Pakistan for guidance. Pakistan would be better served by a more structured cohesive alternative to the Kabul government that would provide some stability in Afghanistan as well as that would be pro-Pakistan. Priority was thus given to the creation of a broad based organization called the "Afghan interim government"

As an aftermath to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, it was felt that there would be some reconsideration in Pakistan's Afghan policy. Just two months prior to the Soviet pull out, a democratically elected government headed by Benazir Bhutto was restored in Islamabad and it was expected that there would be a greater inclination in the Bhutto government for distancing Pakistan from a more radical Afghan policy. She had been extremely critical of Zia's unwavering support of the Afghan resistance. But despite the change of regime in Pakistan a change in its Afghanistan policy could not be easy because of the umbilical cord that tied both the military and the civilian regime to the Afghanistan issue. Because of her political vulnerabilities, Benazir failed to establish a strong grip over her foreign policy and tenuous parliamentary control by Bhutto during her twenty month tenure in office (December 1988-August 1990) did not lead to any substantial policy changes largely because the army and the ISI-resisted any diminution of power. Nawaz Sharif who followed Benazir also wanted to personally run Islamabad's Afghan policy. But under Hamid Gul and Asad Durrani, the ISI ran the Afghan policy independent of the government in Islamabad and looked to the Afghan struggle as merely a stepping stone in the larger battle for Islamic resurgence. What was worse was that the government led by Nawaz Sharif allowed itself to become a hostage on the Afghan issue to pressure groups both within the administration and outside. At times it was an ISI show, at other times it appeared that the Afghan policy was being run by the Jamat-i-Islami. The Afghan cell created by the President Ishaq Khan to monitor the Afghan developments fared no better. The cell held regular meetings but it failed to take the kind of initiatives needed to break the Afghan impasse. Its failure to bridge the differences within the Mujahideen groups was appalling. It has become evident now that the cell was created to keep Benazir Bhutto's government completely out of the Afghan issue. That Islamabad's Afghan policy largely based on wishful assumption of Pan-Islamism has been blown to shreds now stands vindicated. Pakistan now has to "survive" the "victory" it has achieved. Compared to the price Pakistan is paying, the Americans fought a cheap war. Mohammad Yousuf, a former head of the Afghan
Bureau at the ISI for four years has written a book entitled, "The Bear Trap: Afghanistan untold Story". The author simply does not believe that there was any truth in Pakistan's overt posture about its solution and contends that the final reckoning of this clandestine war is still to come. The illusion of military victory has spread in Pakistan and foreign policy is increasingly seen as an extension of 'Jehad'.

3.1 Impact on Domestic Policy: Pakistan and the Afghan Refugees

There has been some very ruinous effects of Pakistan's Afghan policy on its domestic scene. The conflict in Afghanistan has resulted in the world's greatest refugee migration to Pakistan and the population pressures have generated potentially explosive situation in Pakistan. While they are themselves victims of the Afghan crisis, Afghan refugees constitute a potentially destabilizing nation within Pakistan. Historically, great refugee movements have been destabilizing to countries and regions. It is likely that the nearly 4 million displaced Afghans in Pakistan will cling to their ethnic and cultural character and increasingly assert themselves as a powerful political force. Added to this potential are the pressures that millions of refugees place on the services and resources there.

Well over 5 million Afghans have fled their country since the 1979 Soviet invasion. These refugees have settled in India (4,700) and Iran (5,60,000) but the majority (estimated at up to 3.5 million) have settled in Pakistan, most living in 340 settlement camps along the Afghan-Pakistan border. These refugees can be divided into five categories: (1) Refugees who came from politically prominent and wealthy families with personal and business assets outside Afghanistan; (2) a small group who arrived with the assets that they could bring with them such as trucks, cars and limited funds and which has done relatively well in Pakistan integrating into the new society and engaging successfully in commerce; (3) those refugees who came from the ranks of the well-educated and include professionals such as doctors, engineers and teachers; (4) Refugees who escaped with household goods and herds of sheep, cattle and yaks but for the most part must be helped to maintain themselves; (5) the fifth and the largest group constituting of about 60 per cent of the refugees are ordinary Afghans who arrived with nothing and are largely dependent on Pakistan and international efforts for subsistence.

Since 1979 the international community has been mobilized to address the short-term needs of Afghan refugees. However, the potential political consequences for Pakistan are evident. The impact of Afghan refugees over Pakistan's socio-economic life has been rather adverse. The region known as Pushtunistan (South-east Afghanistan and north-west Pakistan) has a long history of complex tribal and ethnic relations. Despite frontier disputes in 1961, the people of this region have flowed across borders relatively freely for generations. Afghan refugees fleeing famine settled in Pakistan in the early 1970s and the present migration is an extension of the historic movements of Afghanistan. The early migration involved primarily peasant Afghans subject to the vagaries of natural calamity, while the present migration comprises a cross-section of rural poor, urban middle and upper classes. While many of the urban class have migrated to the US and West Europe, a significant middle class has settled in Pakistan, giving the refugee population a political awareness hitherto unseen. It may well be for this reason that the Afghan state-in-exile has a highly politicized population which had been consolidated into a formidable resistance to the Soviet occupation and the Najibullah government.

The present situation also tends to discourage repatriation. It is now over more than a decade since Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan (and have since left) and the flow of refugees swelled
into a time span which not only distinguishes the present migration from the past but makes it comparable with the Palestinian crisis and its attendant complexities.

The UNHCR has noted that (to the credit of Pakistan) in the initial stages of the Afghan crisis, the refugees were fed and sheltered by the residents in extraordinary acts of charity and hospitality. Zia-ul-Haq had once mentioned that there were very few social problems between Afghan refugees and Pakistanis. He also emphasized that there was no limit to the contribution Pakistan was prepared to make. The costs have been in terms of the pressures placed upon the Pakistani infrastructure of schools, hospitals, lands, water, employment, the economy and other dimensions of refugee asylum.

Most of the 2 million Afghans that have crossed into Pakistan's N.W.F.P. are Pathans but increasingly Tajiks and Uzbeks have populated Peshawar and Quetta as first the Soviets and then the Afghan government expanded operations throughout Afghanistan. Not only has Dari (Afghan-Persian) begun to flow as freely as Pashto in the bazaars but the clothes and customs representing the Afghan's varied ethnic background point to a gradual transformation in Peshawar's traditional Pathan character.

Today most refugees (75 percent) live in Pakistan's N.W.F.P., the remainder primarily in Baluchistan (20 per cent) and in the city of Peshawar (4 per cent). The majority are Pathan tribesmen largely from the Eastern regions of Afghanistan but the number of refugees representing other ethnic groups has increased. Peshawar has become the largest Afghan enclave outside Kabul while the refugee population also grew in cities such as Islamabad, Quetta and Karachi.

Afghan refugees are not only noteworthy for their numbers but for the duration of their stay in Pakistan. The longer they remain there, the greater are the chances of their becoming a political force in that country. Since the formation of the Afghan interim government, the refugee population and the resistance movement it has launched have sought status in the United Nations and membership in the Organization of Islamic Conference. The resistance group also sought diplomatic recognition from the US and Europe as well as Muslim countries and status as the sole legitimate representative of the Afghan people in any negotiation to resolve the crisis in Afghanistan. Efforts were also made to establish legal structures for the resolution of disputes among Afghans in Pakistan and the elections in the refugee camps have been planned to reinforce the concept of a nation-in-exile. Prolonged displacement could see the formation of an Afghan nation in Pakistan placing a political burden on that country despite its best intentions and efforts from the international community.

### 3.2 Pressures on the Pakistan Economy

Although Zia and later Prime Ministers have emphasized that few problems exist between Afghan refugees and Pakistan, it is well known that Afghan refugees have hardly been popular in N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan. Similar is the position in Sindh where the basic contention of mohajirs has been that Pakistan can accept over 3 million Afghan refugees but it has not been able to repatriate 200,000 Bihari Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh since 1971. Lawlessness, Kalashnikov and drug culture that have overtaken the socio-economic spheres of Pakistani life are attributed to the arrival of Afghan refugees. Unless appropriate measures are taken conflicts are bound to aggravate. The refugee requirement for pastures for their herds of camels, goats, cattle and sheep have provoked disputes with the indigenous population over grazing rights.
When relief food is adequate or in excess, a different set of problems occur. The price of food may decrease as relief goods find their way into the general economy. Such a deflation in prices can subvert local food products and some resentment has arisen when refugees have better living conditions than their hosts. In parts of Pakistan, refugees have shared relief food with destitute Pakistanis who descend upon refugee camps hoping to take advantage of relief supplies. Competition for common property resources can be particularly damaging to the local poor, increasing tensions between host population and refugees. The tension in Pakistan has been most acute over grazing lands but has also been felt in terms of available water and wild life. Competition over scarce employment has resulted in some of the first signs of friction between Afghans and Pakistanis as both place demands on a fragile developing economy. Refugees have been willing to work for lower wages than their Pakistani counterparts at times for as little as 50 per cent of the typical Pakistani wage. There are few options available to host communities or the poor within these communities. They have no resources such as food, medical aid or the programme of refugee relief work agencies unless it is through black market or the generosity of refugees themselves.

Compared with other countries of asylum, Pakistan allows the Afghans relative freedom of movement and they are able to live and work where they will and engage in political affairs related to the crisis in their country. They live in camps rent free, draw relief benefits and work to supplement their incomes. When refugees established business primarily in urban centres some Pakistanis began to resent the competition and Afghan domination in certain trades. The world recession has also had an impact on the refugee population. Many Pakistanis who had gone abroad to work were forced to return to Pakistan when the construction boom in the Persian Gulf ended. The return has placed a greater premium on jobs resulting in competition between Pakistanis and Afghans. The potential for friction has been heightened.

The economic and political problems of Afghan displacement have been compounded by cultural/ethnic behaviour which have caused problems for Pakistani authorities. For many Afghans the maintenance of tribal autonomy has meant relative distance from government, whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Historically, these people have felt that when there was tension or pressures from authorities on one or the other side of the border, they could cross over. This, however, has been minimized by the continued crisis and war in Afghanistan leaving many Afghans no alternative but to remain in Pakistan. Pakistan itself is in the process of nation-building. Political legitimacy will depend on people's capacity to reconcile tribal and ethnic loyalties with national loyalties.

If repatriation is unlikely, will Afghans be willing to assimilate into Pakistani society, and will they submit to Pakistani law and nationalism? Political legitimacy, which is the goal of most developing countries is complicated in the case of Pakistan. The refugee crisis has led to a situation where there is a refugee nation attempting to establish its authority within a country which is attempting to achieve political legitimacy and development.

Among the problems facing Pakistan is the Afghan characteristic of ghairat which refugees have and which can be interpreted as bravery or zeal expressed in the pursuit of one's objectives or self-identity. It may well be this cultural characteristic that has imbued the Afghan resistance within the vigour which proved so formidable to Soviet intervention. Ghairat is expressed by maintaining distance from the state and its authority. This quality has been exercised in the mountainous regions of Afghanistan where government influence has traditionally been inhibited by rugged terrain. But as an increasing number of Afghan refugees are present in Pakistan, an issue facing Islamabad is how to overcome tribal independence so as to avoid creating tensions.
The future stability in Pakistan may be determined by Islamabad's ability to cope with an independent refugee population. There have been instances of disputes between Pakistani officials and refugees where bureaucratic issues have come into conflict with Afghan refugees. There have been various instances where authorities have been denied entrance into refugee houses and disputes have occurred where Afghans have felt that the government had out stepped into bounds in the administration and control of refugee settlement.

The Afghan involvement has also accentuated the feelings of ethnic exclusivity in the N.W.F.P. and brought on the national agenda the potentially explosive issue of a Greater Pushtunistan. The eruption of ethnic conflict is bound to spill over into Pakistan. The threat of kindling the feelings of Pushtun exclusively across the Durand Line can be used by rebel groups to pressurize Islamabad to continue their support to their territorial aggrandizement. A far more serious situation is developing in Baluchistan where the Baluch-Pakhtun divide is assuming a dangerous dimension. Sind has already been in ferment for a long time. The Pashtun nationalism seems to have re-emerged from the shadow of the Islamic jehad that was the main motivating factor to dislodge the "Godless regime". A greater degree of the Afghan crisis is further spilling of ethnic groups along sectarian, linguistic, cultural and territorial lines through most of Pakistan's territory.

Ethnic ferment has also reached the Punjab where the Seraiki movement seeks to create a distinct region in the lower Punjab incorporating the Multan, Bahawalpur, Sialkot and Jhang belt.

### 3.3 Drug Factor in Pakistan's Politics

Pakistan is also deeply enmeshed in a narcotics problem that is complex, multifaceted and growing. Pakistan is a major producer of opium. According to the Federal Cabinet Minister in-charge of Narcotics, farmers in Pakistan produced 200 tons of raw opium in the 1991-92 growing season. This was an increase of 20 tons from 1991 and continued an upward trend since the historic low of 40 tons achieved in 1985. Tribal heroin cartels in Pakistan control more than half of the cultivation and marketing of opium in Afghanistan. This year Afghanistan may have become the world's largest producer of opium. These cartels in Pakistan control the refining of much of the opium produced in both Pakistan and Afghanistan into heroin. Mobile laboratories operating in Pakistan's autonomous tribal areas along and across the Pakistani-Afghan border produce the bulk of heroin manufactured in the Golden Crescent. A few laboratories operate in Pakistani Baluchistan and others have been set up in Jalalabad and Kandhar in Afghanistan.

Pakistani drug cartels garner enormous profits although figures are impossible to verify. According to one study the Pakistani share of the world's narcotics trade is about $120 billion a year, an extremely high figure. In August 1992, the National Development Finance Corporation estimated that the black economy of the country gains US $32.5 billion annually from the cultivation, production and smuggling of illicit narcotics from the Golden Crescent. This makes, according to a secret classified report on "Heroin in Pakistan" commissioned by the CIA, Pakistan's black economy more than half the size of the country's annual Gross National Product. Another study by a US accounting firm puts the entire black economy at US $208 billion but grants that large portion of this comes from the booming returns being received by the country's drug barons.

Such profits have made the drug mafias' penetration into the Pakistani state and economy possible at all levels. Pakistani experts on narcotics believe narcotics money now fuels the political system supporting party organisation and election campaigns. Narcotics money buys...
Afghanistan Factor in Central and South Asian Politics

In Pakistan, protection for the drug mafias at the highest political levels in Pakistan while the privatization scheme of Nawaz Sharif government provided vast opportunities for drug lords to launder their profits and legitimize themselves by buying into banks and industrial conglomerates. Many known drug lords and narcotics traffickers sit in the National Assembly of N.W.F.P., Punjab and Baluchistan. In Sind the Assembly is full of Patharidars land lords who protect bandit gangs involved in kidnapping, narcotics and illegal weapons. One frontier drug chieftain who is a member of the National Assembly had access to the former President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's house. Narcotics traffickers in Punjab were related to former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif by marriage and reportedly was close to the Sharif family.

The US has lost much of the influence it had gained in Pakistan through its support for the Afghan resistance. The two countries are still cooperating on narcotics control and USAID is funding an attempt to address this demand.

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the subsequent conflict disrupted old smuggling routes between Afghanistan and Europe via Iran, Turkey and across the Iran-Soviet border. These routes were patronized by itinerant Afghans who traded in everything from American jeans to Mercedes Benz automobiles. The cutting off of these routes deflected much of this trade south and east to Pakistan. The Herati traders no longer went west to Mashad but south east to Kandhar and Quetta and trans-shipment points at Nushi and Dalbandin in Pakistani Baluchistan and Robat near the Afghan-Pakistan-Iran trijunction.

According to the government of Pakistan there are at least 1.2 million heroin addicts in Pakistan. By far the largest proportion of heroin that moves into or through Pakistan 50-55 metric tonne of 70 metric tonnes (1991) is consumed within the country. It is clear that heroin has touched all parts of Pakistani society.

Pakistan's N.W.F.P. is the region where an illicit heroin industry can be located. Poppy has been grown here since centuries. Historically the major growing areas have been in the Mahaban range of Gadoon Amazai in Swabi districts, Buner parts of the Malakand protected areas and in the upper side valleys of the Panjkora river in Dir, west of the Indus river. The N.W.F.P. is largely populated by Pakhtun tribes who are known for their warlike culture and love of weapons. The major border tribes - Wazir, Masud, Bhattani, Mangal, Bangash, Ovakzai, Afridi, Mohmand Ulmankhel live under their own warlike code of Pakhtunwali. During the Afghan conflict, the border tribes exploited the situation to strengthen themselves.

As far as the major narcotics network in the N.W.F.P. are concerned, four significant drug networks appear to be functioning in the province- the Gandaf traders, the Yusuf Zia and Khattak elites. They have established personal contacts with the key corridors of power and a base from which they promote their business interests. The best example of this is Zia-ul-Haq who did have an entourage who used their position to promote criminal interests including narcotics. Two of his pilots used presidential aircraft to smuggle heroin - one to the US during a state visit. Zia's banker and chief financial adviser, Hamid Hasnain was arrested in 1985 as part of a ring smuggling heroin to Europe through Norway zonal head of Habib Bank. No group is more important to the future of narcotics trafficking in and through Pakistan than the Afridi mafia. The Afridi Pakhtuns are the border smugglers and raiders of Pakistan par excellence. The location of their territory in a crescent around Peshawar from South to West and their holding of the Khyber Pass, the great northern gateway to the India subcontinent has made them a factor to be reckoned with by all in the valley of Peshawar - Mughal, Durrani, Sikh, British and the Pakistani. The big smugglers and narcotic, traffickers all live in guarded fortresses inside the Khyber Agency where the penal codes of Pakistan do not apply.
The Afridis took to the heroin business from the very beginning involving themselves in all phases of the product cycle from cash advances to growers to collecting the opium base and moving it to refine laboratories, to transporting heroin throughout Pakistan and into international channels. As early as 1980, the Khyber agency began to harbour refining "laboratories" and by 1984, the Agency reportedly had 60 such laboratories in the operation.

Baluchistan has always been remote and undeveloped. Huge areas are still ruled by powerful Sardars (tribal chiefs) with 2.5 million Baluch in Central and Southern Baluchistan and another 2 million Pashtuns in the North Quetta - Pishin - Zhob. Pakistan's largest province is sparsely populated. If seizures of narcotics are any indication - Baluchistan has been a major conduit for heroin in the early 1980s after Iranian narcotics dealers and Iranian Baluch Sardars fleeing from the Khomeini regime settled in Quetta and Karachi. Iranian money underwrote the development of the Helmund Valley in Afghanistan as a major poppy growing region under Afghan Mujahideen commanders. Baluch agents took over much of the overland movement of the Helmund crops, transporting it by camel and trucks to refining centres in Robot and Shovawak in Afghanistan and Nushki and Chagai in Pakistan. The role of Baluchistan in the interim heroin trade has increased yearly as Pakhtun dealers from the N.W.F.P. develop contacts with their Pashtun brothers in Zhob in and around Quetta. Moreover, now that Kandhar in Afghanistan is developing as a poppy growing and reportedly a heroin refining centre, the importance of Baluchistan is growing.

Pakistan's biggest drug baron Haji Ayub Zakhakhel had access to former President Ishaq Khan (a Pakhtun from the Bangash belt of Bannu district). In Punjab, other key figures in the heroin trade used to sit in the inner political council of former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif. The easy availability of heroin in Bara and Dara Adam Khel has attracted hundreds of free launchers, small gangs and enterprising businessmen. Increasingly political groups use heroin to fund themselves and buy arms. In Jhang city, both the Shia based Tehrik-i-Nafazil; iqat-i-affaria (TNFI) and the militant Sunni Anjuman-i-Sipah-Sabah (ASS) reportedly killed each other over the control of the local heroin trade. Narcotics gangs are also operating in the industrial city of Faisalabad.

Haji Iqbal Beg is a key figure in Lahore and his closest political ally has been Malik Meraj Khalid a founder member of PPP in 1967 and a former speaker of National Assembly. As the heroin trade boomed, in the 1980s, former COAS Asif Beg's personal wealth also multiplied. It is also mentioned in the report that according to some narcotics expert, Beg cooperated with ISI in its programme to assist anti-Indian Sikh insurgency. Beg's operations made heroin trade an important source of wealth in the Punjab economy.

Karachi in Sind is the main narcotics entrepot in Pakistan served by main roads coming through Baluchistan via Kalat and Las Bela and the National Highway through Hyderabad. Other routes to India go via Hyderabad; one to Badin and then across the Rann of Kutch. Hyderabad has become an important way station for heroin on its way down to Karachi. The city has virtually been taken over by criminal gangs, shielded by powerful politicians connected to the late Jam Sadiq, Sindh Chief Minister (1990-92) and Irfanullah Marwat (a Pakhtun from the N.W.F.P.) son-in-law of Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The major gangs in Hyderabad are also former Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz militias that had turned their organization and arsenals to crime - gun running, opium and heroin. Most heroin comes into Karachi by road in trucks owned by Frontier Pakhtuns and is spread out to godowns located in Pakhtun and Muhajir enclaves in the city. The Pakhtuns have allowed Muhajir gangs run Karachi district networks. The deal represented the underside of the political alliances forged by the late Jam Sadiq between anti-PPP Sindhis, Muhajirs and
Pakhtun immigrants. Once heroin shipments arrive in Karachi, resident traffickers - usually family members of the Frontier drug-lords - oversee distribution to the local network and then to international operations out of the Karachi port and airport.

During the eight year period of martial law under Gen. Zia-ul-Haq (1977-85) a number of officers became involved in narcotics. They were mostly Majors in the army who headed martial law courts and started by taking tribes from those accused in narcotic cases. Some men like Major Afridi, Major Zahoor escaped from custody and became more deeply involved as traffickers connected to the frontier mafias. It has been alleged that the previous Corps Commander at Lahore (IV Corps) Lieutenant General Mahsud Alam Jan made a lot of money by facilitating the movement of narcotics from the frontier to Lahore and then to India.

It is also alleged that the ISI allowed Afghan resistance groups to trade in narcotics after the suspension of US assistance and that individual ISI officers participated in trade. The ISI is also deeply involved with Sikh militants who used Pakistan as sanctuary and also use heroin to fund their arms purchases. The Kashmir insurgency is said to be partly funded by heroin. The stronger pro-Pakistan group, the Hizbul Mujahideen is backed by the ISI, the Jammat-i-Islami of Pakistan and the Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Some observers also believe that the army is more deeply involved in narcotics trafficking and that the narcotics mafias and their politician allies (Nawaz Sharif was included in this group) regularly pay off the corps commanders. Others feel that the combination of US aid cut off and the drug money flowing into Pakistan through the black economy and the legal bearer bond schemes tempted the armed forces to tap narcotics to finance their expensive weapons purchases. There does not seem to be any prospect of abrupt or major changes in Pakistan's domestic narcotics profile although developments in Afghanistan, Central Asia and India could alter patterns of international trafficking and have a significant impact on the role of Pakistan mafias. Pakistan lacks both a strong anti-narcotics public opinion lobby and the institutional capacity to take the drug mafias head on. To many vested interests are benefitting directly or indirectly from narcotics for the civilian law enforcement agencies to have anything more than a sporadic effect on production or trafficking. Drug money underpins the black economy which is now virtually the same size as the legitimate economy.

The narcotics issue faced by Pakistan is one of the priority issues for the government of Benazir Bhutto. The menace of drug abuse and drug trafficking put great strains on Pakistan's limited resources not to mention the disruption of social order. A regional plan of action was agreed upon by the ECO member states to tackle the problem and consequently a committee was set up within the ambit of ECO to institutionalize and promote cooperation in the ECO member states to combat the drug issues faced by the region. The ECO Committee on narcotics abuse control provides an institutional forum ECO member states to combat all aspects of the narcotics problem with full force. A meeting of the ECO Committee on narcotics abuse control was held in Islamabad on 21 December 1993 to mark the resolve of the ECO member states to cooperate with each other to banish drug abuse and drug trafficking.
4.0 AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN AND TERRORISM IN KASHMIR

A. K. Ray

On 22 May 1992, the Statesman carried its own Srinagar correspondent's report saying: "The State Government has begun investigation following the reports that several hundred Afghan Mujahideen have sneaked in or (sic) fight alongside Kashmiri insurgents for separation of Jammu Kashmir (sic) from Indian Union, official sources said in Srinagar. It is not known how far that investigation proceeded and what, if anything, was done to nip the mischief in the bud.

The Times of India of 23 July 1992 carried a report by Ravi Bhatia suggesting that Governor G.C. Saxena had been sufficiently concerned about the implications of the influx of the Afghan Mujahideen so that he rushed to New Delhi to apprise the Prime Minister of the danger. The ex-Collectors who take decisions in such matters apparently assured the worried Governor that some more paramilitary forces would be made available for doing what the Soviet Army could not do. The politicians in control groped, fumbled and dithered, and did nothing that ought to have been done.

Reports about Afghan Mujahideen operating in the Valley of Kashmir continued to appear in the press. While the Central Government which is responsible and accountable for handling Kashmir affairs observed a deafening silence, the Additional Director of BSF, P.C. Dogra, said in Jammu on 17 August 1993 that "foreign mercenaries" had taken over command of most of the militant outfits operating in Jammu and Kashmir "in a bid to boost the sagging morale of the militants", especially in the Kashmir Valley. The Hindustan Times of 24 August 1993 carried a longish report from A.R. Wig definitely naming, on the basis of local briefing, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate of Pakistan (ISI) as the master-mind behind the launching of Afghan Mujahideen into the Valley. Again, on 22 October 1993, the Kashmir Times quoted Prakash Singh, Director General of BSF saying that more than 2300 Pakistan-trained "foreign mercenaries" from at least six countries were fighting against the Indian security forces in the Kashmir Valley. To cap all this, there appeared in the Hindustan Times of 4 December 1993 the salient points in the report titled New Islamist International submitted by a task-force set up by the US House Republican Research Committee to probe the "growing teeth of international trans-border Islamic terrorism". This report revealed that the ISI had sent highly trained Pakistani and Arab terrorists into the Indian territory via Nepal to establish a "countrywide network and support system of subversion and terrorism."

Two conclusions follow from all this: first, there was worse than inadequate, if any at all, appreciation of the implications of the induction of Afghan Mujahideen into the Valley, and, secondly, the Central Government does not have a clue to the proper action to be taken in a situation of this kind. The second conclusion by no means implies that the Army and the paramilitary forces have no ideas as to how to tackle the situation, but, it does suggest that the ruling party is still mesmerized into paralysis of will by its self-created mirage of what is called the "Muslim vote-bank".

The grave danger posed by the induction of Afghan Mujahideen into the Valley cannot be wished or negotiated away. It cannot be handled as if it were no more than a problem of policing an area infested with criminals. It cannot be conveniently downgraded to the class of what is called Low Intensity Conflict (LIC), and then sought to be tackled with a priori principles which have never worked anywhere. It has to be taken as a thing-in-itself, analyzed, understood, and
then combated in the proper manner with the proper means. It requires cold-blooded decision-making and ruthless execution.

The first question to be asked is who these Mujahideen are. To describe those operating in the Valley contemptuously as mercenaries is to commit a grave error. A mercenary is a soldier of fortune without any loyalties or commitments. Anyone who uses them does so at great risk to the purpose in view. The first objective of any mercenary is to remain alive in order to get paid; the second is to carry out the assigned task with minimum risk to oneself; and the third is to run away safely when the going gets too hot. Can these objectives be attributed to the Afghan Mujahideen in the Valley?

These Mujahideen emerged as the fighting arm of various groups resisting the regime of Sardar Mohammad Daud who had overthrown King Zahir Shah in 1973, and instituted an oppressive regime, the "modernization" and leftist policies of which went against the grain of the Afghan people and their religious leaders. There were three stages of their evolution as remarkably successful irregulars: (I) resistance to Daud regime, (2) intensified resistance and armed conflict during the Taraki-Amin period (April 1978 to December 1979), and (3) guerrilla warfare during Soviet occupation and puppet Babrak Karmal regime from 27 December 1979 to 15 February 1989, the date on which the last Soviet soldier left Afghanistan, and, thereafter against the Najibullah regime. During the last phase, there was considerable fighting between The rival groups for overall control and dominance in Kabul. The conflict is far from over.

It was during The Taraki-Amin period that there was a general uprising of the Afghan people against the imposition of radical socio-economic reforms. Persecution by the leftist regime led to a massive exodus of men, women and children over the border mainly into Pakistan. Among them were armed artisans who had already begun to call themselves mujahideen, and also those who wanted to go back into Afghanistan and wage a jehad against the "godless" regime and then against the Soviet interlopers, the shuravi. These were an unorganised lot carrying out sporadic and un-coordinated attacks by independent groups of "freedom fighters". Soon, over 50 different political groups with their own bands of armed people, had put up their offices in Peshawar.

The Soviet Union under Brezhnev had seriously misled itself about the limits of what was then called the Kissinger Doctrine, and thought that the apparent vacuum created by the withdrawal of American involvement from some parts of the US strategic perimeter could be filled by it and used as springboards for further expansion. A Soviet putsch in Afghanistan had been predicted by this author in 1969. When it came about ten years later, the Indian government was caught napping and entirely clueless as to its implication for the security of the country it ruled. Naturally, it missed a golden opportunity to give a decisively new turn to Indo-Pak relations by offering security assurances to the neighbour, and using them to limit US involvement in Pakistan's India policy which the USA had slowly but surely started dissocializing itself even during the latter days of Nixon administration.

In terms of Kissinger Doctrine, the refashioning of the Northern Tier assumed the continuance of Afghanistan as a buffer state. There were not enough grounds as US saw them for active interference with the Daud regime as its Russophilia was more tactical then ideological. Still, those who resisted the regime were valuable as a corrective, and fell within the scope of the US strategic compulsion to resist the expansion of Soviet power and influence. It was, therefore, willing, together with its allies, to support proxy wars against the Soviet Union and its satellites. Thus, with the commencement of the second stage of Mujahideen resistance, foreign aid including liberal supplies of arms and ammunition for the Mujahideen began to arrive through
the port of Karachi or down Karakoram Highway. Rawalpindi and Peshawar became the centres for the distribution of CIA supplied military hardware for the Afghan Mujahideen.

It is one thing to provide arms for "freedom fighters", it is another thing to ensure that they got to the hands which could use them best. A CBC- TV documentary titled "The Seeds of Terrorism" which was telecast on February 1, 1994 demonstrated as to how the seeds of international terrorism were sown by USA's alliance with Pakistan and its ISI for supporting Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. "The Mujahideen had to be organise into identifiable groups so that some kind of control could be exercised over them. Since Pakistan had a military government at that time, the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) was given the task to act as the co-ordinator of all military assistance provided to the Mujahideen by friendly nations". The first task was, of course, to reduce the 50-plus political groups to a manageable number. According to Lt. Gen (Retd) Kamal Matinuddin, President Zia gave this task to the Martial Law Administrator of the Frontier Province, Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq who managed to persuade the disjointed elements to form a limited number of groups. Thus came into being seven major groupings each of whom would have a number of "field commanders" under its control. These did not include nine Iran-based Shia groups who, together, formed the Hizb-e-Wahdai. Of the seven Sunni groups, four were and are conservative and radical Islamists of varying degrees, the rest not quite so. Of the four, the Hizb-e-Islami af Gulbadin Hikmatyar is the most trenchant, the most numerous, the most uncompromising and the most ruthless while in terms of performance in the field, Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani's Jamiat-e-Islami (which includes Ahmad Shah Masood, the Lion of Panjsher) is probably the most experienced, the most battle-hardened, and the best guerrilla warriors.

Never in history have the Afghans been noted for unity amongst themselves. The primary loyalties of an Afghan are to his tribe and its chief, and to the territory in which his hearth and home and family are. The one single factor that overrode the innate divisiveness of the Afghan people was the motivation to save Islam from the danger posed by the atheistic cult of socialism-communism, and by the "godless" shuravi (Russians) with their abhorrent ways. Additional fuel was provided by the time-honoured Afghan tradition of badal, i.e. exacting blood-revenge for those killed by the leftist regime and the Soviet occupation forces. This composite motivation made it possible for the mutually exclusive groups to fight as one under the overall control and guidance of ISI. President Zia's total support to the Mujahideen was no secret to anyone. He had risked a great deal in confronting the Soviet Union, albeit with US support, but came out successful. A half jocular question is said to have gone round the GHQ at Rawalpindi: "what do you think the Indian Army is going to do if one fine morning it saw Russian troops on the other bank of the Sutlej?"

The objective of Mujahideen activity was the liberation of their country from Soviet occupation and the puppet leftist regime it had installed. Why and how has it been possible for Pakistan to induce and encourage them to infiltrate into the Valley and fight alongside the militants? President Zia obviously had two purposes in mind, first to counteract the threat to his country posed by Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and secondly, decisively to destroy the traditional Indo-Afghan friendship through the eminently realistic and the most obvious means, viz., the forging of an Islamic front with the Mujahideen and their political groups. He achieved both. The bonus he earned was in the renewed involvement of the USA with Pakistan, which the Republicans would have kept within reasonable bounds, and which the Clinton administration has managed, for good or evil, to deepen.
It may sound strange but the fact is that President Zia, in his attempt to drive a wedge between the Afghans and India, received considerable help from India itself in a form which Pakistan is even now finding very crucial. When at the ungodly hour of near-midnight of 27 December 1979, the Soviet Ambassador in New Delhi called on Foreign Secretary, R.D. Sathe to tell him the blatant lie that Soviet forces had entered Afghanistan on invitation, he got the dressing down of his life. Sathe had minced no words. The 'caretaker' government of Charan Singh was hardly to be found anywhere. Between that dressing down and the infamous speech by India's Permanent Representative at the UN before the Security Council in mid- January 1980, an extremely grave miscalculation was made by people yet to hold the reins of government, and, a hapless - because bossless - Foreign Secretary was railroaded into sending utterly shameful instructions to the PR in New York. The PR, not having been put wise, criticised certain unidentified nations for arming, training and encouraging subversive elements, and asserted that India had no reason to doubt the Soviet claim about the invitation. President Zia must have chortled with glee at the news.

It is impossible to believe that the Indian government had been totally unaware of the struggle of the Mujahideen against the Taraki and Amin regimes, and how close to success they were when Brezhnev moved his troops to save his puppets. It was obvious to anyone who eared that the Mujahideen would continue their struggle with outside help, and would prefer death to dishonour. It was also obvious that the Russians will get as bogged down in Afghanistan as the Americans had been in Vietnam. There was time, but, not for long, to acknowledge one's error and retrace one's steps. For some inexplicable reason, the saga of blunders continued. Within the much wider horizon of the long-term implications of what was going on in Afghanistan, India concentrated on the small gnat, viz., the possibility that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan might induce USA to arm Pakistan. Thundered Foreign Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in the Parliament on 17 June 1980, "It is time to ask ourselves if Afghanistan has not become or is not likely to become, a pretext for those who wish to create further instability in that country". It was also the view that the Russians had moved in to prompt the Americans. How easy it was for Pakistan then to convince the Mujahideen groups that India was hand in glove with the atheistic communists and the shuravi! A fortiori then, Islam must also be in danger in India, and particularly in Kashmir which was under "Indian occupation".

It is one thing to indoctrinate the Mujahideen against India while their own liberation struggle is on, but, it is very much a different thing to make them take time off from the internal struggles that followed, and go to fight in the Valley. It is self-evident that the Mujahideen as organised units could not have moved into the Valley, and cannot continue to do so without planning by the ISI, and logistical and other support from that organisation. It is not just the love for Islam that has provided the ISI with the motivation. It is necessary to attempt a probe into the rationale behind the move in the light of the objectives of Pakistan's India policy. Is it a spur-of-the-moment opportunistic decision in furtherance of a given policy, or is it the unfolding of a new phase in a strategic plan formulated in the past? Is it a part of plan "K-2"?

What is the kind of material that has been available to Pakistan's planners? The Mujahideen are of three types: (1) those who remained behind in Afghanistan to carry on the jehad, (2) those who came out in order to go back again, and fresh recruits from the refugees in Pakistan, and (3) Islamic fundamentalist militants, soldiers of fortune, and "specialists for hire" from various Arab countries from the Gulf to Algeria, and some Iranian elements. The ouster of the Najibullah regime after the withdrawal of Soviet troops did not lead to a massive return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan. In fact, the unsettled situation within Afghanistan and the continuation of violent
factional conflict has discouraged a lot of them from returning while encouraging others to come out to a safe haven in Pakistan. It is also a fact that an appreciable number of Afghans with access to arms supplies had fanned out inside Pakistan, and were a source of both actual and potential law and order problem. As the experience with the PLO "fighters" evacuated from Lebanon (some 13,000 of them) in mid-1982 has shown, part-time partisans generally gravitate back to where their families are and where they have some means of peaceful livelihood. It is, therefore, likely that some Mujahideen returned to Pakistan after carrying out their task, although their further presence in that country was neither necessary nor desirable. Something had to be done with and about this population.

At this point, Pakistan's Afghan and India policies come together in active convergence. The slumber-prone and incoherent Home Minister has belatedly woken up to the fact that Pakistan has been working on a plan to balkanise India in which the Valley is the first step while it has been evident to every intelligent Indian since 1972 that sooner or later Pakistan will engineer a riposte to the emergence of Bangladesh and India's involvement in that affair. Such a riposte would have clearly defined targets, and would be carried but according to carefully laid plans taking into account not only the realities on the ground but also every possible twist and turn in the international situation. And, it will require a very strong motivation for a sustained and long-term operation because 1971 had taught the lesson of the futility of a direct military assault based on unreal presumptions.

In order to understand the real character of Pakistani depredations inside Indian territory, it is necessary to recognise certain aspects of the Pakistani psyche. "The dominant factor is the mental attitude of the armed forces, complemented by that of the bureaucracy - both dominated by the Punjabi elite." And this elite is thoroughly infiltrated by adherents of Maududi's Jamaat-e-Islami. "This elite believes that Pakistan ought to have included the whole of Punjab, Hyderabad, Kashmir, the whole of Bengal, and Assam with a corridor connecting non-contiguous areas."

Baladiya adds: All cadets on training in various military establishments in Pakistan are given an intensive course of indoctrination. The sum and substance of this indoctrination consists in instilling the conviction that Islam is superior to all other religions, that Muslims by consequence are superior to all others and are destined to rule over the world, that it is the duty of every Muslim to spread the sway of Islam, that a part of this duty is to 'liberate' Muslims from infidel rule everywhere, that cowardly Hindus can never win a battle against Islamic forces, and that glory of Islam and its flag has to be restored on this 'sub-continent'. And, also: "The only way this revenge can be sought is through first cutting India down to size by engineering secession of various areas, and then to administer a military coup-de-grace. It is at this particular point that the aims of the Pakistani military establishment coincide with those of Jamaat-e-Islami and Muslim Brotherhood".

Whether or not the Afghan imbroglio at its very inception gave Pakistan the idea of killing two birds with one stone is a matter for conjecture. What is established as a fact is that through it, the Pakistan army and the ISI gained a great deal of extremely useful and relevant experience in conducting a clandestine operation on a large scale. It is evident at the same time that Pakistan cannot devote all its energies and resources for the pursuit of its India policy, so long as Afghanistan does not settle down to at least a semblance of peace with a truly Islamic regime in control. Therefore, a relatively peaceful Afghanistan is a necessary pre-condition for the successful pursuit of the policy of balkanising India.

As the Pakistani planners and operatives took stock of the situation after a composite Mujahideen government assumed control in Kabul, however fragile that device was, they may have seen it
like this: (1) Afghan love of independence was not enough to forge the diverse resistance groups into a unified body; (2) unification, at least for tactical purposes, was brought about by the overriding motivation of saving Islam from "godlessness" of the leftists and the shuravi; (3) with the departure of the Russians and the downfall of the communist regime, this basis for unity no longer existed in Afghanistan as a binding force; (4) in the foreseeable future, there is every likelihood of intense factional warfare with various groups trying to secure exclusive Pakistani support (5) it is necessary, therefore, selectively to weaken various factions so that on the one hand the dimensions of the problem within Afghanistan are reduced while on the other hand promoting the interests of the particular faction or factions that Pakistan desired to see in control; (6) this objective can be at least partially achieved if the focus of jehad is shifted elsewhere, viz., the Valley, and a sufficient number of the Mujahideen are diverted into that area; (7) induction of battle-experienced Mujahideen trained in the use of not only sophisticated arms, but also better techniques of sabotage and more effective tactics would greatly increase effectiveness of the militants in the Valley; (8) such a move would facilitate the transition from the hit-and-run phase to that of defensive-offensive operations in the classic guerrilla operational method; (9) the induction of the Mujahideen into the Valley will make it that much more difficult for the Indian security forces to gain the upper hand; (10) such induction will attract international attention to the problem of Kashmir, and plausible claims to virtue could be made by saying that involvement in the Valley is keeping the Mujahideen away from spilling over the borders in to any of the Central Asian Republics. The guiding principle behind this calculation is the fundamental military wisdom which says that if irregulars do not lose decisively, they win, and, if the regulars do not win decisively, they lose. This is the substratum of plan 'K-2'.

To conclude from interrogation reports that Afghan Mujahideen have been sent to the Valley in order to put some spine back into the local militants is a serious error arising generally from a wishful interpretation of what apprehended militants say to their interrogators, and from the basic mistake of swallowing the myth that the militants in the Valley are "misguided youth". "In any organised terrorist activity, there is an assumption that if a member of an operation squad is apprehended, he will be thoroughly grilled by 'hostile intelligence'. He is, of course, carefully briefed beforehand as to what to say if apprehended. As regards the "misguided youth", only an imbecile will described them as such, and, only a bigger imbecile will imagine that there are, among these, young men who have been forced to become insurgents and are not really willing to be so. In any organised insurgency, there is no place for the weakling, the unwilling and the undefeatable."

What does the induction of Afghan Mujahideen into the Valley then imply? Pakistan's internal compulsions apart, the real purpose behind this move is two-fold, first to escalate the level of militancy in the Valley from the hit-and-run stage to that of defensive-offensive operations carried out from well-protected bases, and involving increasingly long engagements with the security forces, and, secondly to use this stage to train and harden the local militants to go on to the tactical offensive stage with better arms, better logistics, better fighting methods, and experience in field command. The development will generally follow the pattern seen elsewhere. Propaganda-wise, the whole business of escalation will be presented as new phase in the "liberation struggle" a la Afghanistan, as well as an Islamic struggle against infidels - the latter for consumption in the Islamic countries. By seeing a parallel between the two situations, Ms. Robin Raphel, in her address to the Asia Society, has already clearly indicated the extent to which Pakistan has succeeded in putting across its own story. No mistake should be made about the wider implications of this Foothold in US policy-making.
There is no point in reading non-existent meanings in the tie-up of particular groups or the Mujahideen with particular groups of militants in the Valley. The tie-ups may not indeed mean anything more than territorial divisions for purposes of operations. The Mujahideen are not at all free agents in this matter. Their joint operations will have to conform to the lines and targets set by the ISI on which they have to depend entirely for support in all forms. The Islamic umbrella will ensure overall operational co-operation.

Some may argue that the Mujahideen cannot be very effective in the Valley as they will not be "fish in water", and that the memory of the atrocities perpetrated by the Pushtun Tribals in 1947-48 will make the local Muslims hostile to them. Both arguments are false. If the Mujahideen are seen merely to be Afghans, they will not be "fish in water", but, if they are seen as valiant fighters on a jehad mission, they will be, and the mullahs will insist on everyone honouring the Islamic obligation to assist mujahids. The trained Mujahideen operating in the Valley are not the marauding rabble from the Tribal Area launched by Pakistan in 1947 with the lure of loot and women: they are, by and large, a disciplined lot who have learned the importance of securing local support. Even the memory, if it survives at all, of the oppression during the Afghan rule in Kashmir in the past, will not work against them; for, according to strict Islamic doctrines, even a tyrannical Muslim regime is always preferable to infidel rule, however benign, and, ruling by force was legitimised six hundred years ago by the Chief Qazi of the Mamelukes in Cairo.

What has to be realised first is that what is going on in the Valley is no longer a local affair, and that it has now become an integral part of the world-wide offensive of militant fundamentalist Islam which now supports Pakistan's hostile intentions regarding India. In fact, Pakistan has become a willing partner in that offensive.

It may be comforting to imagine that the international community can somehow be aroused to shake a warning finger at Pakistan, but, the truth is sadly otherwise. That community, particularly the West, is sick and tired of the decades-long Indo-Pak squabbles, the only exception being the United States where the Clinton administration is on a Bible-belt morality binge abroad. For the US, South Asia is a low-priority area, and, therefore, there is tendency to embrace the criminal in a woolly-headed attempt to be even-handed. The situation, thus, has to be tackled by us with our own means which must exclude the futile and litigious gambit of distributing "evidence" of Pakistani interference in our internal affairs. The more we let Pakistan know what we know, the easier it becomes for that country to deceive us and rest of the world. Those who are not congenital defeatists know that it is possible to liquidate the militancy in the Valley at some cost but not too much. The guerrilla loses his effectiveness when he can no longer use his tactics. The 'hammer and anvil' tactics used by the Soviet Army in Afghanistan will not work; used, it will only create more enemies. Guerrillas need people; deny them the people, not with bribes of 'economic packages', nor with dangling the rotten carrot of 'political process', but by making the people inaccessible to them, and by denying them the steady supply of replacements and recruits they are always in need. There are tested ways to do this, but, do we have the courage and the determination to adopt them? Force the guerrillas to fight conventionally by denying them the essentials of war by irregulars. More than the militants in the Valley, it is our political decision-makers who need the spine.

These gentlemen had better wake up fast and shake themselves out of their stupor. There is a growing suspicion that there exists a bunch of 'moles' who ensure that the Central government will either not do anything, or do precisely the wrong thing. There is also the suspicion that behind all the PR exercises, it is a "sell-out" that is being planned.
5.0 MAJOR AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN GROUPS: A PROFILE

1. Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party/ Hikmatyar)

Radical Islamist in character, Hizb-e-Islami is one of the best armed and organized groups. Its leader, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar who was born in Kunduz in 1947, is a Kharuti Pashtun of Gilzai origin. He was a leader of Muslim Brotherhood movement in Kabul in the early 1970s and shifted later to Pakistan to organize an Islamic opposition movement against the Daud regime. He led a major insurrection in the Panjshir valley in 1975 near Kabul, which was sponsored by the Pakistani government in response to Daud's support of Pashtunistan movement inside Pakistan.

The Hizb-e-Islami of Hikmatyar, which is believed to have about 30,000 trained fighters, has close ties with the Jamat-i-Islami of Pakistan, Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan and Hizbul Mujahideen, Al Barq, Harkat-ul-Mujahedin and Jamat-i-Islami of Kashmir. Hikmatyar and his party have received strong support from Pakistan. Hizb-e-Islami is mainly composed of Pashtuns from the eastern and north-eastern part of Afghanistan.

Considered to be both ambitious and ruthless, Hikmatyar displayed his political opportunism first in the spring of 1990, when he aligned with the former Defence Minister in the Najibullah regime, General Shahnawaz Tanai, who staged an unsuccessful coup against the Afghan President on March 6, 1990; and more recently when he joined hands with the Uzbek Commander, Dostam against the present Afghan government led by Burhanuddin Rabbani. Though not a mullah himself, Hikmatyar is a modern Islamist committed to the ideology of Islamic state in Afghanistan. He has been lending active men and material support to Islamist extremists in Tajikistan and Kashmir.

2. Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party/ Khalis)

This faction of Hizb-e-Islami, is led by Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, who broke away from his former colleague, Hikmatyar in 1979. Although about seventy years old, Khalis has been actively involved in the anti-Soviet operations. He is well organized and has some of the best field commanders. He viewed the Afghan resistance movement as a struggle between Islam and Kufr. Khalis aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state in accordance with the Quran, Sunnah and the Shariah. He considers the modern concept of elections as un-Islamic. Khalis is of traditional ulema (clerical) background and has translated works of a prominent Egyptian Muslim Brother, Sayyid Qutb. His party which is primarily Pashtun in membership, is believed to have around 10,000 trained cadres. Khalis maintains close relations with Burhanuddin Rabbani of Jamiat-e-Islami.

3. Jamiat-e-Islami

Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani distinguishes itself by its basically northern (non-Pashtun) membership particularly Tajiks and some Uzbeks as well. Born in 1940 in Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan in northern Afghanistan, Rabbani is a Tajik specialised in Islamic theology. Holding a degree from Al Azhar University - the premier institute of Islamic studies, Rabbani, founded the Jamiat-e-Islami, Afghanistan in 1967 and became its President in
1972. He migrated to Pakistan in 1974 and later operated from his base in Peshawar against the Soviets in Afghanistan.

Jamiat-e-Islami has been operating mainly in Panjsher valley under the effective commanders like Ahmad Shah Masood and Ismail Khan. With an effective strength of around 20,000 fighters, Jamial-e-Islami received support from Pakistan and Arab States. Though both Rabbani and Hikmatyar have Islamist orientation and wanted a strictly Islamic state in Afghanistan, their ethnic and personal differences led them split into two groups in 1976-77. Besides, Rabbani who has a broad background of classical culture, religious orthodoxy and political Islamism, has been willing to work with traditional ulema (clerics) which was opposed by Hikmatyar.

4. Ittehad-e-Islami (Islamic Union)

Led by Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, the Ittehad-e-Islami is closely aligned to the militant international Muslim Brotherhood and is heavily financed by radical Islamic groups in Saudi Arabia. Holding a Masters degree in Islamic theology from Cairo, Sayyaf speaks fluent Arabic which has facilitated his ties with the Saudis. This group is known to be close to Wahabis, hence receiving most of the support from Saudi Arabia. It is believed to have about 20,000 fighters, mostly in the Paghman Province near Kabul. This party too is for a strictly Islamic state in Afghanistan.

5. Harakat-e-Inquilabi-e-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement)

Led by Maulvi Mohammad Nabi Mohammad, this party was founded by him in Quetta in 1978. Mohammad is a Pashtun and being a cleric himself, his party draws its strength from graduates of traditional madrasseh and the clergy. With an estimated strength of about 20000, this party has been one of Afghanistan's strongest Mujahideen groups operating mainly in Ghazni, Kabul and Herat.


Led by Syed Ahmad Effendi Gaillani, a spiritual leader of Afghanistan's Sufi sect, the Qadiris, Mahaz too is Pashtun dominated and conservative. Gaillani who is related to Afghanistan's royal family, advocates the return of former King Zahir Shah. Despite his religious credentials, Gaillani is opposed to radical Islamists. His front is reported to be about 18000 strong.


Led by Sebghatullah Mojaddidi, who is a theologian by training and a Pir (religious heed) of another important Sufi order, the Naqshbandi, this party is also Sufi oriented and is opposed to radical Islamist ideology. Mojaddidi too has had links with the royalist establishment and consequently had differences with Hikmatyar. This group is reported to have about 18000 cadres, operating mostly around Qandhar, Farah and Baghlan.

8. Hizb-e-Wahdat

contacts with Iran. Iran has been extending full support to these Shia groups in securing their share in the political set-up in Afghanistan.
6.0 "THE NEW ISLAMIST INTERNATIONAL" OF TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE SET UP BY US HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE

EXCEPTS FROM THE REPORT
Dated February 1, 1993.

Sponsoring international terrorism and separatist subversion and insurgency is not new to Pakistan. Since the 1970s, Islamabad has been training Sikh and other Indian separatist movements as part of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's strategy of "forward strategic depth", and also as a part of his effort to gain revenge for India's support of an independent Bangladesh.....

Thus, the further militarization and radicalization of the Sikh armed struggle increased, as larger quantities of high quality weapons became available. Among the novelties of the revived terrorist campaign were sophisticated bomb making techniques and better training for Sikh terrorists of the Dal Khalsa separatist movement in the Afghan Mujahideen camps. Indeed, Sikh 'trainees' were killed in a Soviet raid on an Afghan training camp in Pakistan and their documents were seized......

The extent of the external, that is Pakistani and Afghan, influence on the Islamist transformation of the Kashmiri insurgency is quite clear. Indeed, Kashmir was the only area in India where, as of the mid-1980s, Islamic revivalism had "taken a radical political stance" and where "the slogans of the Islamic state have been publicly raised" and had been received with growing popularity. The population was increasingly adopting the leadership of Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan and Khomeynists representing the "following of the line of Imam Khomeyni" as their own leaders. Consequently, by 1984, an Islamic radicalization had developed that saw the rise of such movements as the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Mahaz-i-Azadi and the Liberation League. Later, by 1985, both the Jamaat-i-Islami and Al-Jihad movements, the latter "a clandestine organization influenced by the ideology of the Iranian revolution," were becoming highly influential in Kashmiri politics. Indeed, the Al-Jihad movement publicly raised the issue of an "Islamic Revolution" as "the only way to liberate" Kashmir in the mid-1980s. Thus, in the space of a few short years, "there was a marked erosion of the secular Kashmiri personality and a Muslim identity with fundamentalist overtones started emerging rapidly". Therefore, it also became imperative for the emerging separatist leaders to "give the struggle a Pan-Islamic character and extra-territorial dimension."

Indeed, as noted, this transformation was assisted and reinforced by an active ISI program. Initially, the emphasis of this program was on using the Afghan-support infrastructure in Pakistan to support Kashmiri militants. Indeed, during the main escalation of Islamist violence in Indian Kashmir in mid-1988, Pakistan provided assistance in the training and arming of Kashmiri terrorists, as well as sanctuaries to Kashmiri insurgents across the border. At times, the ISI's
assistance to the Kashmiri Islamists was even funneled through Afghan rebel leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami group, thus providing Islamabad with deniability.....

In 1986, with growing experience in training, organizing and running the Afghan mujahideen, and with military supplies available (through US, Saudi, and other foreign assistance), Pakistan began expanding its operation to sponsor and promote separatism and terrorism, primarily in Kashmir, as a strategic long-term program. Among the most crucial activities of the ISI were the following:

- "Religious fundamentalism was propagated in small but lethal doses to promote separatism and communal outlook”.
- "Training and indoctrination of selected leaders from the Kashmir valley was arranged to create militant cadres”.
- "A large number of youth from the Kashmir valley and Poonch Sector were given extensive training in the use of automatic weapons, sabotage and attacks on security force. Automatic weapons and explosives were now issued to these people”.
- "Special teams were trained to organize agitations and hartals, and to engineer incidents to damage the democratic and secular image of India”.

Thus the rise of Islamist ideology to predominance throughout Indian Kashmir facilitated the emergence of a tight link between the Kashmiri insurgents, their supporters, and Islamabad. Thus, it was with the widespread adoption of Islamist ideologies that Kashmiri Muslims could not seek ideological sustenance from a transnational Islam, while simultaneously basking in the guaranteed patronage from across the border. Concurrently, for the Pakistani defense establishment, the Kashmir cause constituted a combination of regional interest and commitment to the global Islamist cause. "Muslim fundamentalists in Pakistan... see the Islamic surge in Kashmir as the long awaited hour for jihad against Indian infidels, a holy war for which Pakistan must funnel material and moral backing”.....

There is a profound difference between support for Sikh terrorism in Punjab, which is a matter of harassing New Delhi, and Islamist terrorism in Kashmir, where there is a genuine whole-hearted commitment to Jihad.

Furthermore, in the increase of support for terrorism in India, Islamabad has been able to find a task for the Pakistani and Afghan cadres that Islamabad had developed during the Afghan War and must now keep from meddling in Pakistani domestic politics. Indeed, to secure that goal, Brig (Rtd.), Imtiaz, head of the ISI Political Section, has developed a long-term program called 'K-2'.

The 'K-2' program is aimed at unifying and better coordinating the Kashmiri and Sikh subversion efforts by "bringing under one umbrella Sikh and Kashmiri extremists and Muslim fundamentalists who would then intensify acts of violence in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, and the Terai region of Uttar Pradesh. "Indeed, the escalation of terrorism and subversion since the early 1990s is believed to have been a direct outgrowth of the ISI's implementation of the 'K-2' long-term program .....
The ISI established and runs its own "Kashmiri organization". The most important among these are the Hizb-i-Islami, which is comprised of former Kashmiri Mujahideen who were trained by the ISI and then fought with Gulbuddin Hikmatyar's organization in Afghanistan. Also, there is Harakat-ul-Jihad another highly professional terrorist group created in Pakistan. It is made up of veteran 'Afghans' from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir who receive extensive ISI support....

By early 1991, the importance of the Pakistani-Afghan terrorist infrastructure for the international Islamist movement further increased as a result of changes in Libya in the aftermath of the economic sanctions that were imposed on the country because of Qadhafi's support for international terrorism.

The Libyans assisted in the upgrading of the terrorist infrastructure in the camps of the Afghan resistance both inside Pakistan and just across the border in Afghanistan, because, as Qadhafi pointed out, "Afghanistan is open to anyone who wants to train".

By then, as the fighting in Afghanistan was grinding to a near halt, the Islamist Mujahideen were shifting more and more attention to the training of thousands of "brethren" from all over the Muslim world. Some 2,000-3,000 volunteers were in the Khost area alone in early-1991. The organized transfer of training installations to several camps in Pakistan-Afghanistan began in the summer of 1991 and still continues as terrorist teams arrive from Libya or via other countries.

For example, some 30-35 Libyan expert terrorist trainers arrived in Peshawar in November 1991 with the declared objective "to train national liberation forces" in Mujahideen camps, mainly those of Gulbuddin and Sayyaf.

It is noteworthy that the Armed Islamic Movement also played a major role in the consolidation of the capabilities of the Islamist terrorists. In the spring of 1991, 13 Kashmiri Islamists were accepted for about 6 months of highly specialized terrorist training in Sudan under the personal supervision of the Sudanese leaders Turabi and Mustafa Uthman. By then, AIM's leader, al-Turabi, had already visited Pakistan and Afghanistan in September 1991 to coordinate terrorist support activities.

Indeed, Jam'at-i-Islami (Pakistan), Hizb-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Islami (Afghanistan) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (Kashmir) had all become members of the Turabi-led Popular International Organization (PIO), and, in this capacity, provided assistance to, and closely cooperated with, Islamists from Egypt, the Hizbullah in Lebanon, FIS in Algeria, and NIF in Sudan. PIO members exchanged experts and cooperated in joint support and training activities.

In the early-summer of 1992, some 200 highly-trained and well armed Afghan Mujahideen infiltrated into Indian Kashmir in order to assist in what was by now a full blown armed struggle. They are directly responsible for the increase in violence in Kashmir, in itself a part of a concentrated effort sponsored and backed by the ISI.
Another group of 300 Afghans in command of a larger force of Pakistani-trained Kashmiris are waiting in Pakistani Kashmir for the opportune conditions in order to infiltrate into Indian Kashmir and open a new terrorist front.....

ISI's vast and highly experienced terrorist support infrastructure, tempered by years of assistance to such regional armed struggles as those in Afghanistan and India, is increasingly expanding its operations to include and sponsoring of global Islamist terrorism. At present, the Armed Islamic Movement supports and trains Islamist terrorists and fighters for Jihads throughout the world from centers in Afghanistan and Pakistan.